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ABSTRACT
A RECORD OF THE DEFENCE OF XIANGYANG’S CITY WALL, 1206-1207
SEPTEMBER 2009
JULIE JANE AVERY, B.A., BATES COLLEGE
M.A. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Alvin P. Cohen
This thesis presents an original annotated translation of Xiangyang shou cheng
lu 襄陽守城錄 [A Record of the Defense of Xiangyang’s City Wall] written by Zhao
Wannian (ca. 1169-1210) in 1207. In this record, Zhao, a low ranking official in the
Song army, describes the events of a two and half month siege imposed upon the city
of Xiangyang by invading Jin troops. Currently the only other full translation of this
text that is available is in German by Herbert Franke and can be found in Studien und
Texte zur Kriegsgeschichte der südlichen Sungzeit that was published in 1987. In
addition to my translation, an overview of this event in the war between Song and Jin
(1206-1208) as well as an overview of Xiangyang’s strategic geographic location is
included in the introduction. A copy of the Yue ya tang edition of the text is provided
in the appendices, along with an index of names which appear in the text, an
explanation of the translation of titles, a glossary of weapons, a glossary of place
names, and supplementary maps and photographs.

Key words: Xiangyang, Zhao Wannian, Zhao Chun, Wanyan Kuang, Southern Song
warfare
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The focus of this thesis is the annotated translation of a diary completed in
1207 by a low ranking military officer in the Southern Song army named Zhao
Wannian 趙萬年 (ca. 1169- ca.1210),1 titled A Record of the Defense of Xiangyang’s
City Wall, (Xiangyang shou cheng lu 襄陽守城錄; hereafter referred to as XYSCL).
This diary provides a firsthand account of the siege of Xiangyang by Jin forces that
lasted from late 1206 to early 1207.
The diary is particularly striking because the author’s experience seems to be
closer to that of an average citizen than to the experience of an elite. Zhao Wannian
never attains a high military rank and his literary works remain widely unknown.
Although he shares the same surname as the rulers of the Song dynasty, there are no
indications that he held a strong connection to the ruling family. His middle-of-thebarrel point of view is nearly absent from official records, and so the diary presents us
with minor characters and deeds that would otherwise have gone unrecorded. In
addition, Wannian’s diary is very detailed and provides a window into the actual
strategies and siege tactics used during the early thirteenth century,2 as compared to
the theoretical strategies and tactics suggested by Song period military manuals.

1

These approximate birth and death dates of Zhao Wannian are from the title of Herbert Franke’s
“Kriegsdichtung der Sung-Zeit: Die ‘Gedichte aus dem Stabszelt’ (Pei-wo chi) des Chao Wan-nien (ca.
1169- ca. 1210).” I do not know what sources Franke used to estimate these dates, nor have I personally
been able to date him so precisely.
2

I refer to the author, Zhao Wannian, throughout this text by his given name, Wannian, rather than his
surname, Zhao. This is to avoid confusion with the main figure featured in his diary, Zhao Chun, who
shares his surname.

1

Perhaps most importantly from the reader’s perspective, Wannian’s diary is full of
action. Lists of equipment and casualties are interspersed with human interest
details—from the commander who was almost eaten by his subordinates to the comet
that foreshadowed the Song victory by falling into the enemy camp. Wannian’s
account allows us to see the events, from his perspective, of a siege that took place
eight-hundred years ago, and activates our imagination to consider the life of an
ordinary officer in early thirteenth century China.
Herbert Franke has done extensive work on the XYSCL, especially in Studien
und Texte zur Kriegsgeschichte der südlichen Sungzeit (1987), which includes his
annotated German translation of the diary. Franke also includes a translation of the Bi
wo ji 裨幄集, a collection of poems and letters which is the only other known extant
work by Zhao Wannian.3 Unfortunately, I am not yet able to read German, and thus I
was only able to utilize the bibliographies, appendices, and pick through the indices
and table of contents of these valuable sources. Franke has also published some
excellent sources in English that directly discuss the XYSCL. His “Siege and Defense
of Towns in Medieval China” (1974), uses sources from the late 900s to the mid 1700s
to discuss “Preparations for Defense” (pp. 152-161), “Weapons and Tactics” (pp. 161179), and illustrates the principles outlined in these sections with “Three Sieges of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries” (pp. 179-192), one of which is the siege of
Xiangyang from 1206-1207 (pp. 181-185). Franke’s conference paper, “Warfare in

3

Two different versions of the Bi wo ji are preserved within the Si ku quan shu. The edition which
Franke translates seems to have been longer and more complete than either of these. His bibliography
states that the edition he uses comes from “Manuskript Academia Sinica, Taibei, Institute of History
and Philology.” I have been unable to access a copy of this edition.

2

Medieval China: Some Research Problems” (1986), though unpublished and not for
citation, is very illuminating and can be obtained from the University of Hong Kong.
Corinna Hana also references the XYSCL in her 1970 dissertation titled Bericht
Über Die Verteidigung Der Stadt Tê-an, a German translation of a record of the siege
of De’an, which occurred at the same time and roughly 110 miles away from
Xiangyang.4 Charles Peterson, in a review of Hana’s book, reports that she includes
information on the relations between the Song and Jin states during the early thirteenth
century, on the 1206-1208 war itself (“becoming the fullest account we have in
western literature”), and on Chinese towns and their defense.5 Joseph Needham uses
the XYSCL as a primary source for his Science and Civilisation in China sections on
“Missiles and Sieges” and “The Gunpowder Epic,” and on pages 168-169 of the latter
section, translates selections of the diary into English.
Fang Chenghui has published a most helpful, punctuated, typeset (simplified
characters), edition of XYSCL with collation notes on the four extant editions of the
XYSCL.6 There are several places in the text where I disagree with Fang’s punctuation,
and I have noted some of these variations within my translation. With the exception of

4

Except for transcriptions in the titles of published articles and books, pinyin is used throughout this
thesis. Apostrophes are also inserted in several place names to avoid confusing them with English
words.
5

Peterson, 216.

6

Editions of XYSCL are in Zhi hai 指海, Yue ya tang cong shu 粵雅堂叢書, Bi ji xiao shuo da guan 筆
記小説大觀, and Cong shu ji cheng chu bian 叢書集成初編. A punctuated version of the XYSCL can
also be found on a website sponsored by “The Network of Yue Fei Research and Records” 岳飞研究文
献网 and “The Forum on Yue Fei and Song dynasty History and Culture” 岳飞-宋代历史文化论坛.

3

Fang, I have not found any serious, modern, Chinese scholarship which focuses on
this text, though several articles refer to it.7
Currently there is no full English translation of the XYSCL available and
English sources regarding the strategic importance of Xiangyang in the 1206-1208 war
between the Jin and Song states are very limited. While not attempting to supercede
the work of Franke and Hana, this thesis provides a wider audience access to this
fascinating text and time period and adds a new perspective to the text. More than
twenty years after Franke’s translation and nearly forty years after Hana’s dissertation,
I have access to more research tools, such as the searchable Siku Quanshu, as well as a
larger body of scholarship.

The Start of the Southern Song and the Strategic Position of Xiangyang
To place Zhao Wannian’s Record of the Defense of Xiangyang’s City Wall into
context, I first outline the political history of the period to introduce the key players,
and weave in the geographical significance of Xiangyang’s location.
After the Jin state, founded by Jurchen nomads from the north, captured the
Northern Song capital of Kaifeng in early 1127, hundreds of thousands of Chinese
refugees fled south.8 Fighting continued between the Song and Jin dynasties,
particularly in the Huai River region, until oath letters were finally exchanged between

7

For example, Wang Cengyu 王曾瑜 (1994), Tang Zhaomei 唐兆梅 (1994).

8

In her history of China, Valerie Hansen notes that “An enormous number of people fled to the south…
in the early twelfth century. Hundreds of thousands of people, including twenty thousand high officials,
tens of thousands of their office staff, and over four hundred thousand military and their families moved
to the new capital of Hangzhou and its surrounding towns” (p. 281).

4

the two courts in 1141-1142.9 This peace agreement, which was unfavorable to the
Song, normalized trade relations and marked the boundaries of the two states. “The
Huai river became the border between the two states, the annual tribute [gong 貢] was
fixed at 250,000 taels of silver and 250,000 bolts of silk, and the Song had to declare
themselves vassals of the Jin.”10 The language of the treaty, deeply humiliating to the
Song, reveals just how hard pressed the court must have been after more than a decade
of resistance to the Jin.

Figure 1: Map of Northern Song circa 1111 CE. (Based on Tan, maps 3-4).
9

In “Treaties Between Sung and Chin,” Franke explains that Chinese “treaties” consisted of “two
parallel unilateral declarations” (p. 57), and thus I adopt his term, “oath letter,” to describe the peace
agreement.
10

Franke, “Treaties,” p. 76. The border between the two states is defined specifically within a draft of
the short version of the Song oath written in 1141, which Franke translates:
…the border to be drawn henceforth should take the middle course of the Huai river as the
border-line. In the west the two prefectures of Tang and Deng will be ceded and shall belong to
your superior state. The border will be 40 li south and south-west of Deng prefecture. What
belongs to Deng prefecture beyond 40 li in the south and southwest shall all belong to the
military district of Guanghua and become [part of] the prefectures and military districts along
the borders of our insignificant state” (Franke, “Treaties,” p. 78).
Note that these locations all become critical during the later Song-Jin conflict of 1206-1208.

5

Figure 2: Map of Southern Song circa 1142 CE. (Based on Tan, maps 42-43).

Peace lasted until the failed invasion in 1160 when the Jin ruler, “Prince
Hailing,” tried to take the Southern Song capital (located at present day Hangzhou).
Prince Hailing is characterized as being extremely intelligent and brutally violent, and
was “obsessed” with crossing the Yangtze River. After being assassinated by his own
frustrated generals in 1161, he was not even given the traditional posthumous temple
title of an emperor.11 Franke states that the resulting 1164-1165 peace treaty “brought
some improvements for the Song. The term gong, ‘tribute,’ was replaced by bi [幣
‘valuables’]; the payments were reduced from 300,000 to 250,000 taels of silver and
11

Mote, pp. 232-233.

6

bolts of silk;12 instead of the relation vassal-overlord the pseudofamily relation of
younger uncle (Jin) and nephew (Song) was adopted.”13 Once again “normal”
relations between the Song and Jin states returned and lasted for roughly forty years.
During all of these military interactions between the Song and Jin states, the
city of Xiangyang and its surrounding area played a key role. The twin cities of
Xiangyang and Fancheng (now collectively called Xiangfan), are located in modern
Hubei Province on the southern and northern banks of the Han River, just upstream
from where the Tangbai River enters the Han. They are at the center of the Han River
valley, with the Qinling Mountains to the northwest, the Daba Mountains to the
southwest, and the Jiang-Han plains extending east and south. Xiangyang and
Fancheng are also nearly at equal distances between China’s two most important
rivers—the Yellow River in the north and Yangtze River in the south.
Xiangyang’s location on the Han River is the main reason for its importance.
The Han is the largest southward flowing tributary of the Yangtze, and Xiangfan has
long been the most heavily fortified area along the Han. Thus, after a vessel passes
south of Xiangfan, it is a relatively easy journey to present day Wuhan, where the Han
River meets the Yangtze. Once on the Yangtze, a vessel then has easy access to any
point from Chongqing to the eastern coast. Therefore, an army in control of
Xiangyang and Fancheng can easily control north-south movement to and away from
China’s main central waterway.

12

I am confused by this part of Franke’s statement. Above, he states that the payments were originally
set at 250,000 taels and bolts, not 300,000.
13

Franke, “Treaties,” p. 81.

7

Figure 3: Modern Location of Xiangfan and surrounding area. (Based on CIA, 1979).

In addition to using the Han River for transporting armies and commodities, a
network of overland routes have also been available since the early days of China’s
imperial history. Xiangyang was directly connected to Nanyang and Jingzhou during
the Qin dynasty [221-207 BCE]. A road from Xiangyang to Chang’an (at present day
Xi’an) was constructed during the Western Han [206 BCE- 9 CE], and it was a
relatively easy journey to both Luoyang and Kaifeng. Thus, because of its location
along both water and overland routes, Xiangyang has always been an important stop
for travelers, particularly those headed north or south.

8

Figure 4: Early roads connecting Xiangyang and Fancheng to Kaifeng and Xi’an (Chang’an). (Based on
Needham, 28. Civil Engineering, fig. 711).

The city of Xiangyang was especially important during the Southern Song
dynasty. Located approximately 50 km from the boundary drawn in 1141 between the
Song and Jin States, when sailing south from the Jin border along Han tributaries,

9

Xiangyang would be the first major city encountered. Because part of the Song
imperial family had managed to escape the Jin and flee south to establish their capital
at Lin’an (present day Hangzhou), the Yangtze River system became a virtual
highway to the capital. Northern tributaries of the Han River reached into enemy
territory to the north of Xiangyang, and the Han River was the largest northern
tributary of the Yangtze. Thus the city of Xiangyang located at a sharp bend in the
river, held a position of extreme military importance. In a letter to the court, Ezhou’s
Supreme Commandant of the early 1160s, Wu Gong, clearly states this, saying:
“Jingnan represents the gateway to Wu and Shu, and Xiangyang
represents Jingzhou’s fence, protecting and guarding [the area] upstream,
[therefore] it is called a strategic area. If we abandon it and do not defend
it, than this [is like] removing the fence ourselves. Moreover, Xiangyang
is backed by mountains and secures the Han, and [it’s] fertile soil [extends] for
a thousand li…”14
Wu Gong’s words not only speak of Xiangyang’s strategic military position, they also
point out Xiangyang’s valuable natural resource—arable land. The combination of
fertile soil and warm climate makes the area around Xiangyang excellent for growing
crops. Unfortunately, during the Southern Song the land around Xiangyang suffered
from the frequent fighting between the Song, Jin, and later the Mongols. Although
many farms were deserted, the area that was farmed produced two grain harvests a
year—one of rice and the other of wheat. In addition to exporting grain, the area also
produced a wide variety of vegetables and fruits (including watermelon, which had

14

(Xu zi zhi tong jian, ch. 134, p. 3565). This letter was written in 1161 during Prince Hailing’s
invasion of the Song. Wu Gong had been ordered to retreat from Xiangyang if conditions changed and
it appeared the city could not defend itself. In this letter, Wu Gong argues against these orders.

10

just been introduced to the area).15 Mulberry leaves (fed to silkworms) were also a
valuable crop, and Xiangyang was famous for its bai hu 白縠, a type of white silk
crepe.
Because Xiangyang is located along convenient transportation routes, it has
also been a vital link for trade and is a key economic center. During the Northern Song,
Xiangyang’s location was in the interior of the state. However, when the capital
moved southeast at the start of the Southern Song, Xiangyang suddenly found itself
both a border city and a stop on the route for merchants involved with interstate trade.
One of the most important exports of the Southern Song was tea, and although tea was
not produced in Xiangyang prefecture itself, tea was produced in nearby Jiangling,
Xingguo Military Prefecture, Jinghu, and Guizhou.

Figure 5: Tea growing regions around Xiangyang
15

Hubei tong shi: Song Yuan juan, p. 100.

11

Trade between the Jin and Southern Song was highly regulated. Licensed
markets were set up on both sides of the border. Franke notes that the main center of
trade for the Song was the county town of Xuyi 盱眙, located where the Bian River
entered the Huai River, while the main center of trade for the Jin was located in
Sizhou 泗州.16 Altogether Song and Jin had twenty-two licensed markets along the
border.17
Franke continues, “For both states, foreign trade was a sort of state monopoly.
Unauthorized transactions were forbidden, and Song goods were sold to Jin merchants
at fixed prices through the government…”18 It was perhaps these strict regulations that
encouraged smuggling. In his article titled, “Tea Production and Tea Trade under the
Jurchen-Chin Dynasty,” Hok-lam Chan explains:
It is not difficult to account for the burgeoning illicit traffic between Jin
and Song despite the imposition of the government monopoly on mutual trade
upon the conclusion of the peace settlement. This is because, first of all, the
existing institutional framework on trade was too rigid to allow a sufficient
flow of commodities to meet the needs of the other side. Song faired much
better in her demands because of the ample resources in south China, but Jin
was heavily dependent on Song for many items of daily necessities and raw
materials. In the second place, not withstanding the mutual agreements, Jin did
not acquire what she wanted on a regular basis because the Song court
deliberately restricted the export of many of her desired commodities as an
economic and political bargain, and Jin often had to pay a higher price for her
imports which was often fixed arbitrarily by Song in order to reap an
handsome profit. This imbalance between supply and demand, therefore, posed
an acute problem to Jin, and her pressing needs thus induced the Song
16

Franke, “The Chin dynasty,” p. 298.

17

The other licensed border markets of the Song were: Chuzhou 楚州, Huaiyin County 淮陰縣, Anfeng
Military Prefecture 安豐軍, Huoqiu county 霍丘縣, Xinyang Military Prefecture 信陽軍, Zaoyang
Military Prefecture 棗陽軍, and Guangzhou 光州. Those in Jin included: Shouzhou 壽州, Yingzhou 潁
州, Caizhou 蔡州, Tangzhou 唐州, Dengzhou 鄧州, Fengxiang Prefecture 鳳翔府, Qinzhou 秦州 ,
Gongzhou 鞏州, Taozhou 洮州, and Mizhou 密州 (Chan, p. 111).
18

Franke, “The Chin dynasty,” p. 298.

12

merchants to smuggle valuable goods to the north, sometimes with implicit
encouragement from Jin government officials as circumstances warranted.
Finally, the private merchants wanted a greater share of profit from their
transactions, not only to avoid the heavy government taxes on trade through
the border markets, but also to benefit directly from the attractive prices
offered by their counterparts by delivering the needed commodities. These
circumstances therefore provided strong incentive to private individuals for
indulging in illegal transactions across the border, and both governments had
failed to deter such activities despite the imposition of heavy fines and severe
punishment during this long period of peaceful co-existence.19
Chan also notes that the preferred smuggling route was along the Han and Huai
Rivers.20 Therefore, Xiangyang must have been a popular stop for both legal and
illegal traders alike. Indeed, Wannian mentions in his diary, that the city is able to
supplement its government forces with members of the “Tea Merchants’ Army.”
Clearly the tea merchants were prominent members of society whose goods (and
persons) needed protecting!
The city of Xiangyang was not a city that could be passed up in any Jin led
campaign against the Southern Song. The Han River extended into Jin territory,
making an ideal path for the Jin army’s supply lines. In addition, since the area around
Xiangyang was agriculturally productive, if the Jin occupied Xiangyang, they would
not only be able to transport supplies through Xiangyang, but would also be able to
procure supplies from Xiangyang. This would be highly advantageous to the Jin state,
saving it both energy and money. Likewise, it was essential that the Song keep control
of Xiangyang and the transportation routes along the Han River if the court was to
protect its capital in Lin’an.

19

Chan, p. 115.

20

Chan, p. 115.

13

Figure 6: Licensed border markets during the Southern Song. Note that the Jin markets of Qinzhou,
Gongzhou, Taozhou, and Mizhou are too far west to be pictured here. Xiangyang is only on the map for
reference- it was NOT a licensed border market.

14

The 1206-1208 War
From the peace settlement with the Jin in 1165, the area around Xiangyang
enjoyed relative peace for over forty years (with the exception of an attack on
Fancheng by the Mongols in 1188).21 However, on June 14, 1206, the Southern Song
government circulated a declaration of war against the Jin throughout their domain.
Franke states that the declaration “is a document combining moral indignation and
accusations against the [Jin], with the assertion that the [Jin], through their evil actions,
and incompetence, had lost the Mandate of Heaven and thus the legitimate claim to
rule their country.”22 But why did the Song government make these accusations? What
led to intensified hostilities after over forty years of relative peace? According to the
studies by historians Richard Davis, Herbert Franke, Corinna Hana, and F.W. Mote,
the Song declaration of war stemmed more from general resentment towards the Jin in
the Song court, as well as the machinations of the Song’s chief councilor, than from
any new conflict with the Jin.
Because many Southern Song families had experienced personal loss during
previous wars with the Jin, there was a general feeling of hostility towards their
northern neighbor. In the early 1200s, those between the ages of fifty and sixty would
have remembered the failed invasion of Jin Prince Hailing. There may have even been
some still living who vaguely remembered the unrest before the first treaty between
the Song and Jin in 1141. Certainly everyone would have at least heard family stories
about the terrifying times of uncertainty brought on by the initial Jin invasion. As the
21

Xing, Jin, and Lu, p. 100.

22

Franke, “The Chin dynasty,” pp. 247-248.

15

Song general Zhao Chun declared in December of 1206 (as reported by the XYSCL),
“When [our] ancestors commanded Heyang, [our] entire family was killed by the
enemy. Only my father escaped.” He also wrote, “My revered dynasty holds
irreconcilable enmity [with the Jin state].”23 Mote summarizes that “espousal of the
war policy was meaningful to many…”24 and this included the reigning emperor,
Ningzong, who “privately favored the war policy and would be happy to achieve glory
by regaining some of the Jin-controlled North.”25 These psychological wounds among
the Song population cannot be underestimated as a condition making the Song
predisposed to war with the Jin.
Many historians also assert the placement of Han Tuozhou’s assumption of
near absolute power in the Southern Song court as the main reason for the start of the
1206-1208 conflict. Davis notes:
“Although never officially appointed chief councillor, Han [Tuozhou]
nonetheless functioned as one. From 1197-1207, he reigned as undisputed
decision maker at court, the sole formulator of government policy, arbiter of
bureaucratic disputes, and shepherd of official advancement.”26
In addition, Han was hated by many, for he had condemned the contemporary
teachings of Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and his associated school of “Neo-Confucianism” as
“false learning” and had banned anyone associated with this prominent school of
thought from court. Davis notes, “His lack of scholarly credentials, identification with
the disesteemed Palace Postern, close ties to consorts and eunuchs—all combined to
23
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make him, in the eyes of officialdom, undeniably undeserving of the throne’s
confidence…”27 With all of these negative qualities, the question remains, “How did
Han get into power in the first place?” Davis answers this question as well:
“Lacking an examination degree, it was principally by being nephew of
Gaozong’s influential Empress Wu that Han Tuozhou was initially selected to
serve as supervisor of the Palace Postern (gemen shi).28 The Postern, a quasimilitary office, was responsible for securing the doors of the palace and, in this
way, its chief supervisors could control access to the throne. Han Tuozhou
readily exploited this privilege, as well as his family ties, to emerge as an
important liaison between the palace and court officials in the delicate
deliberations leading to the abdication of Guangzong in 1194. With the
installation of Ningzong as emperor, his first empress, neé Han, was none other
than the grand-niece of Han Tuozhou.29 Such preponderant influence among
imperial consorts ultimately enabled the Postern official to eliminate his major
competitor for court dominance, Zhao Ruyu, and win the imperial favor
needed to become irreversibly entrenched.30
Another factor that may have helped Han Tuozho’s rise to power was that emotional
and mental instability seem to have run in the imperial family. Emperor Xiaozong fell
into deep depression after his adopted father’s death in 1187, and abdicated to
Guangzong in 1189. However, Davis states that “Guangzong had long suffered from
mental illness, for which he reportedly received regular medication. The exact nature
of his infirmity is uncertain, but it became so acute that he, like his father before him,
was incapacitated, this time within months of ascending the throne.”31 As for the next
emperor, Zhou Mi states: “Some say Ningzong was not intelligent and had a slowness
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of speech.”32 If the emperor had such a disability, it is likely that Han Tuozhou
(among others) would have taken advantage of it.
As can be gathered from the paragraph above, Han was a powerful man, but
his position was precarious. Therefore Davis believes that “in light of his mounting
failures in the domestic realm” Han Tuozhou’s “foreign policy offensive was
politically motivated, not an outgrowth of revanchist idealism.”33 Because Han did not
leave behind any written statement, it is impossible for us to be certain of his
intentions. However, the public records (which, of course, have their own biases)
suggest that Han was attempting to distract his opponents from domestic failures by
involving the country in what he thought was a winnable war.
What conditions led Han Tuozhou, as well as others, to believe that Song
would gain from a war with Jin? At the start of the thirteenth century, the position of
the Jin court was perceived to be unstable. For years, Jin had fought along its northern
and western borders with the Xixia state (1038-1227), and this conflict drained Jin’s
military and economic resources. The Mongols were also growing in power and
loomed as an increasing threat. Furthermore, during this same period, Jin also suffered
many natural disasters. The Yellow River dramatically shifted course from north of
the Shandong Peninsula to its south in 1194, destroying crops and causing widespread
famine. Significant flooding (and famine) continued throughout the next two
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decades.34 The cultural policies of the Jin court were also under attack from both
inside and outside their state.35 Therefore, it seemed to some that Jin’s resources could
be easy taking, and Song could recover the territory lost under the 1142 settlement.
The actual war declaration, presented on June 14, 1206, seems almost to have
been an afterthought on the part of the Song court, since the Song offensive actually
began long before the official declaration. According to the “Basic Annals” of the Jin
dynastic history, in March of 1205, the Song army violated Jin’s border and attacked
Qinchuan.36 The following month, they also attacked Laiyuan Garrison. Through their
spies, the Jin court learned that Song was plotting a northern invasion. In response, the
Jin court ordered the Song court to swear an oath that they would withdraw their
troops. Interestingly, the Song “Basic Annals” of the dynastic history makes no
mention of these two incursions into Jin territory, nor does it acknowledge Jin’s
demand for reconfirmation of Song’s commitment to peace.
In May, the Jin chief minister, Pusan Kui, ordered the military to make
preparations to defend against Song. On June 16, approximately one year before the
war declaration, Song attacked Lianshui County (in present Jiangsu) and succeeded in
capturing it four days later. According to the Song shi, on June 23, 1205, the emperor
34
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“One can plausibly argue that the way the Jurchens went about adapting their governing
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military bases of their dynastic power, and so corrupted the tough resilience of their social order, that
their dynasty eventually collapsed? That was the stated belief in China, much debated as early as the
thirteenth century, and it continues to be argued. But in fact the demise of the Jin was not brought about
solely, or even principally, by such internal factors. Despite the continuous changes in the patterns of
Jurchen life in China and in the workings of the Jin dynastic state throughout the twelfth and early
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decreed that all of the various armies, of both the capital region and outlying areas,
were to secretly produce a plan for mobilizing their armies against Jin. On July 4, the
Song shi reports the “recovery” of the industrial prefectures Tong’an, Hanyang, and
Qichun. Shortly after this, the Jin emperor asked his various advisors about their plans
for preparing against Song. Hinting at government propaganda and psychological
preparations for war, the Jin shi states that all the officials reported that they were
“nourishing hatred” within their districts.37
On July 22, the Song emperor granted Han Tuozhou the title “Manager of
Important National Security Matters” and set his rank above the status of “Chief
Minister.” In addition, throughout the summer and fall, Song was busy recruiting and
reviewing troops, enlisting spies from amongst the Jin population, and bribing the
locals for information.38 The Jin shi notes widespread and increasing fear among
border residents that the Song military was about to strike in a surprise attack. Indeed,
in October, Song troops attacked Biyangsi. In November, they burned down
Huangjian; and in December they attacked Luonan’s Gu County, gathered troops at
Xingyuan, and began to harass the border towns of Huaibei Province.

37
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Figure 7: Eastern edge of the Song-Jin Border.
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Figure 8: Western edge of the Jin-Song border.

Unsurprisingly, the lunar New Year celebrations during February of 1206 were
rather tense at both the Song and Jin courts. According to the Song shi, the conduct of
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the Jin ambassador, Zhao Zhijie, who had been dispatched by the Jin court to offer
congratulations for the New Year, “was extremely arrogant.” The “Basic Annals”
gives no further detail here, but Franke notes that “At the New Year’s audience at the
Song court in 1206 (5 February), the [Jin] envoy mistakenly believed that the Song
courtiers had violated the taboo on the personal name of the [Jin] emperor’s father and
protested strongly. This was, of course, interpreted by the Song as arrogant
insolence.”39 The Song court’s Editorial Director, Zhu Zhi, even sent up a writ
requesting that the Jin ambassador be decapitated, but nothing came of this request.40
At the Jin court, it appears that the ceremonies were not much friendlier. After
the Song ambassadors left the court, the Jin emperor dispatched Scribe Grand Master,
Meng Zhu, to go to the Song embassy and deliver the following message:
“At the beginning of the Dading reign period [1161], Emperor Shizong
allowed the Song kingdom to constitute a ‘nephew’ state. I, the [Jin] sovereign,
have abided by the laws preserved and handed down [to me], and [we] have
been reconciled up to the present. How could it be that your state has
repeatedly made use of bandits to violate our borders? ...My approach is to
regard All under Heaven with magnanimity, not small minded suspicion.
Consequently, I shuttered the Pacification Bureau,41 but soon afterwards the
number of robbers and bandits surpassed those of previous days! Recently, a
group of officials have again and again said that your state will revoke [our]
covenant. I, alone, have abided by it. For a long time, I have bent backwards
and forwards, excusing and forgiving [you]. However, I fear that [my] nephew,
Song’s emperor, perhaps does not understand this clearly. If we do not become
lax about what [our states] previously agreed upon, then we may again [be able
to] exchange officials and have something [productive] to say. Even though I
have equal love for the common people, how can I bring this business to an
39
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end? When you, the ministers, return to your state, you ought to carry my
meaning and speak of it in detail to your presidor (ruzhu).”42
It appears that Emperor Ningzong ignored the Jin emperor’s reprimand and did
not take his warning seriously. In March, the Jin shi reports that after arranging to
meet with Song generals at the border, the Jin leaders were ambushed. Violence
continued into May, and the Song attacked Lingbi and besieged Shouchun. However,
in both engagements they were defeated.
It is also in May that we find more evidence of Jin’s suspicion of their southern
neighbor, and their preparations for a larger confrontation. The Jin shi reports that
Commander General Geshilie Ziren dispatched a team of spies to enter the Song city
of Xiangyang in order to “observe the enemy’s secret affairs.”43 It is presumably from
this, that the Jin court learned that Huangfu Bin had employed several Jin locals to
guide his army to attack Tangzhou and Dengzhou. It is upon gathering this
intelligence that the Jin military seems to have begun full scale mobilization.
Song continued its invasion, attacking cities along the Lanjia mountain range
of Laiyuan County, as well as Xinxi, Neixiang, Sizhou, Baoxin, Hong County,
Yingshang, Shouzhou, Qi County, Caizhou, and Jincheng’s seaport. Finally, on June
13, the Jin emperor, anticipating Song’s formal declaration of war, reported Song’s
betrayal of their alliance at Jin’s Altars of Grain and Earth. Although news from the
Jin court could not yet have reached the Southern Song capital at Lin’an, the next day,
(June 14, the seventh day of the fifth lunar month) the Song court, still deeply divided
over this issue, jumped into a formal confrontation with Jin. Song had rallied their
42
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troops under a banner of “moral indignation” and perhaps even vengeance. However,
the luck of Song was already beginning to change.
On June 13th the day before the declaration of war, Song was routed at Caizhou;
on the 20th, Huangfu Bin was “utterly defeated” at Tangzhou; on the 21st, they were
defeated at Suzhou; on July 10th, Li Shuang was defeated at Shouzhou.44 Frustration
over mounting defeats led to the demotion or dismissal of the defeated Song generals.
Davis points out, “…military leaders, including those in strategically vital areas, were
quickly replaced for daring to differ with the special councillor over policy or for
suffering a single defeat. In this way, military leadership fell into inexperienced hands
at the most untimely juncture.”45 In his paper, “On Han Tuozhou and Kaixi Northern
Expedition,” Han Longfu says that many historians seem to place all the blame for
these Song defeats on Han Tuozhou. They charge that he had not planned the war
carefully, and had placed incompetent generals in leadership positions. However, Han
Longfu argues that Han Tuozhou could not possibly be solely responsible. Because
initiating war was so controversial in the Song court, Han Tuozhou must have used a
great deal of effort and planning to maneuver around the obstacles planted by the
peace faction in order to secure a declaration of war from the emperor.46 In addition,
more factors go into deciding the outcome of a battle than leadership. Franke
acknowledges that during the campaigns against Tangzhou and Dengzhou, “Tens of
thousands of Song soldiers deserted and dispersed, due partly to the weather, however.
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It had rained heavily for days; the soldiers had to camp in tents that were soon flooded
by water; and provisions did not arrive in time so that the soldiers suffered from
hunger. The hay for the Song horses was wet and rotted.”47
Because of these catastrophes, it seems that the Song court began to feel that
its situation was desperate even before the Jin had launched its own retaliatory
offensive across the Huai River and into Southern Song territory in early November of
1206. Consequently the Song court made sacrificial offerings to Heaven and Earth,
proclaimed general amnesties, and canceled elaborate banquets.
In contrast, the Jin celebrated victories. After winning back their own counties
and garrisons, they conquered territory of the Southern Song. One Jin commander who
was very successful at the end of 1206 was Wanyan Kuang.48
In November of 1206 Wanyan Kuang took up an army of twenty-five
thousand,49 went out to Tangzhou and Dengzhou, and then entered Song territory. In
December, he brought down Zaoyang, Guanghua Garrison, Shenma Ridge, Anlu,
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Yingcheng, Yunmeng, Xiaogan, Hanchuan, and Jingshan Counties. 50 On December
22, Wanyan Kuang split his forces: one division lay siege to De’an, while the other
went to surround Xiangyang, which he attacked on December 25th.
In addition to outright defeats on the battlefield, while the siege of Xiangyang
was ongoing, the Song general and leader of the entire western offensive, Wu Xi,
defected to Jin and was conferred the title “Prince of Shu.” Luckily for Song, it seems
that Wu Xi’s subordinates opposed his defection, and a month later they killed him.
Still this disruption virtually ruined any hope for Song’s success in the west.
While Emperor Ningzong avoided the palace’s principal hall, and reduced his
meals as a sign of mourning for the losses, the “Manager of Important National
Security Matters,” Han Tuozhou, who was now as unsuccessful in foreign affairs as he
had been at home, began looking for scapegoats. Davis writes:
“A close confidant who had succeeded him as Supervisor of the Palace Postern,
Su Shidan (d. 1207), was among his first scapegoats… Afraid of becoming the
next scapegoat, previously loyal supporters began to desert him. Even neutral
elements at court joined ranks with longtime opponents in the face of
impending disaster… The enemy must have sensed this, for when the Song
emissary Fang Xinru (1177-1222), visited their camp to open peace
negotiations in the summer of 1207, they demanded no less than the special
councillor’s head… On his way to court on the morning of November 24, 1207,
[Han Tuozhou] was seized by guardsmen, dragged to a garden just beyond the
walls of the main imperial palace, and bludgeoned to death. For the first time
in Song history, a leading court official had been slain, purportedly at the
orders of the palace.”51
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Although there is controversy about the details of this plot, in general all of the alleged
conspirators were rewarded with advancements in position.52
After initial successes, Jin’s military also lost momentum. In the Han River
Valley, Wanyan’s troops became weary and an epidemic broke out among them. In
late spring, Wanyan Kuang gave up the sieges of Xiangyang and De’an and returned
to the Jin capital by way of Bian 汴 (present day Kaifeng).
It almost seems as if Song and Jin simply settled their conflict in 1208 because
both sides had exhausted their “fighting spirit.” Franke notes that “no major and
decisive engagements took place after April 1207,”53 yet both sides were still
expending a large number of resources. In addition, the main war proponent on the
Song side, Han Tuozhou, by this time was already dead.
The stipulations for the 1208 peace agreement were in Jin’s favor, although
they did not gain any new territory.54 The Song was required to pay damages to the Jin
for the war, as well as to increase their tribute payments to the Jin by an additional
fifty-thousand ounces of silver and fifty-thousand bolts of silk per year. Lastly, Jin
requested the heads of the “chief war criminals”—Han Tuozhou and Su Shidan.
Wanyan Kuang, one of the chief negotiators of the peace agreement, personally
escorted the heads to the capital on June 11, 1208. Franke states, “…Han [Tuozhou’s]
head was duly dispatched to [Jin], preserved with lacquer and packed into a box. This
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gruesome souvenir of the war was displayed in the ancestral temple of the [Jin]
imperial family.”55

Consequences of the War and Subsequent Events
The long term consequence of this war was that both Jin and Song were
weakened and were already suffering depletion of their resources by the time the
Mongols were looking to expand their territory and consolidate their power. (Temüjin
achieved the title Chinggis Khan in 1206). In addition, the Mongols were able to play
the “nurtured hatred” between the Song and Jin to their advantage. Ralph Sawyer
notes that during sieges, the aggressor is often debilitated “as much as the defender,
tempting third parties to exploit the ensuing weakness…” (Sawyer, Fire, 344-345). In
this sense, the end of the 1206-1208 war might be characterized as a siege—with Song
as the defender, Jin as the aggressor, and the Mongols as the ultimate victor.
The results of the 1206-1208 Song-Jin war can be seen at the local level in the
postwar events of Xiangyang and the surrounding Han River Valley. Xiangfan bin shi
chun qiu provides an excellent summary of recorded military activity within this
region. After the siege, Xiangyang enjoyed a ten year respite from violence, but in
1217 the Jin army invaded the Song again and attacked Fancheng and surrounded
Zaoyang and Guanghua Military Prefecture before attacking Xiangyang. Again, the
city held and the Jin retreated. In both 1218 and 1219 Jin forces surrounded Suizhou
and Zaoyang Military Prefecture but were defeated both times. In 1220, Song troops
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retaliated, attacking Dengzhou and Tangzhou, but were defeated and were chased by
Jin troops all the way to Fancheng.56 In 1231, Mongol troops attacked and defeated
Jin’s southern border troops and chased them all the way into Wan Mountain. In 1232,
the Mongols allied themselves with Song to raid Jin’s Dengzhou, Tangzhou, and
Caizhou. This alliance continued into 1233 when Mongol troops came to Xiangyang,
and joined with Song to make a joint attack on Jin’s Caizhou. However, in 1234 the
alliance had ended and the Mongols returned, this time attacking Xiangyang and
Fancheng. Nearly a dozen engagements are recorded over a fifty year period until1257
when the Mongols virtually became a permanent presence in the area. In 1267 the
Mongols placed a siege on Xiangyang that would ultimately last six years! Again,
underlining the strategic importance of the area, Mote writes, “…the important bastion
cities of Xiangyang and Fancheng had to fall before the Mongols could invade. The
siege of these two cities is an epic of Chinese and of Mongol military history, full of
heroism and spectacular deeds… The Song Chinese were convinced that their great
bastion on the Han River could hold out for ten years if necessary. It almost did
that.”57 By the time of this final siege during the Southern Song era, the residents of
Xiangyang must truly have been masters of defense!
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Records and diaries also exist detailing this famous siege and much research has been done on
the subject. It would be fascinating to look at this well known siege within the context of the two main
periods of attack proceeding it. The recorded use of gunpowder would be particularly interesting as
rapid technological advancements were being made during this seventy year period.
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Commentaries
There are several extant commentaries of the XYSCL. Most are quite critical of
the text. Tan Yingyu 譚瑩玉 (no dates) states that the events of the diary are
“unverifiable” and asks, “How is it that official historians have left [this record]
behind many times? Have they not seen it? Or, regarding it as exaggeration and
lacking fidelity, do they not accept it?” The compilers of the Si ku quan shu state that
“the text has many deficiencies and errors,” and exclaim that the text “is not only
questionable, but also lamentable!” (However, even more “lamentable” is the fact that
the compilers of the Si ku quan shu confuse the 1206-1207 siege by the Jin with the
more famous 1267-1273 siege by the Mongols). The unnamed commentator cited by
Wu Chongyao 伍崇曜 (1810-1863) is a little more balanced in his criticism and says
that although events of the diary seem exaggerated, it is “extremely detailed and
generally reliable.”
The most thorough commentary was written by Yu Jiaxi 余嘉錫 (Qing
dynasty, no dates) and can be found in Si ku ti yao bian zheng 四庫提要辨証. We
should keep in mind that this commentary was probably written more than fivehundred years after the 1206-1207 siege of Xiangyang, and therefore without further
research it is difficult to evaluate the reliability of Yu Jiaxi’s resources. Nevertheless
he provides information not given elsewhere and cites his sources, and therefore I
translate the majority of it below:
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“…I, Jiaxi, note: The Song shi ji shi 宋詩紀事, juan 77, relies on Shi cang shi
石倉詩 and selectively records two of Wannian’s poems. It also does not record
[Wannian’s] place of registry. The Qianlong yi tong zhi 乾隆一統志, juan 334, Fujian
Funing fu renwu 福建福寧府人物 says: Zhao Wannian, whose courtesy name was
Fangshu 方叔 was a person of Changxi 長溪.58 During the Qingyuan reign period
[1195-1200] he passed the military examinations and he served as Xiangyang’s
Supervisor in Charge of Administrators and Managing Officials 制置司乾辦官. In the
second year of the Kaixi reign period [1206], when the Jin surrounded Xiangyang,
commanders stationed there and various supervisors fled in succession. Wannian
regrouped the troops and set up their food supply. He made every effort to assist and
console Zhao Chun in making plans to defend to the death. When they had held off the
enemy for more than ninety days, the bandits fled and left. Because of his merit he
was advanced to the position of Grand Master of Military Virtue 武德大夫. [His
written works] include Shou cheng lu 守城錄 and Bi wo ji 裨幄集.
“Wang Shizhen’s Ju yi lu 居易錄, juan 26 says, “The Secretary of the Imperial
Carriage 車駕主事, Gong Hengpu 龔蘅圃 lent a hand written copy of the Xiangyang
shou cheng lu, one juan, which records the affairs of the Jing-Xiang Campaign
Commander, Zhao Chun’s, defense of Xiangyang during the second year of the Kaixi
reign period of the Southern Song,. At the beginning it records that Student at the Gate
and Gentleman of Loyal Instruction, Zhao Wannian compiled it. An anonymous
postscript says, ‘According to the record, during the Kaixi reign period [the court]
58
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employed troops. [However, the record] only lists altogether two events that are
credible and detail this affair. As for Zhao Chun, we only have the record that upon
burning Fancheng, he fled. We also have the business of Wei Youliang breaking out
of the siege and leaving. Presently the records and comments of “the guest of the tent”
[Zhao Wannian] are like this, [but] in this case, shouldn’t Wei [Youliang] have
recorded them? How is it that official historians have left [this record] behind many
times? Have they not seen it? Or, regarding it as exaggeration and lacking fidelity, do
they not accept it? None [of this diary] can be verified, and that is all.’59
“The postscript of the Bi wo ji, which appears in Huang Guojin 黃國瑾 ’s Xun
zhen shu wu yi gao 訓真書屋遺稿 (the Qin nan cong shu 黔南叢書 edition does not
divide it into juan), says, “Bi wo ji, one juan, was compiled by Zhao Wannian of the
Song dynasty. Wannian’s [written works] include the Shou cheng lu which is entered
into the Cun mu 存目 of the Ti yao 提要.” According to this book, Wei Liaoweng’s
preface claims that the two records Shou cheng and Bi wo originally circulated
together. The Ti yao, however, has Shou cheng lu, but lacks this, [the Bi wo ji]
composition. It is presumably lost. During the Ming’s Wanli reign period in the wu-wu
戊午 year [1618] Wu Shixun carved it. This copy is recorded from Shixun’s block
print edition and has been passed down. This fortunately is in the book collection of
the treasury of the Imperial Prince, and was a manuscript copy from the beginning of
the dynasty. The Ti yao claims that Wannian’s place of registry is unknown. Presently,
according to the various prefaces, we know that [Wannian] was registered in Changxi
of Fujian. In the bing-chen year of the Qingyuan reign period [1196], he received his
59
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jinshi. During the second year of the Kaixi reign period, the Jin people advanced and
surrounded Xiangyang upon the defeat of Huangfu Bin at Tang[zhou] and Deng[zhou].
At that time Wannian, through his position as supervisor and manager, assisted
Campaign Commander Zhao Chun to defend the city. Their policy was first to occupy
the mountains and passes of the southern Wan Mountains and advantageous terrain
and constrict the supply route of the Jin in order to weaken their strength. In the end,
[the Jin troops] let go of the siege.
“The [Bi wo] Ji is divided into prose and poetry. Everything is composed from
the twelfth month to the second month while the city was in danger. Attached to the
end are [details regarding] the execution of Lü from beginning to end, and it records
that Assistant Campaign Commander Wei Youliang made light of the enemy which
led to his defeat. Area Commander in Chief, Lü Weisun plotted to seize Youliang’s
post. Wannian worked out a plan to delay Weisun, and as a result, Youliang was able
to execute Weisun and put down a rebellion. The defeats and losses of the Song
commanders were abundant, and they tore each other apart. On the outside [of the city
wall], Wannian kept the bullies in check, and on the inside he calmed the strife. His
merit is extremely great. He used “Bi wo” [tent of the subordinate] to name the
collection, presumably because the items within the collection are coarse and contain
comments [from within] the army subordinate’s tent. Heshan 鶴山 saw with his own
eyes the difficult conditions [they were under],60and states, “were it not for the
Supervising administrator circulating amongst them, noble Zhao would not have been

60

“Heshan” was the courtesy name of Wei Liaoweng (1178-1237), who is mentioned above.
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able to support [the city] on his own. It is apparent that that which is recorded is not
presumptuous or exaggerated. The Song shi does not write a biography [of Wannian],
nor has this piece been recorded yet. What a pity!
“Present comments: The Song shi also lacks a biography of Zhao Chun who
defended Xiangyang, not just Wannian. The Basic Annals of Ningzong records the
events of Xiangyang, but it is extremely brief. The Xu song bian nian zi zhi tong jian,
juan 13 says, “On the yi-wei day of the eleventh month of the second year of the Kaixi
reign period, the Jin people moved their cavalry and crossed the Han [River]. On the
xin-chou day they surrounded Xiangyang prefecture. Previous to this, the Jin general
arrived and Zhao Chun burned Fancheng. Upon this, he grew worried and anxious and
became ill. He relied on the various generals to unite efforts to defend against and
resist [the enemy], [and so] the city was able to remain intact.” It can be seen that
Zhao Chun was simply a cowardly person who lacked a plan. Upon a strong army
pressing on the territory and employing [a person] like this as leader, it was as if there
was no one there to devise strategies in the army tent. Although various generals
combined their strength, they were begging for defeat! Wannian’s merit is thus great!
The Shou cheng lu probably uses Chun as the chief general, and could not but devolve
merit upon him. Liaoweng’s Preface is not seen in Heshan da quan ji 鶴山大全集
and has presumably been lost. The present Shou cheng lu has already been carved and
entered into the Yue ya tang cong shu, but the Bi wo ji has absolutely disappeared. I do
not know if there is an extant edition, or not.”61
61

As noted earlier in the introduction, Herbert Franke was able to locate a copy of the Bi wo ji and has
translated it into German.
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Further Questions
The extant commentaries of the XYSCL generate multiple questions. Did Zhao
Chun in fact burn down Fancheng? If so, why? Why would Zhao Wannian skip over
this major event in his diary? Why, after successfully holding off the Jin, is Zhao Chun
remembered as a villain (at worst), or as nervous and incompetent (at best)?
Unfortunately, in answer to most of these questions, I can only speculate.
Zhao Chun is mentioned a total of five times in the Song shi. In the first
reference, Chun receives his new assignment as Pacification Commissioner of the
Capital’s Northwest Circuit.62 The second reference reads, “[Eleventh Month], yi-you
day [December 9, 1206]: Zhao Chun burned down Fancheng.”63 After the siege is
resolved, Zhao Chun is promoted to serve concurrently as the Vice Commander of the
Palace Army and the Military Commissioner of the Jiang and Huai River Regions on
October 11, 1207.64 The fourth and fifth references to Zhao Chun are found in the
Biographies of Xue Shusi 薛叔似, (commander of the troops at Zaoyang and Shenma
Ridge),65 and Han Tuozhou (39/474/13776).66 However, these entries do not provide
us with any new information regarding Zhao Chun.
A search for the name “Zhao Chun” in the electronic Si ku quan shu reveals a
few dozen entries. Most of these are relevant but do not necessarily provide any new
62

Song shi 3/38/740.

63

“乙酉趙淳焚樊城” Song shi 3/38/742.

64

Song shi 3/38/745.

65

Song shi 35/397/12092.

66

Song shi 39/474/13776.
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information. Of interest is the Hou le ji compiled by Wei Jing (1159-1226), which
appears to transcribe speeches or edicts of the emperor, and mentions Zhao Chun five
times.67 In two instances it appears that the emperor refuses to let Zhao Chun resign,
but nothing resembling reproach can be found.68 It seems that it is only in sources
written well after Zhao Chun’s time that he is harshly criticized. Ba xun wan shou
cheng dian, compiled by A Gui (1717-1797), includes Zhao Chun in a list of Song
dynasty people who were fired, and Zhao Wannian in a list of people who were
demoted one rank.69 I have not seen anything else that would support this. Other Qing
sources expand on the original Song shi entry and state: “Zhao Chun burned Fancheng
and fled” (emphasis added),70 or alternately, “Upon burning Fancheng, Zhao Chun
was extremely troubled and became ill and irresponsible.”71 More extensive research
about Zhao Chun might be productive, but barring any unforeseen discovery, it
appears that he was only defamed centuries after his death.
Did Zhao Chun burn Fancheng? I have not found any primary sources making
this claim. Did Fancheng really burn? I have not found primary sources that would
indicate this, either. Perhaps a more extensive search of local histories and current
archaeological research from this area could provide clues, but this is currently beyond
the scope of this thesis.
67

Wei Jing, juan 2, 4, 5.

68

Wei Jing, juan 4: “趙淳辭免殿前司副都指揮使不允詔,” and later: “趙淳辭免特轉承宣使不允詔.”

69

A Gui, juan 75.

70

For example: 趙淳焚樊城而遁. Yu ding yuan jian lei han, compiled by Zhang Ying (1637-1708) et
al., juan 109, among others.
71

“…趙淳焚樊城而憂悸成疾賴.” Xu Song ping nian zi zhi tong jian, compiled by Zhang Haipeng
(1755-1816), juan 13.
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Let us assume for a moment that Zhao Chun did in fact burn Fancheng. Why?
This question is perhaps easier to answer. I believe the most likely reason would be
that Chun evaluated the situation and decided that Fancheng was not defendable. Since
we lack maps from the time period, we cannot be sure whether or not Fancheng was
walled in on all four sides. Furthermore, even if Fancheng did have sturdy walls,
Chun’s forces were already spread thin. Did he have enough resources to defend both
cities? If Zhao Chun decided that he could not defend Fancheng, it makes sense that
he would have burned it. As Franke points out, Chinese strategists concluded quite
early that “everything which could be of potential value to the enemy should be
transported behind the walls. A sort of ‘scorched earth’ should surround the town.
Another reason for the evacuation (qing) measures was obviously a tactical one, that is,
to deny the enemy cover for ambushes and to provide the defenders with an
unobstructed glacis.”72 If Zhao Chun had left the city intact, this would have been like
building permanent barracks for the enemy!
Why Zhao Wannian would skip over a detail this important (still assuming that
it did occur), is quite perplexing. The entire date of December 9, 1206 is notably
absent from the diary. Could it be that Wannian was hoping to slip away from any
blame? According to the entry of December 8th, Wannian was dispatched on the night
of the 8th to admonish Lü Weisun. Presumably on the 9th, Wannian would have been
caught up in the ensuing drama (which included an assassination attempt, an execution,
and an “attempted” act of cannibalism).73 This well publicized event, which is
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Franke, “Siege and Defense,” pp. 152-153.

73

See Translation, lines 2Ab-2Ah.
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included in several official histories and other private accounts, could provide
Wannian with an excellent alibi, if he needed one.74
The reasons for why Zhao Chun seems to have been “defamed,” especially
during the Qing dynasty, still puzzle me. My best guess is that scholars misinterpreted
the record. Perhaps some scanned the diary and thought that it was a record of the
1267-1273 siege. (The chief defender of Xiangyang at that time, Liu Wenhuan,
surrendered the city and defected to the Mongols). Other scholars may have read that
“Zhao Chun burned Fancheng,” but, not being military leaders themselves, they did
not understand that this might have been an intelligent (although drastic) defensive
measure. Thus, they simply assumed him to be incompetent. Still another possibility is
that Qing scholars were indirectly supporting the Jin by criticizing Zhao Chun. The
Manchus, non-Han founders of the Qing dynasty, claimed to be descendants of the Jin.
In fact, the original name for the Qing dynasty was the “Later Jin.” Since the diary
portrays the Jin negatively, Qing scholars could have interpreted this as an affront to
the Qing ancestors. Without more information, it is currently impossible to draw a
solid conclusion. Many other areas of interest surrounding Zhao Wannian’s diary have
still not been addressed and would provide excellent topics for further research.
In the second chapter of my thesis, I present my annotated translation of the
Xiangyang shou cheng lu. This is followed by appendices which include a copy of the
Chinese text, and indices of people, official titles, weapons and fortification, and place
names referred to in the diary. I also include some additional maps and photographs of
the city wall and moat taken in 2005.
74

Note, however, that none of the outside accounts specifically list Zhao Wannian as being present!
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CHAPTER 2
ANNOTATED TRANSLATION

[1Aa]1 A Record of the Defense of Xiangyang’s City Wall
[1Ab] by Zhao Wannian: Student at the Gate,2 Gentleman of Loyal Instruction,
Ezhou’s Campaign Commander,3 Special Official of the Managing Joint Vice-General,
and Vice-Pacification Commissioner of the Capital’s Northwest Circuit in charge of
the Left Dispatch of the Reserves

[1Ac] In the fourth month of the second year of the Kaixi reign period [1206],
Jingzhou and Ezhou’s Campaign Commander, the Honorable Zhao Chun, was
commanded to raise an army to defend Xiangyang. On the fifth day [May 14, 1206],
he was appointed to be the Pacification Commissioner of the Capital’s Northwest
Circuit. At that time [Song] Vice Commisioner Huangfu Bin had personally gone out
to lead an army to attack Tangzhou and Dengzhou,4 [but] to no avail. The Honorable
[Zhao] then gathered the dispersed soldiers and ordered them to prepare to take up a
rigorous defense and to ward off [the Jin].
1

In order to aid the reader who wishes to follow along with the Chinese text, I have inserted a reference
at the start of each English paragraph to the page number (1A, 1B, 2A, etc.) and line (a, b, c, etc) of the
corresponding text of the Yue ya tang cong shu 粵雅堂叢書 edition. For the Chinese text, see Appendix
A.
2

This title suggests that Zhao Wannian was a student of someone and perhaps had passed some level of
the civil service recruitment exam (Hucker, entry 3950). For more information regarding my translation
of this, and other titles, see Appendix C.
3

For a map of Ezhou and other places named within the text, please see the Introduction and Appendix
E.
4

For an index of names mentioned in the diary, please see Appendix B.
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[1Ae] On the third day of the eleventh month [December 4, 1206], the emperor
also appointed the Honorable [Zhao] to administer Xiangyang prefecture. Before this,
it had been reported that the enemy was riding and pressing towards [our] territory;
and the people claimed that five-hundred thousand [soldiers] had divided into three
columns and were headed here.5
[1Ag] On the fifth day of this same month [December 6], the enemy attacked
Zaoyang, and Commander-generals Ma Gong, Zhang Hu, and Han Yuan, etc., were all
killed in battle. [The enemy] then besieged Zaoyang, [but] Senior Commandergenerals Yong Zheng and Ma Jin, etc., led the army and fought with all their might.
The siege broke and they left.
[1Ah] On the seventh day [December 8], the army led by Vice Commander
Wei Youliang was at Shenma Ridge when [the enemy] attacked. Because the
Honorable [Zhao] had heard that the enemy’s troops were very numerous, he
anxiously commanded me, Wannian, to go and take his orders to Commander Wei that
he [should] not face [the Jin’s] vanguard head-on.6 Instead [Commander Wei should]
gather the army and, for the time being, return to Fancheng, and take time to make a
plan for this. When I, Wannian, had almost arrived, they had already been attacked by
the enemy. Senior Commander-general Yang Qi and others were killed in battle, [but]
Commander Wei was able to extract his troops from the siege. On the same day, [the

5

The Jin shi “Basic Annals” records that as of November 4th, Wanyan Kuang only had 25,000 under his
command. The size of the entire Jin force that was mobilized on November 4th to reclaim its territory
and attack the Song is reported to be 145,000.
6

From this point on in the text, Vice Commander Wei Youliang 魏友諒 is referred to as “Commander
Wei” 魏帥.
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enemy] attacked Guanghua and Senior Commander-general Zheng Gao and others
were killed in battle. Guanghua’s old stonework was unable to protect [the city].
[1Bc] The Honorable [Zhao] was worried that the enemy would exploit a
victory and that the [Song] vanguard would not be able to hold out against them.
Consequently, he ordered that at Qingye, north of the river, we tie together a floating
bridge. All of the people from inside and outside of Fancheng who crossed the
bridge—soldiers and civilians, old and young—totaled several thousand. When the
crossing was complete, everyone requested that the bridge be destroyed. However, the
Honorable [Zhao] would not comply. He hurriedly pulled out the government troops
from the various places north of the river that had been guarding and blocking [the
enemy’s] approach, as well as the soldiers who had retreated from battle. One after
another, they entered the city wall, totaling several tens of thousands. Then, at twilight,
we destroyed the bridge, and moved the people who resided outside of the [city] gates
into the market area, and demolished each and every house which was near the city
wall. We carried all [of the wood from the buildings] into the city and prepared it to be
used as fuel for cooking.
[1Bh] The top of the city wall was divided into four corners. The Left Army’s
Senior Commander-general from our own squad, Liu Jin, commanded the eastern
corner. The Senior Commander-general of Jiangling’s Left Army, Wu Qiang, and
Commander-General Hu Li commanded the western corner. Jiangzhou’s Senior
Commander-general, Lin Zhang, commanded the southern corner; and the
Commander-general of our squad, Wang Shixiu, along with Chen Jian commanded the
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north corner.7 [We] promptly transported the weapons and implements for the
guarding of the city, and arranged them on top of the walls.
[2Aa] At once, [Zhao] summoned and consulted with Tan Liangxian of the
Public Petitioners Drum Office and with Pacification Administrative Clerk, Zhang
Shike.8 Both of them said that the senior commander-general of the Loyal and Brave
Army, Lü Weisun, had seen Commander Wei at the battle of Shenma Ridge, [but] did
not know whether or not he had survived. [Weisun] desired to coercively take the Vice
Commander’s post.9 Zhao already knew that Weisun was ferocious and cruel, and so
he was afraid that something might happen. During the night, he dispatched me,
Wannian, to go and indirectly admonish him.
[2Ad] At midnight, Commander Wei unexpectedly arrived and Weisun lost
hope [of getting the post] and held bitter malice [toward Commander Wei]. The
following morning, Weisun tried to kill Commander Wei and his son, Pu. In
preparation, he had concealed a sword, and on his way, he killed two guards. However
[Commander Wei’s] attendants killed Weisun instantly.
[2Af] Because Weisun was usually cruel to the troops under his command,
their bitterness had collected [until] the men were no longer able to endure his
orders.10 Therefore, when he was executed, they fought with each other to slice him

7

Senior Commander-general seems to have been a common title.

8

According to Hucker (entry 6353), the Public Petitioners Drum Office was the office which received
complaints.
9

Here I take the word yin 印 (seal, stamp, chop) to symbolically represent Vice Commander (Wei
Youliang)’s position.
10

I think that kebo 刻剝 is a misspelling of kebo 刻薄 (line 2Ag).
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into small pieces, and eat him. Zhao calmed and instructed the commanders and
officers of the Loyal and Brave Army. Soon after that, they relaxed and all were
content to follow orders.11
[2Ah] On the eleventh [December 12], the enemy arrived at Fancheng. They
had already appeared at Qingye, so this was not unexpected. They combined three
columns of armies and galloped back and forth [through the territories] along the river,
[causing] the officials and the people to be panic stricken. There were those among the
officials and their subordinates who deserted one after the other. The Honorable [Zhao]
said to his younger brother, (the Inner Administrator of the Provincial Branch), Hao,
“For generations our family has received the kindness of this state. While our
ancestors commanded Heyang,12 our entire family was killed by the enemy. Only our
father escaped. Today I command Xiangyang, and while on duty, the enemy has
invaded. I vow that I shall die to defend my state.”
[2Bc] The inner administrator, [Hao], responded, “My aspirations are the
same.” [And so] each time the Honorable [Zhao] spoke to the officials and their
subordinates, [he said that] they must strive to adopt the utmost loyalty and die for the
sake of honor. [They must] protect and console the residents and not become alarmed.
[2Bd] The Honorable [Zhao] suspected that there might be enemy agents
within the city wall, and [so] he commanded [us] to search for them. [Following] the
11

As noted in the Introduction, the “Basic Annals” of the Song shi reports that on December 9, 1206,
Zhao Chun burned down Fancheng. Zhao Wannian’s diary does not include this date or this event
within his diary. This omission is extremely intriguing. Presumably the burning would have occurred
while Wannian was off on one of his several errands.
12

I’m not sure if Heyang is a place name, or simply the yang side (north) of the river. Heyang County
河陽縣, as well as Heyang 河陽邑 Town, are located in the southwest of modern day Meng County 孟
縣 in Henan province.
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strict Community Self-defense System,13 the people’s lineage groups were all given
numbers and recorded. He appointed subordinate staff members to patrol [the city] and
be vigilant for fires and theft.
[2Bf] [Zhao] was also concerned that when the enemy came near the city wall,
they would surely have incendiary missiles, and so every thatched or bamboo building
near the city wall, along with nearby storehouses, were removed. [We] continued to
fetch water buckets from the market well for quenching fire, and took them up [onto
the city wall] to protect against fire-arrows. 14 We went back to the storehouses and
fetched more than a thousand earthen wine jars,15 stored water [in them], and arranged
them by the market well. The plan for distributing them had already been determined.
[2Bh] On the seventeenth [December 18], [we] heard that the enemy was about
to tie boats and rafts together at the mouth of Bai tributary and cross the river. The
Honorable [Zhao] rode unaccompanied to the river’s head to see whether or not the
enemy had boats and rafts. When he had reached mid-way, he met Commander-

13

Fang Chenghui (p. 191) explains that this is a reference to the “Community Self-defense System”
(bao jia 保甲, Hucker’s entry 4465), which was initiated by Wang Anshi in 1070. According to Fang,
this system (the 保伍之法) was a common method for organizing families during times of disaster.
Each household was grouped with nine others, and every member of these ten households was
responsible for keeping each other in line and for providing a certain number of soldiers and laborers
for public projects. Hucker, however, might disagree. He translates bao wu 保伍 as “Local Militia
Squad” and cautions that the Local Militia squad “Coexisted with, and [is] often confused with,
militiamen of the pao-jia system...” (Hucker, entry 4503).
14

The Yue ya tang cong shu edition actually reads, “仍取市井潛火水通上以防火箭” But here I choose
to follow the Cong shu ji cheng chu bian as cited by Fang which reads: “仍取市井潛入水桶，上城以
防火箭。” (Fang, 191).
15

Here I follow the CSJCCB and Zhi hai editions of the text which use the character 千 instead of the
character 十. The Yue ya tang edition states, “We… fetched more than ten earthen wine jars.” Ten jars
would hardly seem adequate for an entire city.
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general Dong Zhangzhen who reported that [the enemy], who was separated [from
him] by the river, had called to him and said that the Honorable Minister Wanyan
desired to request negotiations to cease the fighting. Sure enough, just as [Zhao]
reached the river’s head, Wanyan arrived. Because the edges of the river were
separated by a sandbar, the Honorable [Zhao] desired to board a boat and go to the
midst of the river [to talk with Wanyan], [but] the troops said that the enemy was very
deceitful [and so] no one wanted the Honorable [Zhao] to go. [However], [Zhao]
himself said, “I have received the state’s abundant kindness. How can one death be
regrettable?” and promptly crossed over to the sandbar. [They] faced each other about
forty or fifty paces apart. Someone opened a purple parasol and announced the
Campaign Commander and Honorable Minister,16 and there indeed was Wanyan. He
was tall and approximately over fifty years old. The people in front and behind him
followed good order, and he was surrounded [by guards] several deep. The Honorable
[Zhao] only brought along a few people, [but] also spread out a purple canopy and set
it up on the sandbar.
[3Ag] The enemy said, “I convey a call for you to submit [to our state]. It will
not be easy to control [my] troops.”17
[3Ag] Zhao also returned the offer.
[3Ah] The enemy said, “I have already annihilated Zaoyang, brought down
Guanghua, and grabbed up all of Shenma Ridge. In addition, I have sent out men and

16

A purple parasol is a symbol of status.

17

Presumably Wanyan Kuang is reminding Zhao Chun that plunder is one of the motivating forces
behind his troops: If the Jin enter the city there would likely be much death, destruction, and loss of
property amongst the civilians of Xiangyang.
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horses to capture Suizhou, Xinyang, and De’an. How could I hear a call to submit [to
your state]? Quickly signal your surrender!”
[3Ai] The Honorable [Zhao] answered by saying, “Since ancient times we
have employed troops, and there have been victories and defeats. You have an army
and cavalry. I also have an army and cavalry, which are presently prepared. How
could you ever capture any of our prefectures? As for this kind of talk, it is only meant
to scare and intimidate the common people and village farmers. My dynasty’s army
and cavalry have already killed much of the Northern Army downstream at the mouth
of the Qing River and at other places.18 We have burned eleven hundred of your boats.
It is as if you are not aware of this.”
[3Bd] The enemy again said, “The troops that you dispatch to fight are without
renown.”
[3Bd] Zhao answered saying, “Our two countries have been on good terms for
many years. My court also wants peace and respite. [This conflict] has only [come
about] because of the commercial interactions between the south and north, for when
merchants travel to buy and sell, sometimes they produce bitter feuds, to the extent of
harming one another!19
“[3Bf] My imperial court once sent down an imperial proclamation agreeing to
keep the frontier peoples within its bounds. If there is anyone who often crosses the

18

The “northern army” (北军) is a diplomatic reference to the Jin army. The use of this neutral term
suggests that Zhao does not want to directly insult Wanyan.
19

Here Zhao seems to be blaming the merchants for the unrest that exists between the Song and the Jin.
Zhao’s claim deserves further research.
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northern border, according to military law, he is to be sentenced and beheaded.20 But
because small-minded people enjoy disorder, and the southern and northern people
both loot and plunder each other’s cattle and horses—this has provoked all the trouble.
Consequently, we have arrived at today’s [conflict].”
[3Bh] The enemy spoke again, “Everything is Huangfu Bin[‘s fault].”
[3Bh] Zhao responded, “The real cause is others’ tolerance and sheltering of
these affairs! The imperial court has already exiled [him] far away beyond the sea.”21
[3Bi] The enemy said, “Then properly submit [to our state], and speak clearly
[about it].” He added, “I have received my emperor’s sacred decree that I shall not kill
the civilians of the southern frontier.”
[4Ab] Zhao responded, “You have already killed a great number of our border
people! How can you deny it and say that you have not killed them?”
[4Ab] The enemy said, “Never [have I killed them]! Everyone is going about
their business peacefully, and the families [of our two sides] are very close; they are a

20

Hok-lam Chan writes: “Provisions of severe punishment, including the death sentence, were
established against individuals violating the [trade] regulations in order to deter smuggling at the
expense of the government and benefiting the other side as well as prevent spies from entering the
country.”
21

I am not sure what is implied by hai wai 海外, which I translate here as “beyond the sea.” There is no
evidence in the Song shi that Huangfu Bin was exiled “beyond the sea.” The “Basic Annals” records
that he was demoted three ranks on July 18, 1206 and another five ranks on July 31. There is no
mention of his exile except in the biography of Liu Jia 劉甲 (1142-1214), (Song shi, juan 397, p.
12092), which states that Huangfu Bin was exiled to Nan’an Garrison 南安軍. (No date is provided).
(The only place name that I can find for Nan’an Garrison that was used during the Song dynasty is
located in present day Dayu County 大庾縣, Jiangxi Province. This seems like an unlikely place for
“exile,” because the area is not particularly remote. Perhaps it is more likely that Nan’an stands for “the
southern pacified [region]”—a Chinese dominated part of northern Vietnam. This area is remote, and
many Chinese sent there soon died from malaria).
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single family.”22 He added, “At the eastern end, starting from Hai[zhou] and the
Si[zhou],23 to the western end at Chuan and Shu,24 our northern army has two or three
million troops and horses. The two forces together will take your prefectures, and
upon securing them, they will come [here]. Although Xiangyang has a city wall, you
cannot rely on [it]. If you submit [to our state] as I, the Chief Pacification
Commissioner, have clearly stated, then wouldn't this be to observe Heaven’s intent? I
have received the order to capture Xiangyang. Furthermore, I observe that many
people of Xiangyang have personally made known their [desire for] early surrender. If
you surrender quickly, I will not enter the walls of Xiangyang Prefectural city, and
will personally turn back.”
[4Ah] Zhao loudly rebuked him saying, “Each [man] serves his own ruler. It is
only proper for me to die for the defense of [my] state! What reason do I have to
surrender? I have only the precedent of Wei Xiaokuan.25 You have an army and
cavalry. I also have an army and cavalry. In addition, I hold a strategic pass to the
Yangtze and have a limitless number of warships to deal with your arrival.”
22

According to Hanyu da cidian 漢語大詞典, men 懣 (which commonly means resentful or sullen)
can also be used the same as men 們, a suffix which makes pronouns plural. This reading seems to
make the most sense here.
23

Hai si 海泗 is an abbreviation for Haizhou 海州 and Sizhou 泗州, which are all located near the JinSong border in what is now eastern Shandong.
24

Chuan and Shu 川蜀 are general terms for the areas located in the vicinity of modern Sichuan
province, which is as far west as the Jin empire extended.
25

Wei Xiaokuan 韋孝寬 (509-580 CE) was a general of the Northern Zhou dynasty. He is famous for
breaking out of a fifty day siege imposed on Yubi 玉壁 (located in the southwest of present day Jishan
稷山 county, Shandong Province) by the Eastern Wei general, Gao Huan 高歡. Because of Wei
Xiaokuan’s cleverness and excellent aptitude for manipulating troops, he was able to repeatedly defend
against powerful enemy attacks. For this reason, he was admired and considered a great hero (Zhongguo
li dai ren ming da ci dian, p. 256).
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[4Ba] Wanyan was unable to utter a word. Then, he said, “Submit [to my State]
so that [we all may] rest.” Then he mounted his horse and upon beating a drum, he left.
[4Bb] The next day, the enemy dispatched Recorder Xiang Ming to present
two messages, one from Wanyan together with one from the Vice Controller. The
Honorable [Zhao] did not permit [him] to enter the city walls. [Instead he] dispatched
[his] younger brother, the Inner Administrator, with Administrative Manager Tan
Xuan to accompany the Honorable [Zhao] in opening the letters. Again they contained
“this” and “that”—the same kind of talk [as before]. [Zhao] cast it upon the ground
and loudly cursed the enemy bandits, “What kind of way is this to treat me?!” He
wrote a message answering it, saying:
[4Be] Yesterday [I] entertained the request of the specially-appointed
commissioner, Brigade Commander Dong, [who said that you] wished to hold
a meeting.26 Even though [I] observed [your] manner from a distance and we
were separated by the river, [you] did not seem to be at ease.
[4Bf] [Today] a messenger has come and said that I severely
misunderstood what was meant. [Your] Vice Campaign Commander’s
message reads, “The Honorable Minister [Wanyan] closely attends his position
in office, how can you incite other people to engage in disloyal and unfilial
affairs?”27
[4Bg] My revered dynasty holds irreconcilable enmity [with yours],
[but] rightly takes up the common people’s cause. [Therefore], for the moment,

26

I believe this is a reference to Commander-general Dong Zhangzhen, whom we first met on line 3Aa.

27

Is this perhaps a reference to Zhao Chun’s request that Wanyan submit to the Song state?
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we maintain peace agreements. Over successive years, the state of Jin has
permitted its starving people to loot and plunder our cattle and horses, and has
frightened and harassed our frontier [people]. [You] have sent emissaries to
offer congratulations for the New Year, [but] at [our] court have been without
manners.28 In addition, [you] have interrogated and ridiculed our court’s
messengers! [You] often send out proclamations recklessly adding slander and
insults. How could this be [considered] reasonable?
[5Ab] At Zaoyang and other places there have been small victories and
small defeats [which have become] the military’s routine.29 Nevertheless, your
soldiers and cavalry that have been killed and injured are ten times ours in
number. As for Fu Jian’s invasion of Jin,30 his troops were not small in number.
As for his defeat at the Fei River, this affair is presumably known to you. Your
Honor boasts that your army is large. [If so], why can I not see this? Presently
our city wall is high and [our] moat is deep. We are strongly fortified. We have
skilled troops and fine horses, and we have fully gathered at a strategic place.
As loyal servants of the battlefield, we only know of joining together to repay
our State. We do not know of anything else.
[5Ae] [I] desire that you dispatch someone to report back [that this
message has been delivered]. Because [you], the Honorable Minister, have
28

This is a reference to an episode recorded in the Song shi, ch. 38, p. 739.

29

Since Zaoyang was one of the nine official trade cities of the Song—this could hardly have been
considered a “small defeat”!
30

Fu Jian (苻堅) (338-385 C.E.) was a nobleman of the Later Qin. In 361 he allegedly led 900,000
troops to attack the Eastern Jin at the Fei River (淝水), but was defeated.
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reported this morning’s affair, and since it is not that which should have been
heard, and also should not have been dispatched; for the time being, send
someone here to declare your answer and I shall order that all of your letters
will receive a reply.31
[5Ag] [To] Vice Controller [Xiang Ming] he merely stated, “My reply to you
may entirely be seen in the letter to Wanyan.” [And with that], Ming left.
[5Ah] On the twenty-second [December 23],32 [Courier for] the Pacification
Commision, Xue, brought a message [from the Court] saying that two commanders
did not need to both be at Xiangyang. [Therefore the Court] desired to send
Commander Wei to coordinate action at De’an. At that time, [because] the Honorable
[Zhao] was [also] concerned about Yingzhou and De’an’s lack of preparation, he
dispatched Commander Wei to command an army to go to De’an.33
[5Ba] Because the Honorable [Zhao] determined that the soldiers within the
city walls were insufficient, he consequently raised a flag to recruit the brave and
fierce people among the tea merchants.34 Although there were those who had endured

31
32

I have found lines 5Ae-5Ag particularly difficult to translate. This is my best guess.
The CSJCCB and Zhi hai editions records this date as “the twentieth” [December 21], (Fang, p. 193).

33

Apparently Wei Youliang 魏友諒 (“Commander Wei”) never made it to De’an. He is not mentioned
in the Kaixi De’an shou cheng lu 開禧德安守城錄. The “Basic Annals” of the Song shi reports that on
January 16, 1207, Wei Youliang’s troops broke ranks at Huaquan 花泉 (which I have not been able to
locate) and fled to Jiangling 江陵 (located South of Xiangyang on the Yangtze River). I have not found
any other information on his whereabouts from December 23 to January 16. This requires more
research.
34

Note that these “brave and fierce people” are not necessarily tea merchants themselves, but are rather
armed guards hired by the tea merchants to protect them and their possessions from bandits. The fact
that private guards played a role in the defense of Xiangyang (as well as others cities) is an interesting
detail which, as Charles Peterson points out, deserves further research. It is also interesting that Zhao
Chun never questions the loyalty of this group.
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being exiled and enslaved, none were asked whence they came; and they were named
the Bold and Brave Army. Those that answered the recruitment were drawn together,
and the Honorable [Zhao] magnanimously added a great reward of food and drink [so
that] these men would all be inspired to act vigorously.
[5Bc] Because the Xiang River has many shoals and banks,35 the Honorable
[Zhao] dispatched the government troops to guard them. On several [occasions], the
enemy ordered people to measure [the depth of] the water, but time and again [they]
were forced to retreat by our archers. Coincidently, it had not rained for a long time,
[and so] the river’s flow had daily become increasingly shallow.
[5Be] On the twenty-fourth [December 25], the enemy gathered their army to
ford Xiaofan’s Anyang Beach. While [they] crossed the river, [we] defended the beach.
Our crossbowmen fired in unison, and [our count of] their dead, injured, and drowned
came to a few tens of thousands of people. [In spite of this], the enemy chieftain
showed no sympathy [to his troops]. He spurred them on, and they crossed over. From
the Huaquan Gorge of Wan Mountain in the west, and from Red Bank and Yuliang
Plain in the east, they set down stockades like a string of beads and encircled the
prefectural city. The soldiers and people were terrified. The Honorable [Zhao] was
concerned that the people’s hearts would not be steadfast, and thus he ordered that the
four gates of the prefectural city wall be filled in with earth to show [the people] that
they should die defending [the city], and to prevent the people from harboring any
intent to leave.

35

The Xiang River 襄江 is a local name for the Han River starting from its bend at Xiangfan to the
Yangtze.
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[5Bi] The Honorable [Zhao] reasoned that because the enemy bandits had
newly arrived, their fortresses would not yet be secure, [and therefore] they could be
attacked. [Thus], on the twenty-fifth [December 26], he sent more than six-thousand
men of Dispatcher Lü Shixiong’s division of the Bold and Brave Army to raid and
burn the enemy’s stockades. They rode in boats and met the barbarian army when they
reached the Temple of the Five Maidens. [The barbarians] were driving captives and
livestock on the riverbank.36 Lü Shixiong’s [division] climbed up on the bank to
engage in battle. They seized six horses and rescued more than a thousand civilians—
both young and old— who had been captured by the enemy. At nightfall, [Zhao] also
sent Commander-general Hu Li together with the divisions of the Bold and Brave
Army led by tea merchants Liao Yanzhi, Lu Shizhong, and Zhang Ju, etc., to take a
thousand men out of the southern gate to go to Tiger Head Mountain and other places
to raid [the enemy’s] stockades.
[6Ae] On the night of the twenty-sixth [December 27], [Zhao] dispatched Lü
Shixiong and Commanding Officer Pei Xian to lead more than six-thousand people of
the Bold and Brave Army to go to the river northwest of the city wall and engage the
enemy. They seized two boats loaded with grain.
[6Ag] On the twenty-seventh [December 28], the enemy bandits posted a flag
to the west of the wall. [On the flag] they had written the word, “SUBMIT!”37 and
employed several people to defend it. The Honorable [Zhao] dispatched an audacious

36

Because of its context (see following sentence), I believe that lu ren 虜人 here is being used in its
more common meaning of “captive” (instead of its usual use in this text—a derogatory term for the
enemy).
37

Submit: “zhao an” 招安
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man, Li Chao, to go down from the wall, grab the flag, and bring it back. The
defenders [of the flag] scattered and fled. That night, [Zhao] also dispatched Lü
Shixiong and Pei Xian to command a division of the Bold and Brave Army to go
outside the west side of the wall. [They] rode in boats and crossed to the river’s north,
raiding [the enemy] stockades and burning boats carrying provisions as well as boats
for crossing the river.
[6Ba] On the twenty-eighth [December 29], the Honorable [Zhao] observed
that all of the houses outside of the city walls had been burned down by the enemy
except for an earthen walled storehouse that was still standing. Each of the bandits
concealed behind [this] wall shot at the government troops on top of the city wall. The
Honorable [Zhao] consequently ordered Commanding Officer Xu Jin’s squad of thirty
government soldiers to go out of the city and hack down the wall. However, more than
three-hundred of the enemy’s cavalry made a surprise attack on them! Xu Jin killed
five of the enemy bandits. He cut off each one’s head, and hanging them on a pole, he
brought them back [to the city]. Among [the enemy] there had been only two people in
battle dress—those must have been the leaders.
[6Be] [Zhao] also dispatched Lü Shixiong and Pei Xian to lead a division of
men to ride boats toward the Xiang River’s western sandbar to exchange fire with
several thousand of the enemy bandits. The bowman and crossbowman fought from
early morning until early evening, and the bandits retreated and fled. The number of
dead and injured was very large.
[6Bg] On the twenty-ninth [December 30], spies learned that the enemy
bandits were building a pontoon bridge at the Eastern Ford in order to move [troops]
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back and forth. The Honorable [Zhao] commanded that an old boat be filled with dried
grass that had been soaked with oil. He dispatched experienced sailors to release the
boat from upstream. When it was about to reach the pontoon bridge, they lit the grass
on fire and the boat burned down the bridge. The sailors immediately swam [from the
burning boat] and climbed onto the bank. Again [Zhao] dispatched Lü Shixiong and
Pei Xian to lead their division of men to the Xiang River’s western sandbar as well as
the river’s northern bank. [There], they fought with the enemy bandits, shooting and
causing them to retreat.
[7Ab] On the first day of the twelfth month [December 31], the enemy
dispatched a captive, Liu Bao, to the moat east of the city wall to shout to [those] on
top of the wall. He said, “The Honorable Minister [Wanyan] desires to send a person
to come and exchange words with you. Recorder Xiang Ming will come back
tomorrow.”
[7Ad] [The next day] the Honorable [Zhao] dispatched Pacification
Administrative Clerk Zhang Shike to descend the wall to respond to him. With the
moat between them, they had a discussion. What Xiang Ming said was just the same
as the contents of previous days’ letters. Zhang [Shike] understood the main ideas, and
upon his rejection [of the enemy’s proposal], [Xiang Ming] left.
[7Af] Also on the second day [of the twelfth month], [January 1, 1207],38
several tens of enemy cavalry rode [to a place] west of the city wall. One person came
forward alone, and claimed himself to be “Heaven’s Emissary.” He shouted,

38

Note that this is the same day that the events in the paragraph above took place. It seems odd that the
date is given here.
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“Surrender soon!” and spoke insolently. The Honorable [Zhao] commanded some
heroic men to burst forth from the abatis to catch and kill him.39 They took his head
[and from] below his waist they obtained a wooden tablet strung with a red silk ribbon.
[On it] was barbarian writing that no one could decipher. I don’t know what
constitutes an “Emissary from Heaven.”

Figure 9: abatis (author’s diagram based on Weapons, p. 222).

[7Ai] When night arrived, the enemy bandits transported wood, bamboo, cloud
ladders,40 goose carts,41 shielded passageways,42 trebuchet attacking equipment, grass

39

An “abatis” lu jiao 鹿角 is an obstacle for defense made from felled trees and bushes that are
positioned so that their sharpened branches point towards the enemy. Often these were used in
combination with a ditch (Weapons: an international encyclopedia from 5000 BC to 2000 AD, the
diagram group, p. 222). The abatis was most likely positioned just beyond the city wall (or the moat) as
another layer of fortification. For a diagram of my reconstruction of the defense layout, see Appendix E.
40

“Cloud ladders” yun ti 雲梯 are a type of counterweighted ladder commonly used during sieges to
scale the city walls. They are described in detail in Needham’s Science and Civilization in China,
volume 5, part 6, section 30, pp. 446-453.
41

A “goose cart” e che 鵝車 may have been a type of battering ram used to knock down walls. “Goose
carts” do not appear in Needham’s discussion of siege equipment (unless e che is some sort of
abbreviation for e gu che 餓鶻車, which is translated in Needham as “hungry falcon cart”). The
HYDCD only states that it is a kind of cart used to attack a city wall.
In “Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China,” Franke states that a goose cart (or “goose
carriage,” as he translates it) is a projecting platform on wheels, which the attackers stand on and which
is pushed against the outer wall (p. 170).
42

These “shielded passageways” (Chinese: dong zi 洞子) were probably made from wood and ox hide.
They seem to have been used to protect the attackers from projectiles while they set up and operated
their attacking equipment. Franke calls them an “artificial tunnel” and states that they were “a sort of
corridor built of wood and covered either with planks and boards or with leather which could protect the
attackers against arrow shots” (“Seige and Defense of Towns in Medieval China,” p. 170).
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oxen,43 and sandbags to the base of the city wall.44 The Honorable [Zhao] secretly
instructed the troops and officers of the four corners of the wall to prepare and set up
the gunpowder, arrows, and stones for the trebuchets, etc., and to distribute them
[along the top of the wall].

Figure 10: Cloud ladder (Wu jing zong yao qian ji, p. 437).

[7Bb] On the third day [January 2], while it was still not yet sunrise, the bandit
army arrayed their foot soldiers in the front and their cavalry in the rear. The blockade
[extended] limitlessly in every direction. Amidst the drumming, they emitted a cry,
and as one they gathered together and advanced. As before, we took up the wooden
shields and boarded the gates and windows to screen off and cover ourselves. While
[the enemy] moved and transported their weapons and equipment for attacking the
wall, the Honorable [Zhao] personally instructed the commanders and soldiers to be
solemnly silent and not to make any noise of confusion. We awaited their gradual

43

A “grass ox” cao niu 草牛 seems to be a bundle of grass, (perhaps like a bale), usually used as
incendiary material.
44

Literally “earth cloth sacks,” tu bu dai 土布袋, I have chosen to translate this term as “sandbags”
since they seem to fulfill the same purpose.
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approach until they came within range of our bows and crossbows, and only after this
did we shoot at them.
[7Be] In a flash, the enemy arrows were like rain, and the top of the wall was
like the spines of a hedgehog! The Honorable [Zhao] himself was shot by two arrows.
The number of [arrows] that entered into the city could not be counted. The Honorable
[Zhao] ordered that we first employ the gunpowder arrows to shoot and burn the
bamboo, wood, grass oxen, as well as the wooden [frames] of the trebuchets and other
attacking equipment, that had been carried by the barbarian bandits. Smoke and flames
rose up in all four directions, and the bowman, crossbowman, and trebuchets on top of
the wall fired in unison. As for the enemy bandits who were shot and killed from dawn
to dusk, as well as those who were struck and wounded, we do not know their number.
All were defeated and fled, abandoning their weapons, armor, bows, arrows, clothes,
and other items.
[7Bi] The Honorable [Zhao] promptly dispatched death-defying men out of the
city wall to cross the moat and overtake and kill them. Many [of our men] captured
heads and seized military gear, and burned up their cloud ladders and other attacking
equipment. Immediately we [took up] all of our victories and made them known.
[8Ab] The next day, the enemy’s spirit was broken and exhausted. They
shifted their stockades and moved further back. The Honorable [Zhao] ordered us to
gather up the enemy arrows that were everywhere. From within a temple outside of the
city wall we took more than one million arrows that had been stored there. [Zhao]
rewarded the generals and officers with silver, each according to their distinctions.
The officers’ spirits were greatly raised. In addition, we investigated and discovered
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that many of the injured enemy bandits who had attacked the wall were crossing the
river and heading north. Consequently, [Zhao] dispatched Lü Shixiong and Pei Xian’s
division of crossbowman to take boats to the place where [the enemy] was crossing, so
that we could intercept and shoot them.
[8Af] When the enemy had first invaded our territory, the Honorable [Zhao]
commanded that the Commander-general defending Junzhou,45 Wang Hong, send out
troops to attack Deng[zhou] in order to hamper [the enemy’s movement]. The division
of men that Wang Hong commanded started from Zhechuan and entered Neixiang,46
burning more than one million [units] of the grain and fodder which had been stored
up by the enemy along the roads. They [also] captured the severed heads of Battalion
Commanders Du Tianshi and Duan Shouzhong, etc.
[8Ai] On the fifth, [January 4], the message of their victory arrived. However,
the spy Zhang Hong also reported that the enemy had learned that Wang Hong’s army
had entered the territory of Deng[zhou]. Consequently, they put forth several thousand
of their enemy troops [that were at] Guanghua, and went back from Qingni to rescue
[Dengzhou].47 That night, [Zhao] again dispatched Lü Shixiong and Pei Xian, to unite
with [the troops of] Commanding Officer Shao Shizhong. They followed the
waterway, [and then] split up to raid the enemy bandits. During Lü Shixiong and Pei
Xian’s raid at Xuanma Shoal, the enemy bandits were pushed back and ran away. We

45

Junzhou was the prefecture located upstream from Xiangyang (to the northwest).

46

Dengzhou 鄧州, Zhechuan 浙川, and Neixiang 内鄉 were all located in Jin territory. See figures 7
and 8.
47

I have not been able to locate Qingni. My translation leans on the assumption that Qingni is a locality
subordinate to (and therefore part of) Guanghua.
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seized four ferry boats and one large bamboo raft. Shao Shizhong’s division of
crossbowman fired in unison from above and below the beach’s moraine. A great
many of the enemy bandits fell into the water, and all of the rest, in dire straights, were
defeated and ran away. In addition, [Zhao] dispatched a thousand men from
Commanding Officer Meng Bao, Zhang De, and Liu Yan’s divisions of the Bold and
Brave Army to pass through the Wan Mountains and enter Fulong. [There] we
launched a surprise attack on their rear. The enemy bandits broke ranks and ran, and
many drowned. We burned down more than three-hundred weapons and tools that had
been made for attacking the city walls.
[8Bg] In front of Dongshan Monastery, we also got hold of two beggars. Both
said that among the barbarian soldiers there were those who had looked after each
other and conversed while in tears. They spoke of a Commandant-escort who had been
killed by the Southern Army, [and said] “How can we return home?” [The beggars]
did not know who the Commandant-escort actually was, but how could he not have
been a noble relative serving as a head [of the enemy troops]?
[8Bi] On the sixth [January 5], we investigated and learned that the enemy
bandits were about to come and burn down the abatis that was outside the moat.
Consequently we hid the government troops in ambush within the abatis in order to
prepare for them. Sure enough, several people came straight away to set fire [to it]. A
government soldier, Wang Cai used a spear to kill one person and hacked off his head,
severing it, and at the same time seized [his] flag, spear, bow and saber. [Zhao] also
commanded Wang Cai to go on a difficult reconnaissance to the foot of the Wan
Mountains. There, there were three of the enemy bandits, who were lighting a signal
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fire. Wang Cai captured and killed one person and seized [his] severed head. The
Honorable [Zhao] was pleased by his bravery, and promoted him to the Support Squad.
[9Ad] On the night of the seventh [January 6], [Zhao] dispatched Guo Wang
and more than thirty men from Commanding Officer Wang Heng’s squad of
government troops. They went out of the city walls and burned down more than fivehundred items such as cloud ladders and grass oxen, etc. At that time, there were
barbarian troops within a place called Haizi headed this way, [but] they were chased
by Guo Wang, etc., who captured one bronze gong.
[9Ag] On the eighth [January 7], we investigated and discovered that the
enemy bandits were about to follow the river north and cross to the southern bank.
Consequently, [Zhao] dispatched Pei Xian’s division of government troops to ride in
ships [in order to] intercept and kill them.
[9Ah] On the ninth [January 8], [Zhao] dispatched Wang Heng together with
forty-four men from Head Military Instructor Guo De’s squad of government troops to
cross the moat and burn down more than one-hundred cloud ladders, and also to burn
the grass oxen, bags for sand,48 and other attacking equipment.
[9Ba] On the tenth [January 9], [Zhao] dispatched Dispatcher Yang Jian to
assemble one-thousand people [along with] twenty-five people from Wei Zhong’s
squad of government troops, to cross the moat. They burned down more than twohundred cloud ladders and grass oxen. At night during the fourth watch,49 some enemy
bandits rode in six small ships and floated stealthily from upstream to use fire arrows
48

In this context, I have translated tu bu dai 土布袋 as “bags for sand” which makes more sense than
“sandbags” in this context.
49

The fourth watch lasted approximately from 1:00 to 3:00 a.m.
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to burn the passenger ship below the bank of the north gate. [However], on top of the
wall, Commanding Officer Lü Xing heard a cry come from [guards] on the boat.
Consequently, he ordered the crossbowman on top of the wall to fire together, and the
enemy retreated and ran away.
[9Be] On the eleventh [January 10], [Zhao] dispatched twenty-four people
from Dispatcher Fan Xing and Head Military Instructor Jiang Qing’s, squad of
government troops to cross the river and burn down more than one-hundred fifty cloud
ladders, as well as grass oxen, etc.
[9Bg] On the twelfth [January 11], [Zhao] dispatched fourteen people from
Wang Heng’s squad of government troops to cross the river and burn down more than
seventy cloud ladders.
[9Bh] On the fourteenth [January 13], [Zhao] dispatched Dispatcher Fang Pu,
Head Military Instructor Xu Liang, and the Support Squad’s Sun Xiaozhong to lead
more than thirty people. They crossed the river and burned down more than onehundred cloud ladders. In addition, [Zhao] dispatched fifty-nine people from Lu
Shizhong, Zhang Ju, and Head Military Instructor Xu Gui’s squads of government
troops to go forward to the area around the Wan Mountains. They burned down more
than two-hundred cloud ladders, more than one-hundred wooden shields, and an
uncountable amount of bamboo, wood, and grass oxen. For days, [Zhao] dispatched
troops to burn attacking equipment until it was all burned up.
[10Ac] On the fifteenth [January 14], we investigated and learned that the
enemy bandits had come back to the Ziyang Temple south of the city wall, and to the
Buddhist monasteries, and other such places. Again they were constructing attacking
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equipment. Consequently, [Zhao] dispatched thirty-six people from the government
troop squad of Fang Pu and the Director of Military Training, Zhu Jian. They went
forward and burned down more than two-hundred cloud ladders and seized a mule
together with a saddle and bridle. In addition, [Zhao] dispatched fifty people of Cai
Xiaoxian’s squad of government troops to snatch the large bamboo that the enemy
bandits had piled up for making cloud ladders. More than one hundred enemy cavalry
came forward to chase them [but] they were killed and pushed back by Cai Xiaoxian
and others. We seized their army’s weapons, clothing, and armor.
[10Ah] On the night of the sixteenth [January 15], [Zhao] dispatched Zhang Ju,
LiaoYanzhong, and others to divide into four columns and go forward to burn and raid
the enemy’s stockades. Zhang Ju’s squad led seventy three men from the Bold and
Brave Army as well as thirty-two of the greater army’s crossbowman. They crossed
the river and starting from the Purple Cliff Monastery they went around Tiger Head
Mountain, and raided a bandit stockade.50 They seized felt cloaks,51 clothing, armor,
sabers, scythes, etc., and also took back ten of the captives—both elders and children.
[10Bb] Liao Yanzhong led seventy-two people of the Bold and Brave army to
Shidingzhuan Monastery and other places to raid the bandit stockades.52 They hacked
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If the location that I have for Tiger Head Mountain is correct, it would not make sense for Zhao’s
men to cross the river before going around Tiger Head Mountain.
51

I have not (yet) found the term pizhan 披氊, which I translate here as “ felt cloaks.” Pi 披 means “to
drape over the shoulders,” and zhan 氊 means “a blanket” or “felt.” Note that I believe Fang copied this
character incorrectly, as he uses the character shan 擅 (Fang, 197).
52

Fang (p. 197) notes that the Zhi hai edition within the Cong shu ji cheng chu bian names a Liao
Yanshi 廖彥士, instead of Liao Yanzhong as the leader of this group. It also gives the monastary’s
name as “Dingzhuan 定專” instead of “Shidingzhuan 是定專.”
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off two enemy bandits’ heads, and [captured] two horses—together with saddles and
bridles, clothing, armor, and other military implements.
[10Bd] Sixty-six people from Lü Shixiong’s squad of government troops
reached the area around the Wan Mountains, and burned up more than five-hundred
cloud ladders and battle shields. They also burned up the abatis [around] the stockade,
and chased and killed [the enemy], who were defeated and ran away. In addition, [our
troops] seized more than five-hundred large bamboo poles to be used for constructing
ladders.
[10Bf] Forty-six people of Commanding Officer Ma Anzhong’s squad of
government troops reached Cloud Peak Monastery, and other places, pursuing and
killing the enemy bandits who were guarding the attacking equipment. When [the
enemy] scattered and fled, we burned up more than two-hundred cloud ladders, and
four heavenly bridges.53
[10Bh] On the night of the seventeenth [January 16], [Zhao] dispatched Lu
Shizhong to lead fifty-eight men from the Bold and Brave Army and thirty-one
crossbowman from the greater army to the front of the Cloud Peak Monastery located
to the east of the city wall. [There], we raided the stockade and killed many enemy
bandits. We captured the barbarian soldier, Li Ba’er, alive. He claimed to be Li
Talan’s son.
53

As best I can gather, a “heavenly bridge” tian qiao 天橋 is either a type of cart used to fill in the moat,
or a type of cart for scaling the city wall. For example, in the Song shi’s biography of Chen Gui 陳規
(ch. 377), one sentence reads: 李橫圍城造天橋填濠… Li Heng surrounded the city wall, made
heavenly bridges, and filled in the moat.” The Shou cheng lu might prove to be a clarifying source,
since it mentions heavenly bridges more than twenty times.
In his “Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China,” Franke states that a heavenly bridge
(which he translates “heaven-bridge”) is “a sort of platform mounted on wheels which was rolled
against the outer wall with a number of fighters on the platform. If the platform projected, they were
also called ‘goose carriages’” (p. 170). (He doesn’t happen to mention how he figured this out).
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[11Ab] On the eighteenth [January 17], the enemy took one-thousand cavalry
and put them into ranks west of the city wall. They engaged in battle, exchanging
arrows and stones, with the government troops on top of the wall. While the
Honorable [Zhao] was in the city wall’s tower, he saw one person spur on his horse
and charge out from amid the enemy’s battle array. Holding a banner and giving a cry,
[the cavalryman] lead his troops straight ahead. His will and spirit were fierce and
mighty. The Honorable [Zhao] demanded a crossbow, and personally shot him. [The
enemy] fell off his horse and died. [Zhao] promptly ordered that [the soldier’s] head
be cut off, and it turned out that he had been struck in the left eye. The enemy’s spirit
was broken, and they retreated.
[11Ae] On the twentieth [January 19], [Zhao] dispatched Lu Shizhong to lead
fifty-six people from the Bold and Brave Army, and thirty crossbowman from the
larger army to go to the front of Cloud Peak Monastery. They burned more than threehundred cloud ladders and fifty large planks of wood that were to be used for making
catapults. They [also] killed more than two-hundred of the retreating men who had
been guarding the attacking equipment.
[11Ah] On the twenty-first [January 20], the enemy dispatched Wang Hu, a
general who had surrendered [to them]. When he came, the Honorable [Zhao] was
pleased by his return, and desired to inquire about the actual situation among the
enemy. [Because Zhao] saw that his words and appearance were confused, [Zhao]
suspected that [Wang] had another motive and so he commanded his attendants to
search him. Behind his elbow, they found a purple cloth that was tied [around] fifteen
pieces of silver. We escorted him to the prison in order to make a thorough
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investigation, and it turned out that an enemy Campaign Commander had given it [to
him] so that he would enter the city walls to set fire and serve as a secret agent.
Moreover, he had made a pact to go out from the city wall and report back and would
call out “White Flag Army!” as a signal. The Honorable [Zhao] immediately beheaded
him. Right after this, Li Zun, who had been captured by the enemy returned, and we
learned from him that Wang Hu’s arrival on the previous day really had been to serve
as an enemy assassin. The Honorable [Zhao] said, “My heart is without shame [before]
Heaven and Earth. Were that he was like me!”54
[11Bd] The Honorable [Zhao] learned through investigation that the enemy
wanted to attack the city wall on the twenty-fourth [January 23]. At night on the
twenty second [January 21], sure enough [the enemy] beat their drums and emitted a
cry to the southeast of the city wall. Within the city, all the roof-tiles of the buildings
shook. The Honorable [Zhao] commanded that we increase strict preparation on top of
the wall, and that we were not to make confused racket. At sunrise, we prayed to the
Deity of the Moat and Walls at the various temples. Because [it was] the enemy who
had attacked Xiang[yang] and the Han [River], and injured [its] people, we hoped and
pleaded for Heaven’s help in driving away [the enemy] so that they would retreat and
turn back.
[11Bh] On the night of the twenty-third [January 22], the noise of the enemies’
drums and horde gradually drew closer. At midnight there was thunder, lightning and
a great quaking. In addition it began to rain and hail, and as a consequence the sounds

54

王虎其如予何
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of shouting moved far away. As a result, [the enemy] did not attack the wall the next
day. Was this not a response to what we had prayed for with sincerity?!
[12Aa] From this point on [the enemy] emitted cries every night, yet nobody
knew what this meant. When a person who had been captured by the enemy returned,
he said that the enemy [made] a special cry in the southeast [because] they were about
to [move out] empty [handed] on the west side, revealing that the Besieging Preceptor
surely lacked resolve.
[12Ab] On the night of the twenty-fifth [January 24], [Zhao] dispatched Zhang
Ju and Liu Tian to lead forty-three men of the Bold and Brave [Army] to go to Tiger
Head Mountain and raid the [enemy’s] stockade. [There] they encountered more than
two-hundred enemy bandits! We chased and killed them, and [the enemy] was
defeated and fled.
[12Ad] On the twenty-eighth, [January 27], [Zhao] dispatched Liao Yanzhong
and Lu Shizhong to lead one-hundred twenty men from the Bold and Brave Army to
go out of the east gate and raid [the enemy’s] stockade. When they reached Dabei
Monastery, they burned more than one-hundred cloud ladders. They saw that outside
of the enemy bandits’ large stockade, there was a small stockade [that held] more than
two-hundred people. First we used crossbowman to cut [the small stockade] off from
the big stockade. [Soldiers bearing] tridents and sickles directly entered the small
stockade and killed and scattered the enemy bandits.55 They seized cloud ladders and
assorted items, etc.

55

I translate cha 叉 as “trident” even though I cannot be sure how many tines this weapon actually had.
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[12Ag] On the night of the twenty-ninth day [January 28], [Zhao] again
dispatched Liao Yanzhong and Lu Shizhong to lead men who were part of their squad
out the south gate to raid an [enemy] stockade. They killed and injured many. One
person was captured and the defending group was chased away. Afterwards, we
chopped off the [captive’s] head and returned [to the city]. [Liao and Lu’s squad]
seized saddles, horses, bows, spears, sabers, and armor. They also rescued and
returned six of the young and elderly who had been captured by the enemy. [Zhao]
also dispatched Special Envoy of the River Transport [Bureau] Zhang Chun to lead
fourteen people in ships toward Yuanzhang Beach. They burned and raided the enemy
stockades, and seized five enemy passenger ships. Then they also went to the Wan
Mountains and burned the stockade. They seized and returned twenty-two of the
young and elderly who had been captured by the enemy, as well as clothes, armor, and
other items.
[12Bc] On the night of the first day of the first month of the third year [of the
Kaixi reign period] [January 30, 1207], [Zhao] dispatched Lü Shixiong and Zhang
Chun to lead thirty-five of our sailors to ride boats to Yuanzhang Beach. They raided
and burned down the enemy stockade, and seized three ferry boats.
[12Be] On the morning of the third day [February 1], the enemy piled up and
assembled platforms for trebuchets,56 as well as goose carts, shielded passageways,
and other attacking equipment from the area around Yuliang Plain at the south of the
city. All day, and without interruption, they proceeded directly to the southeastern
56

I am not sure whether pao zuo 砲座 refers to platforms for the trebuchets, or is simply a collective
term following the modern grammar pattern of noun + measure word= collective (as in che liang 車輛,
“vehicles”).

69

[part] of the city wall. The frames of the trebuchets all [had] nine or seven component
poles [to their throwing arms] and altogether there were more than ten of them in
number which were [all] focused on attacking the southeast corner’s resistance
watchtower.”57

Figure 11:

Left—Trebuchet with Seven Component Poles (Wu jing zong yao qian ji, p. 604).
Right—Trebuchet with Five Component Poles (Wu jing zong yao qian ji, p. 601).
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Shao 梢, which I translate here as “component pole” seems to be some sort of measurement, perhaps
indicating the size or strength of the trebuchet. In his “Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China”
Franke translates shao as “lever” (p. 163). However, Needham (with Wang Ling) translates shao as
“component” and further explains: “This terminology has puzzled several sinologists because shao
normally means ‘branch’ or ‘tip’, but a study of the text and illustrations in the military manuals shows
that the word here was applied to the number of component wooden (or even bamboo) poles which
formed the arm when lashed tightly together, or bound with metal bands” (Section 30, “missles and
Sieges,” pp. 212-214). Earlier in this section Needham also quotes Yates, “The arm [of the trebuchet]
itself was probably constructed out of several timbers bound together by iron wire. This technique was
employed to allow for greater strength and flexibility: an arm made from a single tree trunk would be
more likely to fracture after repeated use and with heavy missiles” (p.207). (For a full discussion of
trebuchets see Section 30 in Needham’s Science and Civilisation in China, pp. 204- 231).
A resistance watchtower di lou 敵樓 was a wooden tower constructed on top of the city wall
from which the defenders could observe the enemy. According to Needham, “The towers were built on
top of the ‘horse-face’ foundations like the hoards on the walls, and the latter were recommended to be
7 feet (chi) high in the front, sloping to five feet high in the rear. Each ‘room’, really each section, was
to be one pace (5 feet) wide and 10 feet deep and this was to hold approximately 20 soldiers. If the city
walls were wider, however, the rooms were to be deeper. Across the top of the sections, large boards
called ta tou mu 塔頭木 were laid and these fitted into double posts. The floor was also laid with
timbers (di fu 地栿) and the whole board projected 3 feet from the wall itself. Usually there were two
double posts per section, but up to four could be used. To protect the wood from stone and arrow
missiles, a three-foot covering of earth was tightly packed down on top and a solution of lime was also
plastered on. The rest of the wood was covered with wet felt and the exposed parts of the posts and
floor timbers were covered with fresh oxhide to guard against fire arrows” (Section 30, pp. 340-341,
picture on p. 342). Needham cites Chhien Chi, ch. 12, p. 8-9.
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Figure 12: Resistance Watchtower (Wu jing zong yao qian ji, p. 535, with author added arrow and label.

[12Bh] Their stone missiles all weighed forty or fifty jin,58 and they attacked
and struck the roofed towers.59 There were none that were not damaged. Consequently,
the Honorable [Zhao] used ox and horse hides to make leather screens,60 and we hung
them [vertically] above the roofed towers in order to ward off the stone missiles.61

58

During this time, one jin 斤 was, on average, equal to approximately 661 grams. Thus these stone
missiles would weigh between and 26.4 and 33.1 kg (58.4—73.0 pounds) (Qiu et al., p. 447).
According to the chart in Science and Civilisation (which takes its information from the Wu jing cong
yao and others), a rectangular trebuchet with a seven component arm could fire a missile weighing 125
lbs and had a range of approximately 85 yards (Section 30, pp. 216-217).
59

My translation for lou lu 樓櫓, “roofed towers” comes from Science and Civilization, Section 30, pp.
375-376.
60

According to Needham, who gets his information from the Wu jing zong yao, these “leather screens”
(pi lian 皮簾) were (usually) “made out of tough water buffalo hide 10 feet wide and 8 feet high,
suspended by seven rings from a pole like a mediaeval shower curtain” ( Section 30, pp. 371-373).
Needham translates this term as “leather mats.”
61

Because the trajectory of a missile thrown by a trebuchet is an arc, a leather mat hung vertically
above the edge of the roof would prevent missiles from landing on and crushing the rooftop (provided
the matting extended up higher than the highest point of the arc).
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Figure 13: Leather Screen (Wu jing zong yao qian ji p. 581).

[12Bi] Because the enemy’s trebuchet platforms had been completely covered
by fresh ox hides for protection, and [because] the people dragging the trebuchets
were on the inside,62 arrows and stones could not penetrate [the platforms to kill them].
As before they continued to set up the wheels of the carts, and pushing and turning
they came forward. Towering in form, every trebuchet [had] one platform, which was
like a house several arch-spans wide! The goose carts and shielded passageways were
also covered with ox hide to protect them. The portable shielded passage ways were
linked together, uninterrupted, all the way to the side of the moat to a length of a little
more than a li.63 On the inside [of the shielded passageways] they moved bricks to fill
in the moat and they spread out sandbags, grass oxen, bamboo, wood, and other
materials in front [of it]. The foot soldiers lined up in front grasped boards to screen
their bodies and engaged in shooting the government troops atop the wall.

62

The trebuchet platforms must have been designed to be more like a large covered cart than a simple
(uncovered) platform on wheels.
63

During the Song dynasty, a li 里 would have been approximately 565 m, or about 618 yards.
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[13Ae]64 In all four directions, [the enemy] arrayed themselves, and we could
not count their numbers. Starting from early morning, arrows and stones were
exchanged from above and below the city wall in battle. When night came, the enemy
attacked the wall with even greater zeal, and their army and cavalry would not retreat.
Then the Honorable [Zhao] dispatched more than a thousand men from the Bold and
Brave Army. At midnight on that day each one grasped a short weapon,65 and in
addition bore a bundle of grass on his back.66 They surreptitiously went out of the
small north gate and passed through the sheep and horse wall.67 They [then] split into
two sections. They led one group out from the east gate’s draw bridge, and one group
out from the south gate’s draw bridge.68 Then combining their sections they went
straight toward the enemy. They set fires below the trebuchets and emitted shouts.69
On top of the wall, we also emitted shouts and pounded the drums, frequently using

64

Needham translates selections from the Xiangyang shou cheng lu (13B-23A) in “The Gunpowder
Epic,” (of Science and Civilisation in China), pp. 168-169.
65

I assume here that “short weapons,” duan bing 短兵, include sabers, swords, and axes, etc., used for
hand-to-hand combat, as opposed to pole-arms.
66

Presumably the bundles of grass were to be used as incendiary material.

67

The “sheep and horse wall,” yang ma qiang 羊馬牆, was a low, supplementary wall located between
the moat and the main city wall. The Wu jing zong yao recommended that this wall be “from 8 to 10 chi
high with a parapet reaching 5 chi above that” (Science and Civilisation, Section 30, p. 336). One chi
equals about one foot.
68

Even in the dark and confusion of battle, would not someone from the Jin side notice the lowering of
a drawbridge and five-hundred soldiers crossing the moat—especially if the Jin soldiers were
supposedly arrayed “in all four directions”? Perhaps in reality there were not enough enemy forces to
truly surround the city.
69

Here I follow the Zhi Hai edition which reads “砲下” as opposed to “砲人.” Although ju huo 舉火
often means to light a signal fire, I believe that in this context it means simply to start a fire. The phrase
ju huo seems to be used similarly in line 14Bb below: …舉火燒毀砲座洞子

73

the thunderclap missiles to strike beyond the city wall.70 The enemy was terrified and
they lost their wits—people and horses broke ranks and fled. Each trebuchet [had]
more than two hundred barbarian soldiers below it to haul it, and all of them were
killed by the government troops.71 In addition, we captured alive Company
Commander Wang Tong and others—eight people. We also seized weapons, armor,
saddles, and horses, etc. There were more than two-thousand dead and injured people.
[The fires set by the Bold and Brave Army] completely took over the enemy’s
trebuchets and shielded passageways that were near the city wall, and the flames and
smoke would not subside.72

70

A “thunderclap missile,” pi li pao 霹靂砲, also called a pi li huo qiu 霹靂火球, is described in
Science and Civilisation (Section 30, continued), p. 163-167. A translation from the Wu jing zong yao
reads: “The thunderclap bomb (pi li huo qiu) contains a length of two or three internodes of dry bamboo
with a diameter of 1.5 in. There must be no cracks, and the septa are to be retained to avoid any leakage.
Thirty pieces of thin broken porcelain the size of iron coins are mixed with 3 or 4 lb. of gunpowder, and
packed around the bamboo tube. The tube is wrapped within the ball, but with about an inch or so
protruding at each end. A (gun) powder mixture is then applied all over the outer surface of the ball…”
(p. 163).
71

Note that Zhao Wannian’s description of the number of haulers for each trebuchet is consistent with
the data collected in Science and Civilisation (Section 30, pp. 216-217). According to his chart, a
rectangular trebuchet with a seven component arm would have had a crew of haulers (including those at
rest) of two-hundred fifty as well as two commanders. As many have noted, this is a startlingly large
number! In the same chart, Needham provides the technical term zhuai shou 拽手 and translates it as
“hauler.”
72

Other editions of the text state that “the flames and smoke did not subside until morning” (Fang, p.
200).
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Figure 14: Sheep and Horse Wall (Science and Civilization, p. 338. Needham takes this from the Wu
jing zong yao qian ji, juan 12, p. 3a. His edition is paginated differently from the one I use elsewhere).

Figure 15: Thunderclap Missile (Wu jing zong yao qian ji, p. 640).

[13Bd] On the morning of the fourth day [February 2], the enemy returned
again and separated, pushing their trebuchets and shielded passageways up near the
city wall, and as before they arrayed their cavalry and foot soldiers in front, releasing
their arrows and firing their stone missiles. Again within the shielded passageways,
they moved and transported grass oxen, sandbags, and other things of that sort. Once
again they came and attacked the city wall. Arrows and rocks were crossed in battle
from early morning until early evening. [Then] the enemy took their trebuchet
platforms as well as their shielded passageways and hauled them into an enemy
stockade, presumably to prevent our army from going out at night to burn them.
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[13Bh] On the morning of the fifth [February 3], the enemy returned again,
pushing and gathering around their trebuchets, shielded passageways, and other
attacking equipment so that they were near the moat. They also arrayed their cavalry
and foot soldiers and again came to attack the city wall, their power and arrogance
were increasingly fervent. Over and over again the Honorable [Zhao] assessed [the
situation] and considered it:
[14Aa] If he did not send his troops out, then they, [the enemy], would not be
expecting [anything], and would not have any reason to retreat. However, if he openly
sent out the troops from within the city wall, then [the enemy’s cavalry] would surely
also come forward to make a “surprise” attack [since] their cavalry was numerous.
[Thus] it would be better to make heavy use of our crossbowman on top of the wall
and shoot them.
[14Ac] Because the crenel of the parapet on top of the wall could only support
one row of crossbowmen, on the night of the fourth day [February 2] we made
arrangements with the storehouses, monasteries, and temples, as well as the people’s
households to temporarily borrow their tables. We placed them so that the four legs [of
the tables] were ajoining,73 and [Zhao] ordered that we arrange them two rows high
behind the parapet, so that in all there would be three layers of crossbowman.
[14Ae] As before, we sent out more than one-thousand eight-hundred of the
Bold and Brave [troops] and the Government army in advance. Each held weapons
and tools and shouldered one bundle of grass. They hid below the city wall, behind the

73

I think that 增接四腳 means that they stacked the tables on top of each other, thus creating a terraced
platform, situated behind the parapet, on which rows of crossbowman could be layered.
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sheep and horse wall. However, they were still more than one hundred paces from the
enemy’s trebuchet platforms and shielded passageways beyond the wall. [The enemy]
furtively used some small boats inside of the moat and tied them together to build two
floating bridges, and as before they set the bridges opposite the sheep and horse wall,
first going to pare down [the wall] and make it thin.
[14Ah] When the late morning of the fifth day arrived [February 3] and the
enemy swarmed together to attack the perimeter of the walls, they immediately took
over the [part of] the wall that they had thinned and pushed it over all at once. Our
hidden army suddenly sprang out, and when the enemy stopped to defend [themselves],
troops issued forth from the city wall gates. [The enemy] did not anticipate a surprise
attack from another route, and were scared out of their wits.
[14Bb] First we engaged the enemy’s infantry that was near the moat, killing
and causing them to retreat. Next, we set a fire to burn and destroy the trebuchet
platforms and shielded passageways. As expected, the enemy’s cavalry came to attack
our troops who had come out from the city wall. The Honorable [Zhao] immediately
commanded the three rows of crossbowman on top of the city wall to combine their
power and release [their arrows]. The enemy’s cavalry could not endure them. As
before, we beat our drums, emitted a shout from atop the city wall, and simultaneously
fired our thunderclap missiles out from the city walls. The enemy cavalry, terrified,
retreated and ran away.
[14Be] From dawn ‘til dusk, the enemy and our army advanced, retreated, split
apart and came together dozens of times. The Honorable [Zhao] also continually sent
troops out of the city walls to respond [to the enemy] and come to the aid [of our
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troops]. The number of enemy bandits who were killed or injured was around several
thousand, and their corpses lay all over the ground.74 Although some [of the enemy’s]
trebuchet platforms and shielded passageways had been dragged back [by the
retreating army], there were very few that survived. Likewise, the bags for sand, and
grass oxen, etc.—as well as the wooden planks which we had seized—were burned
and destroyed at the same time. As it happened, a great north wind arose and the
smoke and flames covered the sky and flung themselves squarely in the face of our
enemy. Our army took advantage of the situation and making a racket of drums, we
pursued and killed the enemy, who were defeated and ran away. We seized their
saddles, horses, weapons, and tools, and captured a barbarian soldier. He claimed that
when the enemy had attacked the city wall last year on the third day of the twelfth
month [January 2, 1207], a huge number of barbarian soldiers had been killed. We
[even] had shot and killed Campaign Commander Pucha as well as Brigade
Commander Yaoer, among others.75 In addition, during today’s attack, we killed
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This would have been a severe health hazard to those both inside and outside of the city!
Pucha 蒲察 was a fairly common Jurchen surname. Twenty-six different people with the surname of
Pucha can be found within the juan of the Jin shi that also mention Wanyan Kuang (which would mean
they probably shared the same time context). If I systematically searched through all of these references,
there is a chance that I would be able to determine exactly who is named in the text. This method would
be somewhat problematic because the Jin shi obviously does not include everyone with this surname,
but it would be a start. In Wanyan Kuang’s biography, there is mention of an “Vice Controller Pucha”
fu tong Pucha 副統蒲察, (no personal name mentioned—c.f. du tong Pucha 都統蒲察, which appears
here) who captured Yicheng county 宜城縣 at the same time that Wanyan Kuang’s army surrounded
De’an, and brought down Anlu, Yingcheng, Yunmeng, Hanchuan, and Jingshan, etc. Yicheng County is
located just south of Xiangyang along the Han river, so it is possible that after taking the city, he
traveled north to join Wanyan Kuang in the siege of Xiangyang. However, this cannot be considered
any more than speculation. I have not thoroughly researched the other twenty-five Pucha’s who are
possibly associated with Wanyan Kuang.
There is only one person in the Jin shi who is listed by the name Yaoer 咬兒 (aka Guo Anyong
囯安用). However, he died in 1234. There may also be other ways to transcribe this Jurchen name, (and
I have checked a few), but there are too many possible combinations to investigate them all.
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Brigade Commander Gezha.76 We immediately reported our successive victories to
make them known.
[15Ac] During the previous several days, there were some people who had
been captured [by the enemy] that [managed to] return. All of them said that the
enemy’s Chieftain Marshal had met with various campaign commanders and ascended
Fancheng’s [city wall]. [There] he pointed at Xiangyang’s city wall and said, “Zhao is
very intelligent and manipulates [his troops] well.77 Every time he sends out the Bold
and Brave Army, we do not know where they come out from. How can we possibly
attack this city wall?” In response, the army’s campaign commander,78 rose up and
personally explained, “Marshal, if these few barbarians strike the city wall,79 we
would just be killing and breaking our own soldiers and horses.” The marshal nodded
his head [in agreement].
[15Ag] On the sixteenth day [February 14], Commander-general of the Loyal
and Righteous Army, Li Liangbi, under the jurisdiction of Suizhou, descended from
Baitu Ridge and raided the enemy’s grain [supplies]. He killed many barbarian bandits,
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Fang notes that the Zhi hai edition names this person as Brigade Commander Ge 葛萬戶 instead of
Brigade Commander Gezha 葛札萬戶. The name Gezha does not appear within the Jin shi and the
surname Ge does not appear within any juan that also mentions Wanyan Kuang. Thus I am unable to
identify this commander. (I have also tried other combinations of phonetically similar characters, but to
no avail).
77

Note the colloquial grammar pattern, V+ 得 + compliment: 擺佈得好

78

Is this Wanyan Kuang?

79

It seems unlikely that a commander would refer to his own troops as “barbarians.” I imagine this
conversation has been embellished.
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and captured numerous severed heads. There was a general, Yan Zheng, who rendered
unusually meritorious service, and a message of his victory arrived.80
[15Ai] The Honorable [Zhao] knew that amongst the four corners of the
prefectural city wall, the southern one faced the large training field of the Seventh
Army of Jiangling. [Its distance] from the Yuliang Plains was eight li, and all of the
land was level and flat. Of all the times the enemy had attacked the city, they had
usually used the bulk of their army to attack the southern corner. Beginning from the
attack on the city wall [occurring] on the fifth day of the first month [February 2], [the
enemy] had persisted in setting up trebuchet platforms, goose carts, shielded
passageways, wooden shields, grass oxen, sandbags, etc, and schemed daily to attack
the city.
[15Bd] Because all of the trebuchet platforms, goose carts, and shielded
passageways that the enemy set up used ox hides to cover them over for protection,
with the trebuchet haulers on the inside, our arrows and stones could not enter [and hit
them]. [Thus] they continued to set up the wheels of the carts, pushing and rolling [the
trebuchet platforms] to the base of the city wall, moving them back and forth to attack.
Consequently, the Honorable [Zhao] arranged for us to start opening a channel more
than forty paces from the moat, outside the city wall and at the south side of the
moat’s bank. We engaged in making an obstruction, so that it would be difficult for
the enemy to push and turn their trebuchet platforms, goose carts, and shielded
passageways, etc, to the base of the city wall.

80

There is a Yan Zheng mentioned in the Jin shi (juan 12) who was sent as a spy into Xiangyang on
May 21, 1206, but I don’t think this is the same person. Yan Zheng is mentioned again in the “Basic
Annals” of the Jin shi on June 18, when he is promoted and rewarded.
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[15Bh] On the night of the seventeenth day [February 15], we took advantage
of the rain and darkness, and secretly dispatched a thousand people to go out of the
city walls. We employed six-hundred and fifty workers to open [the moat] from the
inside and carry [dirt] on their shoulders [from] the moat’s pit.81 The crossbowman
combined with the [soldiers from] the Bold and Brave [army] skilled with tridents and
sickles, who guarded and protected this opening of the moat, altogether totaled threehundred and fifty people. In addition, we went to the top of the wall and secretly
arranged three rows of crossbowman.
[16Aa] At night on the twenty-first day [February 19], [Zhao] dispatched twothousand people. [For] the opening of the moat from the inside and breaking it up, [he
dispatched] one-thousand five-hundred people. To defend and protect the opening of
the moat, [he dispatched] crossbowman together with [members of] the Bold and
Brave [army] armed with tridents and sickles, totaling five-hundred people.
[16Ac] On the night of the twenty-third day [February 21], we used twothousand people to start carrying [the dirt from] the moat outside of the prefectural
city wall.82 [Those] protecting the opening of the moat combined their strength with
them to [also help] open the moat.83 [Because] the Honorable [Zhao] anticipated night
after night that the enemy would surely come while the workers labored and clash
with the people who were carrying [the dirt from] the moat, [therefore] the Honorable
81

I don’t understand what is going on here. Nei kai 内開, which I translate as “open [the moat] from the
inside” (and which also appears in line 16Ab), particularly confuses me.
82

Note that the text uses fu cheng 府城 here instead of the usual cheng 城.

83

Fang notes that the Zhi hai edition states, “On the night of the twenty-third day, we engaged in
starting to carry [dirt] from the moat [and regarded it as] still shallow, so again we sent people to go out
of the city walls.”“創挑濠塹”后為“尚淺，再發人出城”，缺“二千人防護開濠”。(Note that I
parse differently)
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[Zhao] on this night dispatched three-thousand people: two-thousand people to open
and break up the moat, and one-thousand people, [including] crossbowman together
with the Brave and Bold [army soldiers] bearing tridents and sickles. In addition, at
the top of the wall, we also secretly arranged three ranks of crossbowman.
[16Ag] Sure enough, late at night, an unknown number of the enemy’s cavalry,
emitted a cry and swarmed forward, united, to clash with the Government troops who
were carrying [dirt from] the moat. The crossbowman on top of the wall together with
those outside of the moat all fired. [Zhao] also dispatched the Bold and Brave [Army],
and they battled with the enemy all the way until just before dawn. Our army
advanced and retreated with the enemy, and were split and gathered a dozen times. We
pursued and killed the enemy bandits. In this encounter the dead and injured were of
unknown numbers. The enemy retreated and ran away.
[16Ba] The part of the moat’s trench which was opened and broken-up started
from the corner of the round tower at the of the city wall’s east gate to the draw bridge
outside the city wall’s south gate. In length it was more than four-hundred ten paces.
It’s width on the surface was eight feet or more, and its depth was six feet. In addition
[to the obstacle created by our trench], outside the south gate of the prefectural city
wall there originally were earthen walls from the residents’ dwellings. [Therefore]
when the enemy used their cavalry, galloping about was inconvenient. [Thus the
enemy] desired to dispatch foot soldiers to break and eliminate [the walls], so that
afterwards they could use their cavalry to make a defense. [However], the Honorable
[Zhao] dispatched the tea merchant Lu Shizhong and his company’s division of Bold
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and Brave [men] bearing tridents and sickles, as well as crossbowman, ahead of time
to hide amongst the earthen walls.
[16Bf] Sure enough, on the twenty-fourth day [February 22], the enemy
bandits’ foot soldiers came to break and eliminate the walls. On top of the city wall,
we raised up a flag as a signal, and the Bold and Brave Army burst out and killed
many of the barbarian troops who were breaking down the walls. We captured the
barbarian soldier, Li Wu, alive and burst out quickly to seize boards for keeping out
arrows. We burned and destroyed them—altogether more than two-hundred panels.
We immediately reported our successive victories to make them known.
[16Bi] The Honorable [Zhao] repeatedly thought that although he had already
arranged the opening of the moat which could serve as a barrier, if our troops went out
of the city wall and crossed the newly opened moat to attack and raid the bandits’
encampment and seize and destroy their attacking equipment, then the enemy cavalry
would still surely come to chase and attack them. Although we had our crossbowman
to defend us, we feared falling into an evil plot because of the enemy cavalry’s
strength and number. Consequently, we began weaving bamboo cages—two feet high
and six feet long [with] small holes that were six inches around—similar to the shape
of a “bamboo lady.”84 If the enemy’s cavalry pursued and raided us, then we could
promptly take the bamboo cages and cast them onto the ground in order to trip them
and cause the enemy’s cavalry to be unable to move about.
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Fang explains that a “bamboo lady” 竹夫人, is “an ancient implement used for relieving summer heat.
[It is made by] weaving green bamboo to make a long cage, or by taking a whole segment of bamboo
with hollowed middle and make holes on all sides to allow the passage of wind. When it is hot, one
arranges it between the bed and the [sleeping mat].”
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[17Ad] Then, on the night of the twenty-seventh day [February 25], [Zhao]
sent out one-thousand three-hundred of the Bold and Brave [Army] and Government
troops. Carrying the bamboo cages, we stealthily went out of an opened gate in the
sheep and horse wall at the southern corner and crossed the floating bridge. Upon
placing wooden gags in our mouths and moving forward,85 we went directly into the
enemy’s camp. The enemy’s cavalry joined us in battle, and consequently we cast
down the bamboo cages. The horses were tripped by the cages and could not gallop,
and there were many who fell off their horses. When the bandit army retreated and ran
away, the Government troops took advantage [of the situation] and pursued and killed
them. There were many dead and wounded. Again we took the goose carts, shielded
passageways, grass oxen, and bamboo component poles that had been constructed,86
and things such as firewood, and burned them all up. We also seized boards for
keeping out arrows, more than one-hundred wooden planks, bows and crossbows,
implements and tools, etc.
[17Ba] Since the time we had been subjected to the siege and the roads been
blocked, it had only been via a water route to the west that we were able to use small
boats to transmit wax ball messages in a roundabout way.87 The enemy learned of this
and as a result started to establish a small abatis at a sandy, shallow place [along the
85

Gags, usually wooden blocks, were used to prevent the soldiers from talking while on a mission that
depended on silence.
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Here I use xia 下 as a verb compliment “indicating the finalizing of an action.” A “bamboo
component pole” is part of a trebuchet. See footnote 51 above for a full explanation.
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“Wax ball messages,” la dan wen zi 蠟彈文字, were commonly used to smuggle information. A
message written on a small piece of paper was folded into a ball and then covered with wax. This made
the message easy to hide and also protected it from moisture. If carried internally by a messenger, it
would have been virtually impossible to detect.
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route].88 On the twenty-eighth day [February 26], [Zhao] dispatched sailors to seize
and eliminate the enemy abatis upon the shoal. Following [previous tactics], he
dispatched the Bold and Brave Army, led by Lu Xuannie, to go to the bank of the
shoal and to hide beneath a dilapidated wall. Sure enough, several dozen enemy
cavalry came to the side of the wall. [Our] hidden troops suddenly sprang out and
killed one person from their vanguard. In addition, we seized two horses. The enemy
broke ranks and ran away. Again we seized army equipment and returned [to the city].
[17Bf] When the enemy realized that a [Song] rescue army would not arrive, a
certain [Jin] marshal [surnamed] Li raised an army from De’an numbering several tens
of thousands and advanced to join the army’s campaign commander to plan an attack
on the city wall together. Consequently, they began to raise an earthen mountain
within the Seventh Army’s training field by the southeast corner. In military strategy
[such an earthen mountain] is referred to as a “bird’s spur mound”:89 upon starting out
far away, it advances; and upon starting out low it becomes high—[until] it is almost
level with the city wall.
[17Bi] Everyday, on top [of the earthen mountain under construction, the
enemy] used two parallel rows of shielded passageways made from ox hide. The
people inside the shielded passageways went back and forth to transport earth and
wood. At the front [of the shielded passageways], they utilized ox stables along with
six hide curtains that were shaped like the [square] sails of a boat to protect the people
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Perhaps this abatis (lu jiao) was established on top of the shoal, but was still below the water level
where it could damage the hull of a ship navigated by an unwary sailor.
89

“Bird’s spur mound”: ju yin 距堙
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of the work crew so that neither arrows nor stones could enter.90 On the two sides [of
the worksite], they used people holding boards, [for additional shielding], and they
arrayed cavalry to support and protect them at the back. When they were met with
evening, [the enemy] then took the hide shielding, and hide curtains, etc, and pushed
them below their stockade at a faraway place, to secure them.
[18Ac] In order to meet the many treacherous plans of the enemy, the
Honorable [Zhao] sent out [troops] hundreds of times. On a daily basis, [we worked to
carry out] our plan of embankment preparation, and twice joined together two floating
bridges within the moat in preparation to sending out troops.
[18Ae] By the thirtieth day [February 28], the [enemy’s] earthen mountain was
approximately one-hundred paces in length and we worried that it was gradually
getting closer to the city wall. Consequently, on that night, [Zhao] sent out the
government troops—more than three-thousand four-hundred people—to go outside of
the moat to destroy and ruin the earthen mountain.91 More than one-thousand people
on the inside [of our battle formation] were specially employed with spades and
pickaxes. More than two-thousand three-hundred people [formed] a network of
bowman and crossbowman together with [the soldiers] of the Brave and Bold Army’s
tea merchants, [wielding] tridents, sickles, sabers, and axes, to protect and support the
government troops who were destroying the earthen mountain. In addition, on top of
90

Presumably these “ox stables” niu wu 牛屋 were left behind by the Song when they entered the city
walls for protection. Perhaps at the time of the evacuation, they were considered too far away from the
city wall to pose a threat (see lines 1Bg-h). The Wubei jiyao (not written until c.a. 1830) recommends
that “terrain within one li from the outer moat should be completely cleared” (Franke, “Siege and
Defense,” p. 153).
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Here the text actually reads “三千四百人餘人.” However, as Fang notes (p. 203), the “extra” 人 is a
“superfluous” character—probably a copyist error.
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the city wall, we arranged crossbowman, three ranks deep, to guard against the enemy.
Sure enough, well past midnight the enemy cavalry came and charged [at us], not
knowing the density [of our defenses], and they were seized and struck down by the
Government troops. The group of crossbowman fired in unison, and the enemy
cavalry was unable to advance. Those who had spades and pickaxes combined their
strength to destroy and cut down the earthen mountain. [For an area of] approximately
thirty feet [long] and fifty feet wide, everything was torn apart and destroyed. That
night, the government troops crossed in battle with the barbarian army several dozen
times in all. The people and horses of the barbarian army that were killed and injured
were of unknown number. We seized weapons, armor, bows, crossbows, wooden
planks, etc.
[18Bd] On the first day of the second month [March 1], the enemy increased
their number of soldiers and horses and continued to push forward, transporting
shielded passageways, leather tents, and leather screens, etc. For a second time they
[began] constructing an earthen mountain with measurements that were twice those of
the previous day. [At that rate], within ten days it would almost be level with the city
wall! At the same time, the enemy’s chief had repeatedly instituted a reward:
“As for the first person to ascend the wall:
-a commoner will be given the hereditary title of Battalion Commander
-an officer [will be given the title of] Vastly Powerful [General] of rank
6a
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-[and he will be given] five-thousand strings of cash.92
As for the second person to ascend the wall:
-a commoner will be given the hereditary title of Company Commander
-an officer [will be given the title] General of Military Integrity of rank
7a
-[and he will be given] three thousand strings of cash.”
Because of this, [the enemy] anxiously began [the construction of] the earthen
mountain, their thoughts surely [focused] on capturing Xiangyang.
[18Bi] Every night the enemy arrayed their troops and cavalry and continued
to burn fires at several dozen places in order to prevent us from tearing down and
destroying [the earth mountain]. The brightness [of the fires] was like the sunrise!
[19Aa] On the night of the tenth day [March 10], the Honorable [Zhao] sent
more than eight-thousand two-hundred people of the Government troops to go out
from the city wall’s south [side]. Among them were more than one-thousand fivehundred people who were specialized in using spades, pickaxes, and metal rakes, more
than six-thousand six-hundred people were crossbowman, and there were also those of
the Bold and Brave Army’s tea merchants who wielded tridents, sickles, sabers and
axes. On top of the city wall, we also arrayed three ranks of crossbowman.
[19Ad] Earlier, the Honorable [Zhao] had learned through spies that the enemy
had augmented their troops and were about to split into several columns to come
forward and charge. On a previous day the Honorable [Zhao] had sent out troops to
put bamboo cages in place to trip up the [enemy’s] horses. Still we feared that the
92

Official government titles were traditionally graded on an eighteen point scale, with 1a as the highest
rank, and 9b as the lowest rank.
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enemy would devise yet another crafty plan. [Therefore] we made arrangements to
order that each person in the front row should hold a small anti-horse barricade and
obstruct the approaching column of enemy [troops].93 Behind the front row, we spread
out squads [of soldiers] and lined them up. As before, we spread out boards at the
front for keeping out arrows, as well as soldiers holding spears and crossbowman to
rush forth to defend and help each other.

Figure 16: Anti-horse Barricade (my own drawing, adapted from Wu jing zong yao qian ji, juan 10, p.
34b).

[19Ag] When it was time to light the lamps, [Zhao] first dispatched Pei Xian
and Shao Shizhong’s division of sailors to the city’s east and west. [From] within the
river,94 they beat their drums and shouted, pretending that they would raid [the
enemy’s] stockade, in order to delay them.95 As expected, the enemy pulled back their
troops in response. When it was late at night, [our] army followed along the sheep and
horse wall at the southern corner, and went out. [Zhao] ordered that we first engage
four-hundred people, holding wooden gags in their mouths, to carry one bucket of
water each and run swiftly toward the enemy’s fires, splashing water on them and
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An anti-horse barricade, ju ma zi 拒馬子, is commonly translated as a chevaux-de-frise (Franke and
Needham, among others). The Diagram Group describes this device as “a log set with spikes” (p. 222).
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Fang notes that the Zhi hai edition lacks the word “river,” jiang 江.
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Presumably this is a ploy to delay the enemy from detecting the direction of the actual attack.

89

extinguishing them. [Our troops then] divided up and advanced forward. Coincidently,
the moon was hidden on that very night, [and so we were able to effectively] use the
anti-horse barricades to cut off their approaching column, and we killed the enemy
men who retreated.96
[19Bc] Those with spades and pickaxes used their efforts then and there to
destroy and chop down the earthen mountain. When the enemy came to charge again,
they were blocked by the anti-horse barricades and could not move about freely. In
addition, because of the unison fire of our ranks of crossbows, [although the enemy]
repeatedly advanced, they were repeatedly pushed back.
[19Bd] When [the enemy] had started constructing the interior of the earthen
mountain, they had used large pieces of wood throughout and had stuck them through
[the earthen mountain] like house joists. On top they used a row of beams and piled up
brush bundles, grass oxen, and covered it all with dirt on top. For that reason, there
was difficulty in tearing it down. From late at night, the Government troops combined
strength and joined in the laboring. When it was almost dawn, we were just over onethird of the way [done].
[19Bg] As the enemy went about ordering their camp, they raised a beacon fire
as a signal. The Honorable [Zhao] feared that when the sky lightened, the enemy’s
cavalry would gather from all four sides. Consequently, he ordered the rest of [the
people] at the moat and stockade to go forward, take up the oil-soaked dry grass
[bundles] that had been prepared, (we named them “fire oxen”), and put them inside
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I think that Zhao is suggesting that they snuck behind some of the enemy to place these barricades.
Thus they prevented the enemy from fleeing and also prevented reinforcements from coming to their
aid.
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the earthen mountain straightaway. We then set fire to it. Just when we had filled the
inside with grass, a great wind suddenly arrived, [causing] the smoke and flames to
block out the sky!
[19Bi] That night the Government troops and the barbarian army crossed in
battle more than twenty times. Many of the barbarian soldiers were dead or injured.
The people and horses that died lay all over the ground. We seized enemy weapons
and wooden boards used to provide cover from arrows, etc.
[20Ab] On previous occasions when the Honorable [Zhao] wanted to cause the
enemy to be unable to figure out [what we were up to], he had sent out troops at night
and some of them beat gongs, some raised fires, and some knocked wooden clappers
when the army was to regroup.97 However, on this occasion our army was mostly at
the front lines, and if we again used [the same deceptive signals], [the enemy] would
surely come to pursue and attack us. [Therefore] previously on the tenth day [March
10], the Honorable [Zhao] had secretly instructed his generals and officers before hand:
“Tonight, when we regroup our army, we will take up the drum to substitute for the
gong, [and thus] regard [the signal to] advance as [the signal to] retreat.” On top of
this, when the day began to dawn the strength of the fire increased, and on top of the
city wall we beat the drums and emitted a shout. [Thus], the enemy thought that our
army was advancing again, and in a panic, they broke ranks and fled. When our troops
reassembled and returned, we were [all] without injury.
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The beating of a gong often served as a signal for troops to regroup, whereas the wooden clappers
(and drums) usually served as a signal to attack. By using various signals at the same time, the enemy
would not be able to anticipate their course of action. I would imagine that this tactic also had the
potential to cause much confusion amongst Zhao Chun’s own troops.
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[20Ag] On the eleventh day [March 11], the enemy came to put out and beat
back [the fire on] the burning earthen mountain. They used earth to bank up and
surround [the fire],98 but left when evening came.99 At midnight, the Honorable [Zhao]
dispatched people to again burn [the earthen mountain], and the strength of the fire
blazed on again.100
[20Ai] On the twelfth day [March 12], the enemy came again to put out the fire.
Consequently, the Honorable [Zhao] sent out two-thousand troops. They arrayed
[themselves] outside of the moat and shot the people who were putting out the fire.
The enemy considered the fire un-extinguishable and consequently used wooden
boards to block off the damaged [part] so that [the fire] would not completely destroy
the earthen mountain,101 and they engaged in breaking off the fire’s path.102 At the
same time, the Honorable [Zhao] ordered the Government troops to spread out in
battle array, and having done so, they advanced. The enemy’s cavalry joined them in
battle several times, but [the enemy] was killed and pushed back by the government
troops. Soon after that, we again used dry grass soaked in oil at the places which had
been damaged and where [the enemy] had broken off [the fire’s path], and burned it.
The enemy feared our powerful crossbows, [and so] they folded their hands, and no
98

Presumably this was an effort to contain the fire and preserve as much of the earthen mountain as
possible.
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Another version of the text states that “when it became daybreak, they left.” However, this reading
does not seem to fit in the context.
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Note that Zhao’s entry for the tenth day of the second month (March 10) seems more disorganized
than his previous entries.
101
It seems foolish to try to contain a fire with wooden boards. However, this is my best guess at what
the text actually says. (And it seems, both here and at other times, that Zhao Wannian had no intention
of making the Jin soldiers seem intelligent).
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Here I follow the Zhi hai edition of the text: “以斷火路” instead of the base text which reads, “they
engaged in breaking off the great route” 以斷大路.
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one would advance [to put out the new fire]. Thus the smoke and flames did not cease
for several days, and all became ashes. Starting from this time, the enemy’s spirit
became greatly dejected, and they did not return to repair or rebuild [the earthen
mountain].
[20Be] The Honorable [Zhao] saw that throughout [the siege], every time the
enemy came to attack the city wall, they were invariably killed by the government
army’s surprise expeditions. Moreover, spies had learned that because of this the
enemy was afraid, and none of them wanted to attack the city wall [again]. Up until
this point, the marshal head chieftain had had an insatiable desire for gaining merit,
and did not pity his officers or soldiers. Consequently, the Honorable [Zhao] wrote an
announcement to be shot into the enemy camp. It laid out the favorable and
unfavorable points [of the current situation], and summoned [the enemy soldiers] to
come forth and surrender.103
[20Bh] That night, a shooting star fell into the enemy camp, and the next day
[Jin] Military Training Official and Company Commander, Nahe the Taoist monk,
took up the seal of the Right Wing Vice Controller and came to surrender.104 Because
of this, the Honorable Zhao immediately lifted up his voice and said, “The monk
comes to surrender.” In addition [Nahe] secretly reported that the number of people
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Franke notes in his unpublished conference paper that the manuscript of Zhao Wannian’s Bei wu ji
found at the Institute of History and Philology in Taibei contains drafts of these “pamphlets” which
were shot into the enemy’s camp. Unfortunately, I have not been able to gain access to this edition. The
Si ku quan shu and Qin ding si ku quan shu editions, which I have scanned, appear only to contain
Zhao’s poems. Franke includes a photocopied excerpt of what appears to be (one of) the pamphlets in
the appendix included in his Studien und Texte zur Kriegsgeschichte der südlichen Sungzeit.
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In the note on p. 36 of Wang Cengyu’s article, he notes that there is no such title as 训武校尉, but
that the character 训 was used to avoid a taboo character from Song Emperor Guangzong’s name, Zhao
Dun 赵惇—thus the title should read 敦武校尉.
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wanting to surrender was very large. We also learned the actual situation of one
column of barbarian troops in the Wan Mountains.
[21Aa] On the following day, we were to advance together by river and land to
surprise and kill the barbarian army. [However] the enemy in the Wan Mountains
learned about [this plan], and consequently the next day they burned down their camp
and all of them crossed to the river’s north. We immediately reported our successive
victories to make them known.
[21Ac] The Taoist monk was the son of the Vastly Powerful General, Brigade
Commander Wuye. When the enemy troops engaged in attacking our city wall, the
number of people who were harmed and broken was large. [The monk knew] that his
father was close to the Marshal as well as the Campaign Commander. Therefore, he
pleaded and urged [them] not to attack the wall. Wuye was furious and desired to kill
him. Consequently, the Taoist monk took the seal and came to us to surrender.
[21Af] On the fourteenth day [March 14], the enemy saw that the earthen
mountain was already burnt to ashes and could not be repaired. In addition, they tore
down and opened up the great embankment outside of the southern gate and piled up
an earthen wall as before with the intention of attacking the southern gate. The
Honorable [Zhao] immediately dispatched five-hundred men of Zhang Ju’s division of
the Bold and Brave [Army] to kill and push back the people who were tearing down
the wall.105 Even after we had killed and pushed them back, we still feared that they
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This does not make sense. Wannian has just stated that the enemy is tearing down a great
embankment and piling up earth to make a wall. Perhaps I have misinterpreted the text, or maybe the
text should read, “The Honorable [Zhao] dispatched… the Bold and Brave [Army] to kill and push back
the people who were tearing down the embankment” 殺退斸隄人, or maybe: “The Honorable [Zhao]
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would attack and strike the southern gate. That night, [Zhao] dispatched two thousand
troops of the government army to start opening a channel approximately three-hundred
paces [long], five feet wide, and eight feet deep outside of the southern gate. When
morning came, the enemy ascended a height to view [the city], and they saw that
suddenly there was [a new] channel of moat! None were left unsurprised.
[21Ba] People who had been captured by the enemy were returning one after
another. They claimed that the enemy had said that the Southern [Song] Army was
successful, so that starting from this juncture, none of their plans [for capturing the
city] would be carried out.106
[21Bc] As it happened, outside of the northeast corner of the wall, there
originally was a very old dyke, which was directly opposite [the wall’s] round [corner]
tower.107 [This] had the potential of being like a brick-laid path for an earthen
mountain.108 Consequently, because of the dyke’s [potential], the enemy added to it
and built it higher and wider. The [enemy] soldiers and horses combined together and
arranged [the construction materials] day and night. Their use of workers was much
quicker than it had been at the eastern corner. Consequently, on the night of the
twentieth day [March 20], the Honorable [Zhao] sent out four-thousand government
dispatched… the Bold and Brave [Army] to kill and push back the enemy and tear down the wall” 殺退
斸墻.
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This section of the text is problematic: 南軍為事便是一會子自此計無所施. My translation is based
on information from the HYDCD which says 為事 can mean “to be successful.”
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I assume that the “round tower” is a part of the wall. I think that “round tower” tuan lou 團樓 is a
technical term (perhaps for all round corner towers). However, I have not been able to identify it.
Needham identifies the corner towers as di tuan 敵團 (Vol. 5, part 6, section 30, p. 339).
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The Hanyu da cidian notes that the character man 漫 (overflow) can also be used as a variant for
man 墁 (to pave with brick or stone), which makes more sense to me in this context.
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troops to start opening the moat at both sides of the ancient dyke. [The channel] was
more than four-hundred paces long. Before it was daylight, [Zhao] also sent out onethousand crossbowman to lie in wait inside the newly opened moat. The enemy was
unaware [of this].
[21Bg] The next day, the enemy cavalry came straightaway to charge, [but] the
hidden crossbowman fired together and shot down the head of the barbarian army. An
extremely large number of people and horses were killed or injured. The enemy’s
cavalry retreated a little, and consequently [Zhao] ordered the government troops to
move forward. More than two-thousand people using spades and pickaxes broke apart
the old dyke into three segments and foiled their plans. Day after day we sent out
soldiers to engage in battle as we broke up [the old dyke]. The enemy repeatedly came
forward and charged, [but] they were all pushed back by the mighty fire from the
crossbows and none dared to draw near. The enemy’s plan was completely thwarted.
[22Ab] On the night of the twenty-third day [March 23], the enemy took two
[siege] towers that faced [the wall],109 more than ten large trebuchets, and several
hundred pieces of leather shielding, and destroyed or dismantled them all. They then
burned down their camp and fled in the night. By the twenty-fourth day [March 24],
all of [the enemy] had crossed to the river’s north. We immediately reported our
successive victories to make them known.
[22Ae] The enemy had already crossed to the river’s north, but they assembled
with the western column’s barbarian army from Wan Mountain that had first crossed
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I think that dui lou 對樓 is a technical term, but I have not been able to find it.

96

[the river].110 All of them took down their stockades in the areas along the rivers Ku,
Bai, and Xinkai.111 At the outskirts of Anlu they raised up and built stockades and
houses stretching as far as the eye could see for more than thirty li.112 A group of
cavalry was hiding in the wilds, and from early morning to late [in the day], they put
[their horses] out to pasture, appearing and disappearing from time to time. The
Honorable [Zhao] was worried that the evil intent of the enemy had not yet ended, and
[because the enemy] was still lingering at the river’s north, he couldn’t afford not to
have a plan to get rid of them.
[22Ah] Consequently, on the night of the twenty-fifth day [March 25], the
Honorable [Zhao] took advantage of the rain and darkness and hurriedly sent
Dispatcher Zhang Fu and Gao Yan to manage more than thirty boats, [both] great and
small. [The boats] held one-thousand crossbowman together with five-hundred [men]
bearing tridents and sickles, as well as one-hundred drum[ers]. They also carried
thunderclap missiles and gunpowder arrows, etc. Stealthily, we sailed our boats and
arrived below the bank of the enemy’s camp. The Honorable [Zhao] personally went
toward the river bank and directed his generals and officers: “Anyone who dares make
a loud noise will be beheaded!” As soon as we approached the enemy camp, [Zhao]
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See line 21Aa above.
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I cannot find the Ku River 枯河 (literally, “dried up river”) or the Xinkai River 新開河 (literally
“newly cut river”) in the Zhongguo gu jin di ming da ci dian 中國古今地名大辭典 or The Historical
Atlas of China (vol. 6, map 63-64). (Perhaps the “dried up river” changed its course and became the
“newly cut river”).
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Note that “Anlu” 安鹿 here uses different characters than the “Anlu” 安陸 which is a city nearby. I
have not been able to locate the Anlu named here. Thirty li would have been approximately 17 km (10.5
miles).
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ordered that the crossbowman first go and step up onto the arrow leveling platform.113
When they heard a drumbeat, they were to release [their arrows] together.
[22Bd] Just as we untied the boats, we were met with a driving rain. The rain’s
sound mixed together with the noise of the skulling oar [splashing water]. In addition,
when we arrived below the bank, the enemy did not detect us. Subsequently, we
sounded one drumbeat and the multitude of crossbows fired together. They continued
[firing] and the one-hundred drums all sounded. The thousand crossbows shot every
which way. Soon after that we released the incendiary thunderclap missiles and arrows
into the middle of the enemy camp. We did not know the number of those who had
been shot dead or injured. The people and horses were frightened and chaotic,
trampling one another. Just before dawn, [the enemy] shouted and fled, scattering to
the four quarters. The Honorable [Zhao] then regrouped the army and returned. Not
one person had been injured.
[22Bh] Again the next day, in the early morning of the twenty-sixth [March
26], there were more than one-hundred squadrons of enemy cavalry who came
forward to clear away the dead bodies. They [piled them] in a circle and cremated
them. At that time, the Honorable [Zhao] commissioned boats to carry more than five
hundred of our crossbowmen, who joined forces to shoot and kill more than onehundred enemy cavalry, and to set fire to their camp. The enemy soldiers were greatly
routed and abandoned their clothes, armor, and military apparatus. After scattering in
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I think that jian ping pan zi 箭平盤子, which I translate here as “arrow leveling platform” is a
technical term. However, I have been unable to find a description of it. From its name, I would imagine
that it is a portable flat surface which archers can stand on for stability in order to take aim at their
targets.

98

every direction, they turned north and fled. We reported our successive victories to
make them known.
[23Ab] On the previous night, [March 25], when the Honorable [Zhao] had
sent out [troops], they had not expected us, and at that point in time, we only knew
that the enemy had been startled and ran away, breaking their ranks. We did not yet
know the actual number of people and horses that had been killed and injured by our
crossbow arrows. [However], on the twenty-sixth day [March 26], Fan Qi, a man who
had been captured, came running back. He claimed that on the night of the twentyfifth day,114 when the barbarian soldiers in the stockade were sleeping they suddenly
heard drums echoing and crossbows firing, as well as the bombardment of the
thunderclap catapult missiles which entered the stockade and filled it with alarm and
disorder. No one could manage to prepare the horses, and it was too late to clear away
the equipment, and [in their panic] they trampled each other. Two or three-thousand
barbarian soldiers and eight or nine-hundred horses were killed or injured.
[23Ag] Furthermore, on the twenty-eighth day [March 28], Zhang Yun, a man
who had been captured, returned and claimed that he had listened at length to a
Brigade Commander state that on that night two or three-thousand people and eight or
nine-hundred horses had been shot and killed by the southern [Song] army.115 The [Jin]
marshal did not yet dare to report [this] to the court, and would wait until he arrived at
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The text has “fifteenth day,” but I think the text is missing a character, and should actually read “on
the night of the twenty-fifth day [March 25],” which is when the event described above [and I presume,
below] took place.
115

Here I follow the Zhi hai edition of the text which uses the character 住 instead of 伍 on line 23Ah
(Fang, 207).
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Dengzhou [where he could] separately tabulate the names and descriptions of the men
and horses that had been lost and submit a report.
[23Ba] The Honorable [Zhao] saw that the enemy had been defeated, and even
though a great group had fled to the north, [Zhao] still feared that some had not yet left.
Consequently, he dispatched some competent people to cross the river. Through
thorough scouting, they found out that the barbarian army, as detailed above, had
already entered their own territory by way of Dengcheng, the Qingshui River, and
Shenma Ridge. In addition, they had gathered up their dead and cremated them. [The
enemy] had used horses to carry away those that did not burn completely and dumped
them into the river. In the entire area of Yuliang Plain, the Red Bank, and Eastern Ford
[along] the eastern road, the enemy had burned their camps and fled at night. Every
one of them had crossed to the river’s north.
[23Be] The enemy feared that they would be pursued and attacked, and so they
abandoned clothes, armor, weapons, tools, grain supplies, ox hides, and countless
miscellaneous army supplies. Take for example the pots and cauldrons—even these
they abandoned and left! Up until the twenty-seventh day [March 27], the Honorable
[Zhao] dispatched people to go and scout for the enemy.
[23Bg] On the twenty-seventh day [March 27], the people who had scouted out
the enemy returned. Through their scouting, they had learned that an army and cavalry
of more than two-thousand people had again come back from the north to the head of
the river at Red Bank where they were using sandbags to fill in the river. [Zhao]
inferred that the enemy’s intent was surely to return: they would think of the
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abandoned military apparatus and miscellaneous items that were quite numerous, and
would want to come burn them up.
[24Aa] The Honorable [Zhao] hurriedly dispatched Gao Yan to lead onethousand of the crossbowman directly to Red Bank. They combined their forces and
shot [the enemy], who retreated. Again they abandoned provisions, weapons, and
armor and hastily ran far away toward the front of [the walls of] Tangzhou.116 We
immediately reported our successive victories to make them known.
[24Ac] From this [time] on, the river’s north was free of enemy cavalry! Hence,
the Honorable [Zhao] divided up and appointed officials and their subordinates to
survey the locations of the enemy stockades. According [to their inspection] they drew
a set of maps which showed that the [enemy’s] camps and stockades were spread out
in the east from Yuliang Plain to Red Bank, and in the west from the Wan Mountains
to Huaquan Gorge. They extended in an unbroken chain for more than thirty li!117
Considering the extent of this fortified land, [Zhao] was alarmed that [it could have
supported] an army of more than two-hundred thousand!
[24Af] The enemy had attacked our city wall at a hundred points, [but] each
time we held them back and they retreated. Because none of the [enemy’s] plans [to
attack the wall] had been successful, they had chiseled an opening more than onehundred paces wide in the great dyke to the west of the Wan Mountains. They desired
to open [a channel] from here that was more than ten zhang deep in order to make a
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I assume that “the front of Tangzhou” 唐州前 refers to the southern edge of Tangzhou since the
Song army would be facing Tangzhou from the south.
117

Thirty li would have been equivalent to approximately 17km, (10.5 miles).
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small river and lead the great [Han] River’s water to Tan Brook.118 The river had
already started from the east of Honorable Xie’s Cliff,119 and entered the mountain’s
great dyke,120 filling and clogging it [with water] and flooding the bridge. They took
advantage of the dyke to serve as an embankment and opened up the river’s course,
desiring it to enter Yuliang Plain where it would meander and enter the [Han] River,
cutting off Xiangyang to the river’s north.121 [Their] scheme was definitely not
unsophisticated. The Honorable [Zhao] said of it, “Ever since the start of the universe
the rivers have held fixed courses.122 How could they possibly change them?! Here is
an example of their foolishness!”
[24Bb] We could not possibly succeed in counting the amount of the enemy’s
military implements, attacking equipment and miscellaneous items that we had seized
throughout [the siege]. [Zhao] sent out two-thousand people daily to transport the
abandoned goose carts, shielded passageways, cloud ladders, anti-horse barricades,
clothing and armor for people and horses, stone missiles, pots and casks, spears and
sabers, as well as abandoned wood, bamboo, boats, and carts, etc; and it took several
days for the area to be cleared. As for their ships and stone missiles, [the enemy] had
used ox carts to transport all of them [here] from the northern frontiers. The stone
118

Ten zhang deep would have been approximately one-hundred feet. This is quite a depth for a “small”
river! Perhaps shi 十 (ten) is an error for yi 一 (one).
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Honorable Xie’s cliff 謝公巖 is located five li to the southwest of Xiangyang.

120

Perhaps this is the same “great dyke” mentioned above. I am not sure.

121

In other words, the Jin commander wanted to change the course of the Han River so that it flowed
south of Xiangyang.
122

China’s natural history of flooding and frequently changing water courses do not support this
statement. This must be a rhetorical flourish.
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missiles were made from carved granite,123 and they were round like a ball. The
workmanship was extremely exquisite. When it came time for them to flee, [the
enemy] buried them in pits, and then left; and so there are still some that we have not
yet found.
[24Bg] Beginning from [the time] we had been surrounded, the Honorable
[Zhao] immediately filed a report to inform the court and begged for troops to provide
aid. The court repeatedly sent dispatches down to the Department of the Campaign
Commanders at Jinzhou and Jiangzhou [for them] to send out troops to raise the siege.
In addition, [Zhao] recruited death-defying soldiers. By way of remote paths, he sent
out countless wax balls to report our emergency to various places and beg for a rescue
army. During the entire three months, there was not even one person from a rescue
army who arrived [at Xiangyang].
[25Aa] The Honorable [Zhao] managed [our troops] with many methods. He
engaged in defense by way of attack methods, and [thus] we were able to fight and
then retreat. At the start, the enemy had an army of two-hundred thousand to charge
the bank and cross the river. They themselves thought that they would accomplish
their plan, and intended to use the toes of their boots to kick down Xiangyang’s city
wall.124
[25Ac] The people [of Xiangyang] urged the Honorable [Zhao] many times to
send out troops during the daytime. [However] the Honorable [Zhao] alone strongly
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I translate qing shi 青石 as “granite.” However, it could also be a reference to an iron ore such as
magnetite of which there are large deposits in Shanxi and Manchuria.
124

“Using the toe of one’s boot to kick down a city wall” seems to be a set phrase which I intuit means
that the enemy thought they would be able to march right in and take the city without difficulty.
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insisted that [because] their [army] was numerous, and ours was scant; and [because]
their [army was made up of] cavalry and ours of infantry; and [because] the land was
flat outside the wall, therefore it was suitable for [their] cavalry while it was only
suitable for us to raid their stockades during the night. Occasionally, [Zhao] would
send an army out during the daytime, but invariably he had calculated beforehand that
they would be victorious, and only after [that] would he resort to battle. For this reason,
every time we went out we invariably triumphed.
[25Ae] From beginning to end, [there were] twelve great battles. From water
and land, we attacked and raided [the enemy] twenty-four [times]. Nearly half of the
enemy’s men and horses were killed or injured. For instance, when we caught
Battalion Commander Xuan Alibeigong he claimed that on the day that the enemy
crossed the bank, those that drowned from the various armies totaled nine-thousand
twenty-seven men and more than three-thousand horses. During the attack on the city
wall, the dead and injured totaled twenty or thirty-thousand men. Nahe the monk also
claimed that in the division of five-thousand people led by his father, Brigade
Commander Wuye, those who drowned while crossing the river totaled more than
one-thousand men. We heard in detail that within one brigade managed by a minor
company commander, all three-thousand people went under [and drowned]. Every
single army and every single squad that we knew about was like this. It was visible!
[25Bb] Our army repeatedly went out from the city wall to raid and attack, and
in comparison [those of our troops] who were seriously injured and died when [the
enemy] attacked our city wall only numbered several tens of men, and that was all!
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[25Bc] While the Honorable [Zhao] controlled the army, discipline was very
strict. Rewards and punishments were not given with partiality. Every time that we
raided a stockade and reaped victory, he would reward us with coins and silver. In no
way was he stingy. Every time there was a government soldier who risked his life to
enter [amongst] the enemy, then no matter how often [this occurred], he promoted him
in rank. But for those who violated orders, he invariably followed the military law.
Together with his officers and soldiers, [Zhao] experienced the same joys and sorrows.
[25Be] As for Xiangyang’s wine shops, [although] their daily income was not
less than one or two-thousand strings [of cash], the Honorable [Zhao] universally
forbade the selling of wine. [However], each time we went out to fight and
encountered snow and cold, [Zhao] would immediately distribute [wine] amongst the
officers and soldiers in order to demonstrate his expectation for all to share in the
hardship.125
[25Bg] Previous [to the siege], the enemy began to set up abatises along the
riverbanks and in the shallows. In the deeps, they used huge rocks and let them down
with a rope in order to fend off horses and to obstruct the [movement of] boats. The
Honorable [Zhao] ordered men to pull up and take away more than one-hundred antihorse [and anti-ship] barricades,126 and to totally destroy their abatises, so that the
movement of boats would be unhindered.
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The phrase tou lao 投醪 (literally “the hurling of the dregs”) which appears on line 25Bg is an
allusion to an episode in the Lü shi chun qiu 呂氏春秋. In this anecdote, there is a rich man who has
wine, but none of the common people do. Because he sympathizes with the people, he dumps all of his
wine into a river, and thus they all share the same hardship.
126

I have been translating 拒馬子 as an “anti-horse barricade.” However, here it seems to be more of an
“anti-ship barricade.”
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[25Bi] Because it had not rained for a long time, the Honorable [Zhao] was
worried that the water in the city wall’s moat would dry up. Therefore we constructed
water wheels [to raise the water level] on the banks of two dykes that were east and
west of the city wall. By treading on [the water wheel] the water entered the moat, and
we relied [on this] to keep [the moat] from drying up.
[26Aa] [Zhao] also worried that there would be a shortage of food amongst the
people. So he took up rice from the Ever Full Granary and divided it amongst all the
poor and needy lower-class [families] in the the four corners,127 and [Zhao] dispatched
officials to establish places that offered relief [to those] buying grain. Hence, although
the siege and blockade lasted for a long time, no one starved.
[26Ac] When the frightened refugees from all around entered the city walls,
those who did not have anyone that they could rely on were all ordered to enter the
prefectural administrative [office] and were provided with coins and rice. As for the
sick, [Zhao] commanded the doctors to treat them.
[26Ad] Because the skies had been clear for long stretches of time, we often
worried about fires [started by] candles. [Therefore] the Honorable [Zhao] established
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I translate the phrase chang ping mi 常平 as the “Ever Full Granary.” This term comes from the law
titled chang ping cang fa 常平倉法 (literally: the law of the invariably [filled to the] brim storehouse)
which, during the Song dynasty, was repeatedly established, revised, and abolished. The law basically
set up a system whereby grain collected as tax in the summer and fall was stored in a public granary. In
times of famine, when grain prices rose beyond the reach of the lower classes, the public granary would
open its reserves and sell grain to the poor at a price that was less than the current market price. Not
only did this help keep the lower classes from starving, but it also helped to stabilize the overall market
price of grain (Zhongguo li shi da ci dian, p. 2692).
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an appropriate method: until the siege was resolved, the residents, without exception,
were to go to bed [early].128
[26Ae] The Honorable [Zhao] [displayed] pure, compelling, personal integrity
which did not waver in the face of danger. His loyalty and sincerity continued day
after day. [For example:]
[26Af] The enemy had commanded someone to come below the city wall and
tell us to surrender. When he arrived he yelled loudly, saying: “Xichuan’s great
general, Wu Xi, has already surrendered to us; and our court has already bestowed
upon him [the title] ‘Prince of Shu.’129 Declare [your] total steadfast loyalty to Our
State. Why cause Xiangyang, a city full of living beings, to become completely
trapped in the middle of scalding water and fire?”
[26Ai] Sometimes [the enemy] used arrows to shoot letters into the city, the
Honorable [Zhao] responded to the letters by immediately bringing people to burn or
shred them. However, we could not stop them. Later on, when someone came, we
would immediately shoot and kill them. Only after they were afraid, did [the enemy]
no longer come.

128

Literally, the residents were to “arrange their pillows,” i.e. rest peacefully. I believe Zhao’s meaning
is that the residents of the city were made to go to bed early so that they would not use candles, and
there would be less chance of accidentally starting a fire, which would be catastrophic under any
circumstance, but especially so while under siege—perhaps causing the fall of the city.
129

Xichuan 西川 refers to the general area of western Sichuan. The Song shi reports that Wu Xi 吳錫
(1162-1207), who was the Song general and leader of the entire western offensive, joined the Jin on
June 4, 1206. However, the Jin shi reports that Wu Xi expressed interest in joining the Jin on January
12, 1207 and was made the Prince of Shu on January 18. The Jin shi dates seem more reasonable—if
Wu Xi had surrendered as early as June, surely Zhao Chun would have heard of this before the start of
Xiangyang’s siege. Wu Xi was killed by his subordinates during the second lunar month (which
corresponds to March 1207).
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[26Ba] At first, when the enemy said that Wu Xi had accepted surrender, the
Honorable [Zhao] did not believe it.130 Only when the siege was resolved did we learn
that the business about [Wu] Xi had actually occurred.
[26Bb] The Honorable [Zhao] exerted his mind day and night. When he slept,
he [could] not rest peacefully; when he ate, he [could] not swallow. As for his clothes,
he did not undo them; and as for affairs—no matter great or small—he invariably
devoted his mind and thoughts [to them]. Therefore, he did as the changing
circumstances demanded and every time he sent out [a command] he was always right
on target. For example, he opened up the berms of the moat in order to submerge
[their] trebuchets; he tunneled through the wall in order to send out [our] troops; he
wove bamboo baskets in order to trip up [their] horses; and he used overlapping tables
in order to array the crossbow[men].131 At night, he changed the signal for regrouping
the army; he stealthily piloted [vessels] to assail the enemy’s boats; he made clay
missiles and caltrop arrows—all of these are not recorded in [the classic manuals of]
military strategy.132 Whenever the Honorable [Zhao] met the enemy, each event
invariably was meticulously [considered] and only after [this] did he act. He was
especially good at seeking council regarding [potential] advantages and disadvantages.
130

Interesting word order: “公初不之信”(26Ba). Perhaps it is a remnant of archaic grammar (不 OV)
or a colloquial expression.
131

For a description of this tactic, refer to footnote 73 above.

132

A caltrop arrow, ji li jian 蒺藜箭, is presumably an arrow with a caltrop or spiked arrowhead
attached. The advantage to using a caltrop arrow is that even if an archer missed his target, it would still
be able to inflict damage if the enemy (or enemy’s horse) stepped on it.
As Franke notes in “Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China” (p. 183), these military
strategies had been recorded in earlier sources. This suggests that these materials were not widely
circulated, Zhao Wannian was not well read on these matters, or Zhao was attempting to deceive his
reader.
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If there was a plan or scheme, no matter if it was [from] above or below, he invariably
selected and employed it, so for this reason none of the [good] policies he considered
were lost.

Figure 17: Caltrop Arrow (my own drawing).

[26Bh] The enemy created earthen mountains in two places. They lumbered
the forest’s trees for a great distance in all directions [to the extent that the trees] were
completely depleted. When the enemy fled they inscribed [a poem] on a wall of a
stockade room, saying:133
With countless bitterness and suffering, we crossed the river to come here.
On the drill field we built a platform, and toward our hometowns we could
peer.134
Although we could not conquer Xiangyang’s city wall,
We surely cut enough firewood to last them half a year.
[27Aa] Because the siege’s blockade had lasted such a long time, firewood
within the city was expensive. Every [string of] one-thousand coins could only buy
133

千辛萬苦過江來
教場築座望鄉臺
襄陽府城取不得
與他打了半年柴

134

In Chinese mythology there is a platform in the netherworld called the “tower for gazing at home”
wang xiang tai 望鄉臺. As a form of psychological punishment, ghosts of the dead ascend this tower to
view their living family to whom they can never return. The use of this allusion is particularly suitable
for this poem. Even if the enemy’s earthen mountain tactic had been successful, it is still probable that
most of the attackers ascending the wall would have been killed by the defenders.
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[just] over ten jin.135 The people reached the point where some tore down their houses
or sought the bones of oxen and horses to feed their cooking stoves. When we
destroyed the earthen mountain, there was several million dan of firewood [and timber]
which we supplied to the army and people for burning and other uses.136 This is the
reason [behind the enemy’s] words.
[27Ad] Although [my] words are unrefined, my true sentiments appear. The
above records the Honorable [Zhao]’s [actions] from the third day of the twelfth
month [January 2, 1207],137 up to his successive days of victory during the first month.
When [the court] appointed the Honorable [Zhao] to the post of Principal Military
Training Commissioner,138 the Honorable [Zhao] said, “The royal lineage and altars
have impressive and numinous power. If the officers and troops heed your command,
what merit could we bring to this?” After the siege was broken, he never again spoke
this way.139
[27Af] [I], Wannian, have been a subordinate in the army for a long time and
have followed the Honorable [Zhao] out to the frontier to put on [armor] and clasp
[arms].140 In addition, I sometimes have had a participant’s knowledge of the plans
135

At this time, one jin was equivalent to approximately 661 grams (Qiu, p. 447).
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Traditionally 120 jin equals one dan (Cohen, p. 333). Thus one dan would have equaled
approximately 79.3 kg.
137

In this edition of the text, it seems unclear whether the character ji 及 or the character fan 反 appears
on line 27Ad. Fang uses fan, but ji seems to make more sense.
138

I cannot find any reference to Zhao Chun’s appointment to this position within the Song shi (or
within the searchable Si ku quan shu database).
139

I think that Zhao Wannian is implying that Zhao Chun did not brag about his defense.

140

I base my inference that the direct objects for the verbs “to wear” huan 擐 and “to clasp” zhi 執 are
“armor” and “arms” on the set phrase: huan jia zhi bing 擐甲執兵 “to put on armor and grasp arms.”
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[made in] the army tent. Although my insights are of low status and vulgar, [this
record] lacks trivial and petty praise, yet [records] the Honorable [Zhao]’s actions and
designs, all of which I saw with my own eyes. It had barely been several days since
the enemy was pushed back, when I took up my brush to chronicle [these] occurrences
from beginning to end, and without resting I have made this text. In days past, for
recording facts and praising merit there was the Grand Scribe.141 In this chronicle, I
have also fully engaged in preparing [the facts] and have searched and queried for
them. The actual evidence states:
[27Bb] As for Xiangyang, from the time when it was sealed off by the siege to
the time the siege was broken it was altogether ninety days. We held off the enemy
from beginning to end. Although everything about these events is in the record, the
specific details are repeated in a list as follows:
— [27Bd] In all, the circumference of the wall of Xiangyang Prefectural City
is nine li and three-hundred forty-one paces.142 Outside of the city wall, there is a
horse and sheep wall, and outside this wall there is a moat of water. In addition,
outside of the horse and sheep wall, we also set up one row of abatises.

141

The “Grand Scribe” 太史氏 is a reference to the famous historian Sima Qian (ca. 145- ca. 86 BCE).

142

At that time, nine li and three-hundred forty-one paces equaled a distance between five and six
kilometers. The current wall is approximately 6.5 kilometers. (Note that this estimate was very
unscientifically calculated using a tourist map and some dental floss. My guess is that the dimensions of
the wall have not changed significantly, but it would be interesting to find some archaeological
information that would back this theory up).
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— [27Bf] Outside of the north gate of the city wall there are a pair of wild
goose-wing [levies] to the east and west that abut the river bank,143 and extend down
several feet. Outside of this [portion of the] city wall, below the riverbank, the boats
are quite numerous. Because we were afraid that the enemy could launch a surprise
attack without notice, we used the area between the pair of wild goose-wing [levies]
and the city wall to establish a wooden palisade. By the banks of the two dykes below
the city wall, we dug out multiple moats and set up two rows of abatises. In addition,
we used broken carts to link the towers and [serve as] anti-horse barricades, and
[arranged] brave men lying in ambush to defend it. On top of the city wall we had
crossbowman, and we additionally used war ships to transport crossbowman to the
base of the riverbank where they stood guard day and night.
— [28Ab] Every time the enemy came to attack the city, we struck them with
stone missiles from on top of the wall. However, the enemy would reuse them to
throw over the city wall. Consequently, [Zhao] ordered the various troops to mix
yellow clay together with the hair of oxen, horses, and deer in order to make clay
missiles shaped like balls.144 Some we sun dried and some we baked with fire. When
we threw them at the people outside of the wall, all were lethal. [However] if they hit
the ground, then they would smash to pieces and could not be used again by the enemy.

143

I have not been able to determine what a “wild goose-wing [levy],” yan chi 雁翅, is, nor how it
acquired this name.
144

It may seem strange that Wannian reports that the hair of deer was used. However, during the Song
dynasty, Xiangyang was a famous producer of musk, she xiang 麝香, which is obtained from a sac
beneath the abdominal skin of the male musk deer and used as a perfume fixative. Therefore, there must
have been a sizable deer hide supply (Hubei tong shi: Song Yuan juan, p. 13).
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— [28Af] On top of the old city wall there were only sixteen trebuchets.
Consequently, we make plans to start increasing [the number] and constructed large
trebuchets as well as whirlwind trebuchets,145 so that altogether [we had] ninety-eight
of them. We arranged [them] on top of the wall, as well as inside the wall, pressing
against the foot of the wall. For example, the large trebuchets that were set in place at
the base of the wall all had nine or ten component poles.146

Figure18: Mobile Whirlwind Trebuchet (Wu jing zong yao qian ji, p. 615).

— [28Ai] In order to guard against the enemy’s stone missiles, we used wood
to make frames at the top of the resistance [watch]towers. Each one, on each side, was
more than a zhang [high].147 We used hemp ropes on top of the frames and wove them
together to create net walls, and erected them on the top of the resistance
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Needham notes that a “whirlwind trebuchet,” xuan feng pao 旋風砲, was used for “small-‘calibre’
missiles” and consisted of a single pole that could easily be turned to face any direction (Needham,
“Missiles and Sieges,” p. 211-212).
146

For a discussion of “component poles,” see footnote 57 above. Trebuchets were often placed inside
the city walls so that they were better protected from the enemy. This was possible because the
trajectory of a missile thrown by a trebuchet forms an arch, thus the missile would rise to clear the wall
before descending on the enemy.
147

A zhang 丈 is roughly ten feet in distance.
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[watch]towers. On occasions when [the enemy] shot stone missiles [at us], the [rocks]
would hit the net and fall down.148 We also made leather screens outside the resistance
[watch]towers, and also used cloth sacks filled with chaff and set them on top of the
battle palisades of the resistance [watch]towers. When the enemy’s missiles were
thrown in, they would hit the hide screens and spring away, or they would hit the chaff
sacks and stop, not damaging the towers.
— [28Be] We also created a kind of arrow, which we called a caltrop arrow.
On every occasion when we fought with the enemy, we fired them into the enemy
ranks. When men and horses stepped on them, all fell down without exception.
— [28Bg] The residents within the city wall were divided into four quarters.
[Every] five households were brought together to form a single unit, and they were
assigned to mutually detect spies amongst each other. As [had been done] previously,
in [each] quarter [the people] were divided into regiments, each with leadership
positions. They prepared many tools and implements to quench fires in order to guard
against things that could catch fire.
— [28Bi] Through investigation, we heard that the enemy feared the crossbow
arrows the most. If an arrow struck, it [could] pierce a horse’s belly and pass through
heavy armor. Our spies also learned that the enemy was short of [longbow] arrows, so
that each time they came and attacked the city wall, they would secretly collect the
[longbow] arrows on the ground that had been shot from on top of the wall, and reuse
them to shoot into the city. The Honorable [Zhao] passed down an order that we must
not [carelessly] release [even] one [longbow] arrow because he feared that they would
148

Presumably without damaging the tower.
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be used by the enemy. Because of this he sought out and asked men, one by one, who
were among the [ranks of the] [long]-bowman (and also the spearman, shield bearers,
and swordsman) for those willing to change to being crossbowman. All of those who
heeded [this call] were paid three strings of cash. Consequently, we obtained more
than three-thousand men who changed to become crossbowman, and added them to
the top of the wall.
— [29Ae] The [siege and] defense of the city started in winter and ended in
spring. The force of the crossbows gradually decreased, so we were afraid that [the
arrows] would not be able to reach [targets] far away. Consequently we set up the
practice of [attaching] a longbow to the back of the crossbow to help make up for the
deficiency.149 Thus their force increased and did not decrease, and [the crossbows]
were able to reach distant [targets].
— [29Ag] Amongst the city people, there were some who were afraid that
there would be a shortage of food. Consequently, we established a site to offer relief in
buying grain at the four corners of the city wall. We took out rice from the granary,
and for a hu [of grain] we only accepted the amount of cash that we had originally
paid for it.150 [Zhao] appointed officials to go to the gates and to make an official
record of the impoverished lower[class] households and to provide [them] with [ration]
149

Needham notes that “it was possible to couple two or three bowstaves together in order to increase
the energy of tension and hence the initial velocity of the bolt” (Missiles and Sieges, p. 185). In
addition to becoming stretched out through normal wear and tear, the contractility of the bowstring
would have been affected by temperature and humidity (Missiles and Sieges, p. 186), thus making
adjustments necessary.
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A hu 斛 is a unit of volume. Like all Chinese units of measure, its actual size varied over time and
place. Sometimes a hu equaled five dou 斗, other times a hu equaled ten dou. During the Song dynasty,
a dou was equivalent to approximately 2.8 kg.
For a discussion of the grain reserve system, see footnote 127 above.
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permits. Day after day we helped them buy grain in order to meet the people’s food
[needs]. Among [the people], there were shop[keepers], wealthy people, and families
friendly with the Honorable [Zhao], who fraudulently went under other people’s
names to request permits to buy rice. Therefore, [Zhao] appointed officials to go door
to door to verify [everyone’s permits]. As expected, there were some families
possessing wealth [who had permits], [so the officials] took back the permits, and gave
them to the impoverished lower class households as well as the frightened refugees.
— [29Bc] Since the weather had been clear for a long time, the moat that
surrounded the city wall was becoming shallow and was drying up. Consequently, by
the walls of the wild goose wing [levies] near the riverbank, we established two spots
where we set up several waterwheels. The [water] wheels carried the river water into
the moat. Each [wheel] employed a varying number of government soldiers. [Over a
period of] ten days, the moat’s water gradually deepened.
— [29Bf] After the siege and blockade had lasted for a long time, we were so
short of grass for the horses within the city that [some people] even snapped off roof
thatching or fed them straw mattresses. [Zhao] was deeply worried [over this].
Suddenly, the Honorable [Zhao] thought of the green grass inside the sheep and horse
wall that was flourishing. Consequently, he ordered us to graze the horses there, and
we did not have anxiety about being short of grass.151
— [29Bi] Each time that we engaged in battle, we would use no less than onehundred thousand crossbow arrows in one day. Although there were [supplies of]

151

This might seem obvious, but I would imagine most people would be afraid to graze their horses
outside of the main wall (in the middle of an ongoing siege).
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crossbow arrows in the city, we still feared running short [of them]. Consequently,
[Zhao] commanded us to seize the enemy’s arrows. We cut them to make crossbow
arrows,152 and only lacked the plume feathers. Consequently, two inches below the
thick end of the [arrow] we drilled one hole and stuck hemp through it to substitute for
the plume. [The arrows] were both able to travel a long way, and especially able to
penetrate objects.
— [30Ad] When the residents outside of the city wall saw the enemy cross the
banks, they all moved inside the city wall. All of their houses were burned down by
the enemy. As for the dogs that each family had, [they were left] outside of the city
wall. One-hundred and ten of them would form one pack, and there were several
thousand of them [altogether]. Every time [Zhao] sent out troops to attack and raid the
enemy’s camps and stockades at night, the packs of dogs would attack them and bark.
The enemy would then know [what we were up to], and they used [this opportunity] to
make preparations. Therefore the Honorable [Zhao] ordered the various troops to
weave many bamboo boxes without bottoms, and then hide them near the wall outside
of the moat and spread them out. Within ten days the dogs in the packs had all been
caught. Not only did the officers and soldiers get meat from them to eat, but also from
this point on, whenever [Zhao] sent out troops, the enemy did not know or sense [their
presence]. Therefore each time our troops went out, they were invariably victorious.
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The crossbow arrow is much shorter than the arrow used in a longbow or compound bow. This
seems to suggest that the Jin troops did not have crossbows, which is hard to believe. Perhaps Zhao
simply considered their crossbow arrows to be inferior.
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[30Ba] The document above organizes all the methods used by [Zhao]. In
former times, Wei Xiaokuan’s defense of Yubi [lasted] all of sixty days,153 and Liu
Xinshu’s defense of Shunchang [lasted] approximately twenty days.154 But, as for
destroying earthen mountains, burning [the enemy’s] assault equipment, and sending
out troops to engage in battle, they did this no more than thirty-five times, and that
was all. [In contrast] our recent experience of Xiangyang’s siege lasted months, and at
first we were without the help of even a minuscule army or a scrap of iron. [Yet], we
used [only] over ten-thousand soldiers to resist two-hundred thousand wild and
ferocious enemy [troops]. Our large battles [numbered] twelve, and the raids on land
and water [numbered] thirty-four. Compared with the two Honorable [commanders
mentioned above], our task was more difficult and our merit was double theirs. Most
certainly, the Honorable [Zhao] possesses the heart of Wei and Liu, and therefore he
was able to protect all of Xiangyang.155 As for future defenders [of this city], they
[need] only heighten its city wall, deepen its moat, and [be sure] all the weapons and
tools are prepared. If we had been without our Honorable [Zhao]’s loyal and sincere
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Wei Xiaokuan 韋孝寬 (509-580) defended the stronghold of Yubi 玉壁 (located in present day
Yuncheng, Shanxi) against Eastern Wei forces led by Gao Huan 高歡 (496-547) in 546. Gao’s forces
far outnumbered Yubi’s defenders, yet Wei Xiaokuan was able to hold off the assault through
innovative defense tactics (Zhongguo li dai ren ming da ci dian, p. 256).
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Liu Xinshu 劉信叔 (1098-1162), whose personal name was Qi 錡, defended Shunchang 順昌
(located in present day Fuyang County, Anhui) against Jin forces in 1140. Reportedly, Jin general
Wanyan Zongbi 完顏宗弼 violated the recently signed peace agreement with the Southern Song, and
led 100,000 crack troops to attack the city. Against great odds, Liu managed to hold the city (Zhongguo
li dai ren ming da ci dian, p. 649).
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It is interesting that Wei and Liu are referred to by their surnames instead of their personal names.
Usually the reverse is done in Chinese texts.
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heart, then we could not have easily engaged in even speaking of [Xiangyang’s]
defense.

Solemnly recorded during the third year of the Kaixi reign period on the fifteenth of
the third month [April 13, 1207].
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APPENDIX A
TEXT

Figure 19. Xiangyang shou cheng lu 襄陽守城錄, Yue ya tang 粵雅堂 edition, title page.
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Figure 20. Text, pp 1-2.
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Figure 21. Text, pp 3-4.
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Figure 22. Text, pp 5-6.
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Figure 23. Text, pp 7-8.
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Figure 24. Text, pp 9-10.
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Figure 25. Text, pp 11-12.
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Figure 26. Text, pp 13-14.
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Figure 27. Text, pp 15-16.
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Figure 28. Text, pp 17-18.
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Figure 29. Text, pp 19-20.
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Figure 30. Text, pp 21-22.
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Figure 31. Text, pp. 23-24.
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Figure 32. Text, pp 25-26.
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Figure 33. Text, pp 27-28.
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Figure 34. Text, pp 29-30.
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Figure 35. Text, p 31.
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Figure 36. Text, commentary.
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APPENDIX B
PEOPLE
Here are the people mentioned in the text, and arranged in alphabetical order. I have
also provided the page number and line where they can be found in the Yue ya tang
edition and briefly stated the role which they play within the diary. I was only able to
find additional biographical information for thirteen of the people listed in the text. I
have summarized some of this additional information below and listed some sources
where the interested reader can find out more. Note that I have reviewed each source
and entry listed below, and have listed only the sources that seem relevant. Obviously
I have probably missed quite a few, and much more sifting could be done. However,
this is a good start. (A simple search in the electronic Si ku quan shu can result in
many “hits,” but many are for people from different time periods who share the same
name, or are not names at all but part of phrases).
蔡孝先

Cai Xiaoxian
10Af, 10Ag
Song, no title provided.

董張珍

Dong Zhangzhen
3Aa, 4Be

Jin Commander General and/or Brigade commander.
杜天師

Du Tianshi
8Ah
Jin Battalion Commander.

段守忠

Duan Shouzhong
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8Ah
Jin Battalion Commander.
樊起

Fan Qi
23Ad-e
Song escaped captive, no title provided.

樊興

Fan Xing
9Be
Song Dispatcher.

方溥

Fang Pu
9Bh, 10Ad
Song Dispatcher.

郜彥

Gao Yan
22Ai, 24Aa
Song, no title provided.

葛札

Ge Zha
15Ac
Jin Brigade Commander.

過德

Guo De
9Ai
Song Head Military Instructor.

郭旺

Guo Wang
9Ae, 9Ag
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Song, no title provided.
韓源

Han Yuan
1Ag
Song Commander General.

扈立

Hu Li
1Bi, 6Ad
Song Commander General.

皇甫斌

Huangfu Bin
1Ac, 3Bi

Song Vice Commissioner. Lots of other information can be found in various
records. For complete bibliographic information, see the bibliography.
Song shi: vol. 3, juan 38, pp. 737, 740-741; 747, vol. 34, juan 393, p. 12020;
vol. 34, juan 396, p. 12079; vol. 35, juan 397, p. 12092; vol. 35, juan 398, p.
12115; vol. 38, juan 455, p. 13376; vol. 39, juan 474, pp. 13775-13776.
Jin shi: juan 12, pp. 273-274, 276; juan 62, pp. 1474, 1476; juan 121, p. 2645.
Chang gu ji: juan 14.
Da qing yi tong zhi, juan 88.
Fujian tong zhi, juan 26.
Gong kui ji, juan 47.
He shan ji, juan 18, 40, 99.
Hou le ji, juan 11.
Jian yan za ji, juan 6, 18.
Jiangxi tong zhi, juan 30.
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Liang chao gang mu bei yao, juan 5, 8, 9, 10.
Qi dong ye yu, juan 3.
Qin ding si ku quan shu zong mu, juan 57.
Qin ding xu tong dian, juan. 99.
Qin ding xu tong zhi, juan 37, 53, 193, 517, 389, 392, 393, 391, 394, 617.
Shui xin ji, juan 10, 25.
Song shi ji shi ben mo, juan 21, 22.
Song shi quan wen, juan 29b.
Tong jian xu bian, juan 19.
Xi shan wen ji, juan 47.
Xu Song bian nian zi zhi tong jian, juan 12, 13.
Yu pi li dai tong jian ji lan, juan 89, 91.
Yu pi xu zi zhi tong jian gang mu, juan 17.
Zi zhi tong jian hou bian, juan 130, 132, 133.
江清

Jiang Qing
9Bf-e
Song Head Military Instructor.

李八兒

Li Ba’er
11Aa-b
Jin soldier captured by Song, no title given.

李超

Li Chao
6Ah
Song soldier, no title given.
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李良弼

Li Liangbi
15Ag-h

Song Commander General of the Loyal and Righteous Army.
李撻覽

Li Talan
11Ab

Jin soldier, no title provided, but perhaps a person of high rank since the diary
mentions that Li Ba’er claims to be his son.
李兀

Li Wu
16Bh

Jin soldier captured by Song, no title provided.
李遵

Li Zun
11Bc

Song captive who escaped from Jin, no title provided.
廖彥志

Liao Yanzhi
6Ad

Song fighter associated with the tea merchants, no title provided.
廖彥忠

Liao Yanzhong
10Ah, 10Bb, 12Ad, 12Ah

Song fighter associated with the tea merchants, no title provided.
廖彥士

Liao Yanshi
10Bb
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Song fighter associated with the tea merchants. Note that this name only
appears in the Zhi hai edition. In all other additions his name is given as Liao
Yanzhong (see above).
林璋

Lin Zhang
1Bi

Song Senior Commander General of Jiangzhou.
劉寶

Liu Bao
7Ac
Song captive of Jin, no title provided.

劉津

Liu Jin
1Bh

Song Senior Commander General of the Left Army.
劉畋

Liu Tian
12Ac

Song fighter associated with tea merchants, no title provided.
劉彥

Liu Yan
8Be

Song fighter associated with the tea merchants, no title provided.
旅世雄

Lü Shixiong

6Aa, 6Ab, 6Ae-f, 6Ai, 6Bf, 7Aa, 8Ae, 8Ba-b, 8Bb, 10Bd, 12Bd
Song Dispatcher, associated with tea merchants, helped lead more raids than
anyone else listed in Zhao Wannian’s diary.
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路世忠

Lu Shizhong
6Ad, 9Bi, 10Bi, 11Ae, 12Ad, 12Ah, 16Be

Song fighter associated with the tea merchants, no title provided. Another
famous person with the same name lived during the Song dynasty.
呂渭孫

Lü Weisun
2Ab-c, 2Ad, 2Ae, 2Ae, 2Af, 2Af

Song Senior Commander General of the Loyal and Brave Army. He appears in
several records, more information can be found on him.
Song shi, vol. 35, juan 397, p. 12092.
Hou le ji, juan 1.
Jian yan za ji, juan 18.
Jing xiang lu juan 12.
Liang chao gang mu bei yao, juan 9.
Qin ding xu tong zhi, juan 392.
Shui xin ji, juan 25.
Song shi quan wen, juan 29b.
Zhejiang tong zhi, juan 129, 174.
呂興

Lü Xing
9Bd

Song Commanding Officer. A Song dynasty author shares his name.
魯選臬

Lu Xuannie
17Bc
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Song fighter, associated with tea merchants, no title provided.
馬安忠

Ma Anzhong
10Bg
Song soldier, no title provided.

馬珙

Ma Gong
1Ag
Song Commander General.

馬謹

Ma Jin
1Ah
Song Senior Commander General.

孟保

Meng Bao
8Be
Song Commanding Officer

納合

Nahe
20Bh, 25Ah

Jin Military Training Official and Company Commander, surrendered to Song.
The monk Nahe is mentioned in several sources, but more time would be
needed to translate the dense writing of the passages.
Chang gu ji, juan 6, 29.
He shan ji, juan 29, 30.
Shi cang li dai shi xuan, juan 221.
裴顯

Pei Xian
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6Af, 6Ai, 6Bf, 7Aa, 8Ae, 8Bb, 8Bb, 9Ah, 19Ag
Song Commanding Officer, helped lead tea merchant army.
蒲察

Pucha
15Ab

Jin Campaign Commander. This is a common Jin surname; I have not been
able to identify him.
邵世忠

Shao Shizhong
8Bb, 8Bc-d, 19Ah
Song Commanding Officer.

Note that a famous person from earlier in the Song dynasty shares his name!
孫孝忠

Sun Xiaozhong
9Bh-i
Song Support Squad member.

譚良顯

Tan Liangxian
2Ab

Song Public Petitioner’s Drum Office official. He received his jin shi degree
during the Chun Xi 淳煕 reign period (1174-1189). His official place of family
registry was Wujin 武進 (Jiangnan), (Jiangnan tong zhi, ch. 120).
完顏匡

Wanyan Kuang

Only referred to as “Wanyan” and/or “xiang gong” 相公
3Ab, 3Ab, 3Ae, 4Ba, 4Bb, 4Bf-g, 5Ac, 5Af, 7Ac, 5Ag-h
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Jin Minister. (1152-1210CE). See Introduction for further information (pp. 2729). I have done more extensive research on Wanyan Kuang than on any of the
other people listed and have prepared a nine page annotated bibliography of
sources. However, it seems awkward to include it here. Therefore I have only
included a list of references:
Jin shi: juan 9-13, 35, 64, 70, 92, 98, 101-103, 121, 128.
Fu shui ji, juan 11.
Qian tong, juan 18.
Qin ding ri xia jiu wen kao, juan 29.
Qin ding cheng jing tong zhi, juan 49.
Qin ding xu wen xian tong kao, juan 34, 75, 85, 101, 135, 199, 201, 204, 206.
Shanxi tong zhi, juan 119.
Song shi ji shi ben mo, juan 22.
Tong jian xu bian, juan 19.
Wu li tong kao, juan 123.
Yu ding quan jin shi zeng bu zhong zhou ji, 目錄, 首上, juan 3.
Yu pi li dai tong jian ji lan, juan 89, 90.
Zi zhi tong jian hou bian, juan 126, 129, 132, 133.
王才

Wang Cai
9Ab, 9Ac, 9Ad

Song government soldier, promoted to the Support Squad. Note that this is an
extremely common Chinese name!
王橫

Wang Heng
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9Ae, 9Ah-I, 9Bg
Song Commanding Officer.
王宏

Wang Hong
8Af, 8Ag, 8Ai, 8Bb
Song Commander General of Junzhou.

王虎

Wang Hu
11Ah, 11Bc, 11Bd

Song General who surrendered to Jin and returned to Xiangyang as a spy /
assassin. This is an extremely common Chinese name.
王世修

Wang Shixiu
2Aa
Song Commander General.

王通

Wang Tong
13Bc
Jin Company Commander.

魏友諒

Wei Youliang
1Ai
Also referred to as “Commander Wei” 魏帥:
1Ba, 1Bb, 2Ac, 2Ad-e, 2Ae, 5Ai, 5Ba

Song Vice Commander. Lots of information available:
Song shi: vol. 3, juan 38, pp. 742, 743; vol. 35. juan 397, p. 12092; vol. 38,
juan 455, p. 13376.

148

Gong kui ji, juan 47.
He shan ji, juan 89.
Hou le ji, juan 5.
Jian yan za ji, juan 18.
Jing xiang lu, juan 12.
Ju yi lu, juan 26.
Liang chao gang mu bei yao, juan 9.
Mian zhai ji, juan 18.
Qin ding xu tong zhi, juan 37, 392.
Shui xin ji, juan 25.
Song shi ji shi ben mo, juan 22.
Song shi quan wen, juan 29b.
Wu li tong kao, juan 95.
Xu song bian nian zi zhi tong jian, juan 13.
Yu pi li dai tong jian ji lan, juan 90.
Yuan shi, juan 74.
Zi zhi tong jian hou bian, juan 132.
魏仲

Wei Zhong
9Bb
Song soldier of the Government troops.

吳強

Wu Qiang
1Bi

Song Senior Commander-General of Jiangling’s Left Army.
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伍

Wu
23Ah

Jin Brigade Commander. Given name unknown.
吳曦

Wu Xi
26Ag, 26Ba, 26Bb

Song General. Defected to the Jin, then assassinated by his subordinates.
He is listed all over the place! His biography appears in the Song shi, vol. 39,
juan 475, p. 13811. In the Jin shi his entries are concentrated in juan 12 and 98.
Since he is not a central figure in the siege, I have not waded through the
mountains of material available.
吾也

Wuye
21Ac, 21Ae, 25Ai

Jin “Vastly Powerful General” and Brigade Commander. Father of Nahe the
Monk.
向明

Xiang Ming
4Bb, 5Ah, 7Ad, 7Ae
Jin Vice Controller.

徐貴

Xu Gui
10Aa
Song Head Military Instructor.

許進

Xu Jin
6Bc, 6Bd
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Song Commanding Officer of Government Troops.
許亮

Xu Liang
9Bh
Song Head Military Instructor.

萱阿里孛供

Xuan Alibeigong
25Ag
Jin Battalion Commander.

嚴整

Yan Zheng
15Ai

Song General. A Jin person with the same name was sent to spy in Xiangyang
before the siege (Jin shi, juan 12, pp. 274, 275). I do not think that he is the
same Yan Zheng mentioned in the diary. I think more could be found out
about both of these people with a little more sifting. However, this is a very
common name!
楊建

Yang Jian
9Ba
Song Dispatcher.

揚杞

Yang Qi
1Bb
Song Senior Commander-General.

咬兒

Yaoer
15Ab
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Jin Brigade Commander.
雍政

Yong Zheng
1Ah

Song Senior Commander-General. Mentioned in He shan ji, juan 89.
張椿

Zhang Chun
12Ba, 12Bd

Song Special Envoy of the River Transport [Bureau]. He received his jin shi
degree in 1195. His official place of family registry was Yongxin 永新
(Jiangxi tong zhi, ch. 57).
張德

Zhang De
8Be

Song Commanding Officer, associated with the tea merchants.
張福

Zhang Fu
22Ai
Song Dispatcher.

張宏

Zhang Hong
8Ai
Song spy.

張虎

Zhang Hu
1Ag
Song Commander-General.

張聚

Zhang Ju
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6Ad, 10Aa, 10Ah, 10Ai, 12Ab, 21Ag
Song fighter associated with the tea merchants.
章時可

Zhang Shike
7Ad, 7Ae

Song Pacification Administrative Clerk. In 1199 he was named the
administrator of Poyang 鄱陽. His official place of family registry was
Yongkang 永康 (Zhejiang tong zhi, juan 126). He is also referred to in the title
of a poem by Chen Zao (1133-1203) (Jianghu zhang weng ji, ch. 2), but it does
not provide any biographical information.
張雲

Zhang Yun
23Ah

Song man who had been captured by the Jin but escaped.
趙淳

Zhao Chun
1Ac

Referred to throughout the text as “the Honorable” 公.
Song Campaign Commander of Jingzhou and Ezhou, Pacification
Commissioner of the Capital’s Northwest Circuit.
Song shi, vol. 3, juan 38, pp. 740, 742, 745; vol. 35, juan 397, p. 12092; vol 39,
juan 474, p. 13776.
Chang gu ji, juan 14.
Gong kui ji, juan 47.
Ju jin shi wen lei ju [missing character] gu jin shi wen lei ju, juan 11.
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*Note that Zhao Chun is conspicuously absent from the He shan ji! This is
very interesting since the author was the military inspector of Xiangyang ten or
so years later and he refers to the 1206-1207 siege. He doesn’t mention Zhao
Wannian, either.
Hou le ji, juan 2, 4, 5.
Huang dun wen ji, juan 12.
Jian yan za ji, juan 15, 18.
Ju yi lu, juan 26.
Liang chao gang mu bei yao, juan 9, 10, 12.
Qi dong ye yu, juan 3.
Qian tong, juan 22.
Qin ding si ku quan shu zong mu, juan 52.
Shui xin ji, juan 25.
Song shi quan wen, juan 29b.
Tong jian xu bian, juan 19.
Wen xian tong kao, juan 62.
Xi shan wen ji, Juan 41.
Xu Song bian nian zi zhi tong jian, juan 13.
Yu ding yuan jian lei han, juan 109.
Yu pi li dai tong jian ji lan, juan90.
Yu pi xu zi zhi tong jian gang mu, juan 17.
Zi zhi tong jian hou bian, juan 132, 133.
趙淏

Zhao Hao
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2Ba, 2Bc
Song Inner Administrator of the Provincial Branch, Zhao Chun’s younger
brother.
趙萬年

Zhao Wannian
1Ab, 1Ba, 1Bb, 2Ad, 27Af

Song author of Xiangyang shou cheng lu. Multiple titles, see line 1Ab.
Ba xun wan shou cheng dian, juan 75.
Chun xi san shan zhi, juan 31.
Da qing yi tong zhi, juan 334.
Fujian tong zhi, juan 35, 48, 68.
Jiangxi tong zhi, Juan 51.
Ju yi lu, juan 26.
Liang Song ming xian xiao ji, juan 352.
Qin ding si ku quan shu zong mu, juan 52.
Qin ding xu wen xian tong kao, juan 163.
Shandong tong zhi, juan 15, part 3.
Shi cang li dai shi xuan, juan 221.
Song shi ji shi, juan 77.
Yu xuan Song Jin Yuan Ming si chao shi [missing character] yu, juan 72.
鄭皐

Zheng Gao
1Bc
Song Senior Commander-General.

朱建

Zhu Jian
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10Ad
Song Director of Military Training.
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APPENDIX C
OFFICIAL TITLES
The Translation of Chinese titles is daunting. The best Chinese-English
Dictionary that I’ve found is A dictionary of official titles in Imperial China by
Charles O. Hucker. The Best Chinese-Chinese dictionary that I’ve found is the
Zhongguo li dai zhi guan ci dian 中國历代职官辞典 by He Xuzhi 贺旭志. However,
there is definitely room for an updated Chinese-English dictionary of titles as well as
an expanded Chinese-Chinese dictionary of titles. One of the main frustrations is that
there is no agreement amongst translators on a single system of translation. Another
frustration inherent in the Chinese titles themselves is that title names usually do not
give the reader a clear idea of what function the title has. Below I provide my
translation of each title which appears in the translation, the page and line number
where it can be located within the Yue ya tang edition of the text. If the title appears in
Hucker’s dictionary, I also list its entry number so that the interested reader can easily
reference it.

Administrative Clerk

fu gan

撫幹

can guan

參管

jiang

將

2Ab, 7Ad
Hucker: gan #3127
Administrative Manager
4Bc
Hucker: can #6865
Area General
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4Ba
Hucker: #690.
Battalion Commander

qian hu

千戶

wei shi

圍師

wan hu

萬戶

8Ah, 18Bf-g, 25Ag
Hucker: qian hu suo #901
Besieging Preceptor
Hucker: shi #5202
Brigade Commander

4Be, 15Ab, 15Ac, 23Ah, 25Ai, 25Ai-25Ba
Hucker: wan fu #7620
Campaign Commander

du tong

都統

1Ab, 1Ac, 3Ae, 11Ba, 15Ab, 15Ad, 15Af, 17Bg, 21Ad, 24Bh
Hucker: #7321
Chief Pacification Commissioner

zhao fu tai wei

招撫太尉

qiu

酋

fu ma

駙馬

4Ae
Hucker: tai wei #6260
Chieftain
5Bf, 15Ad
Commandant-escort
8Bh, 8Bh
Hucker: 駙馬都尉 fu ma du wei #2083
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Commander

shuai

帥

tong ling

統領

5Ah
Hucker: #5475
Commander General
1Ag, 1Bi, 2Aa, 3Aa, 6Ad, 8Af, 15Ag
Hucker: #7494
Commander General of the Loyal and Righteous Army
zhong yi jun tong ling 忠義軍統領
15Ag
Commanding Officer

jiang guan

將官

6Af, 6Bc, 8Bb, 8Be, 9Ae, 9Bd, 10Bf-g
mou ke

謀克

Courier for the Pacification Commission xuan fu

宣撫

Company Commander
13Bb-c, 18Bh, 20Bh, 25Ba
Hucker: #4039

5Ah.
Hucker: xuan fu si 宣撫司 #2661
Defender-in-chief

tai wei

太尉

xun lian guan

訓練官

4Ae
Hucker: 6260
Director of Military Training
10Ad
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Hucker: xun lian xia #2747
Dispatcher

bo fa guan

撥發官

6Aa, 9Ba, 9Be, 9Bh, 22Ai
Hucker: bo fa chuan yun guan 撥發船運官 #4724
Hucker: 撥發催綱 #4725
General

jiang jun

將軍

zheng jiang

正將

da jiang [jun]

大將[軍]

wu jie

武節(正六品)

zhong xun lang

忠訓郎

tai shi

太史

tou mu

頭目

21Ac
Hucker: #694
General
15Ai
Hucker: #398
General-in-chief
26Ag
Hucker: #5897
General of Military Integrity
18Bh
Gentleman of Loyal Instruction
1Ab
Grand Scribe
27Ai
Hucker: #6212:
Head
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6Be, 8Bi, 21Bh
Hucker: #6799
Head Chieftain

qiu zhang

酋長

jiao tou

教頭

gong

公

xiang gong

相公

20Bf
Head Military Instructor
9Ai, 9Be, 9Bh, 10Aa
the Honorable [ ]
Used 106 times!
Hucker: #3388
the Honorable Minister [ ]
3Ab, 3Ae, 4Bf-g, 5Ac, 5Af, 7Ac
Inner Administrator (of the provincial branch)
(lu fen) nei ji

(路分)内機

nei ji

内機

yu

虞

guan

管

si tong fu jiang

司同副將

2Ba, 2Bc, 4Bc
Inner Administrator

2Ba, 2Bc, 4Bc
Inspector
Hucker: yu hou 虞候 #8134
Manager
3Ag, 4Bc, 15Ah
Managing Joint Vice General
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1Ab
Hucker: si 司 #5533
Hucker: tong 同 #7464
Marshal

yuan shuai

元帥

15Ad, 15Af, 15Ag, 17Bf, 20Bf, 21Ad, 23Ai
Hucker: #8244
Messenger

cheng

承

jun tong ling

軍統領

xun wu xiao wei

訓武校尉

fu gan

撫幹

zhao fu shi

招撫使

4Be, 4Bf
Hucker: cheng chai 承差 #459
Military Commander General
15Ag
Military Training Official
20Bh
Hucker: xiao wei 校尉 #2456
*Pacification Administrative Clerk
2Ab, 7Ad
Pacification Commissioner

1Ab, 1Ad, 3Ab, 3Ag, 3Ai, 4Aa, 4Ae, 4Ba
Hucker: #282
wang

Prince
26Ag

Principal Military Training Commissioner
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王

zheng ren tuan lian shi 正任團練使
27Ae
Hucker: #420 and #7382
Recorder

zhu bu

主簿

you yi fu tong

右翼副統

tong zhi

統制

shi chen

使臣

7Ad
Hucker: #1413
Right Wing Vice Controller
20Bi
Senior Commander General
1Ah, 1Bb, 1Bc, 1Bh, 1Bi, 1Bi, 2Ab
Hucker: #7472
Special Envoy
12Ba
Special Envoy of the River Transport [Bureau]
pai an shi chen

排岸使臣

te cha

特差

zhuan chai

專差

Hucker: pai an si 排岸司 #4392
Special Official
1Ab
Specially Appointed Commissioner

4Be
Hucker: 差遣 #67
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Hucker: zhuan #1485, #1486
Student at the Gate

men sheng

門生

yong dui

擁隊

guang wei jiang jun

廣威將軍(正六品)

fu du tong

副都統

fu shuai

副帥

fu shi

副使

fu tong

副統

zhao fu fu tong

招撫副統

1Ab
Hucker: 3950
Support Squad
9Ad, 9Ah
Vastly Powerful General
21Ac
Vice Campaign Commander
4Bf
Hucker: #2107.
Hucker: fu #2032
Vice Commander
1Ai, 2Ac
Hucker: #5475
Vice Commissioner
1Aa, 1Ad
Hucker: shi #5197
Vice Controller
4Bb, 5Ag, 20Bi
Hucker: tong #7465
Vice Controller of Pacification
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Hucker: zhao fu shi 招撫使 #282
Vice General

fu jiang

副將

zhao fu fu shi

招撫副使

1Ab
Hucker: #2041
Vice Pacification Commissioner
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APPENDIX D
MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND FORTIFICATION
The following is a list of military equipment and fortification terms used within the
diary. I have provided descriptions of these terms within the footnotes of my
translation, so they are not repeated here.
Abatis

lu jiao

鹿角

Anti-horse barricade

ju ma zi

拒馬子

Arrow

jian

箭

Axe

fu

斧

Bamboo Raft

zhu pai

竹簰

Boats and Ships
Ferry boat

du chuan

渡船

Ship

chuan

船

Passenger Ship

ke chuan

客船

War ship

zhan chuan

戰船

Boat

zhou

舟

I am not sure what the differences amongst these terms are.
弓

gong

Bow

I do not know if this term is used in the diary to refer to simple, laminated,
composite bows, or all three.
Caltrop Arrow

蒺藜箭

ji li jian
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Camp

ying

營

Cloud ladder

yun ti

雲梯

Crenel of a parapet

nu kou

女口

Crossbow

nu

弩

Draw bridge

diao qiao

弔橋

Earthen mountain

tu shan

土山

Equipment, items, weapons, apparatus, and devices
I have not found a clear distinction between these terms. For consistency, I used:
Equipment

ju

具

Items

wu

物

Devices

ji

機

Weapons/ Apparatus qi

器

Fire arrow

huo jian

火箭

Fire missile

huo pao

火砲

Fire Ox

huo niu

火牛

Floating bridge

fu liang

浮梁

fu qiao

浮橋

Frame

jia

架

Goose cart

eche

鵝車

Goose wing levy

yan chi di

雁翅抵

Grass ox

cao niu

草牛
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Gunpowder

huo yao

火藥

Gunpowder Arrows

huo yao jian

火藥箭

Heavenly Bridge

tian qiao

天橋

Ladder

ti

梯

Leather Screens

pi lian

皮簾

Leather Tents

pi wu

皮屋

Missile

pao

砲

Clay missile

ni pao

泥砲,

Stones [for] the trebuchet

pao shi

砲石,

stone missiles

shi pao

石砲

Thunder clap missile

pi li pao

霹靂砲

pi li huo pao 霹靂火砲
Ox Stables

niu wu

牛屋

Pickaxe

jue

钁

Platform

zuo

座

Raft

fa

筏

Rampart

lei

壘

Resistance [watch]tower

di lou

敵樓

Roofed Tower

lou lu

樓櫓

Round Tower

tuan lou

團樓
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Saber

dao

刀

Sandbag

tu bu dai

土布袋

Shield

pai

牌

Shielded passageways

dong zi

洞子

Ox hide passageways

niu pi dong zi

牛皮洞子

pi dong

皮洞

Sickle

lian

鐮

Spade

qiao

鍬

Spear

qiang

槍

qiang

鎗

These two characters seem to be used interchangeably within the text, but
perhaps one was wooden and one was metal?
Stockade

zhai

寨

Trebuchet

pao

砲

Great trebuchet

da pao

大砲

whirlwind trebuchet

xuan feng pao

旋風砲

Seven component trebuchet qi shao pao
Trident

cha

叉

Water wheel

shui che

水車

Wooden palisades

mu zha

木柵

Wooden Shield

mu pai

木牌
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七梢砲

APPENDIX E
PLACE NAMES AND ADDITIONAL MAPS
Here is a list of place names mentioned in the diary and the corresponding Chinese
characters. It is followed by several maps and drawings of the city and some 2005
photographs of the current city wall and moat.
Anlu

安鹿

Anyang Beach

安陽灘

Bai River

白河

Bai Tributary

白河口

Baitu Ridge

白土坡

Buddhist monasteries

寺院

Capital’s Northwest Circuit

京西北路

Chuan

川

Cloud Peak Monastery

雲峰寺

Dabei Monastery

大悲寺

De’an

德安

Dengcheng

鄧城

Dengzhou

鄧州

Dingzhuan Monastery

定專寺

Dongshan Monastery

洞山寺

Eastern Ford

東津
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the eastern road

東路

Ezhou

鄂州

Fancheng

樊城

Fei River

淝水

Fulong

伏龍

Guanghua

光化

Haizhou

海州

Haizi

海子

Han River

漢水

Heyang

河陽

Honorable Xie’s Cliff

謝公巗

Huaquan Gorge

華泉谷

Jiangling

江陵

Jiangzhou

江州

Jingzhou

荊州

Jinzhou

金州

Junzhou

均州

Ku River

枯河

mountain’s great dyke

山大隄

Neixiang

内鄉
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North of the river

江北

Purple Cliff Monastery

紫巗寺

Qing River

清河

Qingni

青泥

Qingshui River

清水河

Qingye

清野

Red Bank

赤岸

Seventh Army’s Training Field

七軍大教場
(abbreviation of 江陵七軍大教場)

Shenma Ridge

神馬坡

Shidingzhuan Monastery

是定專寺

Shu

蜀

Shunchang

順昌

Sizhou

泗州

Suizhou

隨州

Tan Brook

檀溪河

Tangzhou

唐州

Temple of the Five Maidens

五娘子廟

Tiger-head Mountain

虎頭山

Training Field of the Seventh Army of Jiangling

江陵七軍大教場
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the Wan Mountains

萬山

the wilds

埜

Xiang River

襄江

Xiang River’s Western Sandbar

襄江西洲

Xiangyang Prefectural City

襄陽府城

Xiangyang Prefecture

襄陽府

Xiangyang

襄陽

Xiaofan

小樊

Xichuan

西川

Xinkai River

新開河

Xinyang

信陽

Xuanma Shoal

渲馬灘

Yangtze

長江

Yingzhou

郢州

Yuanzhang Beach

源漳灘

Yubi

玉壁

Yuliang Plains

漁梁平

Zaoyang

棗陽

Zhechuan

浙川

Ziyang Temple

紫陽觀
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Maps of Xiangyang and local area:

Figure 37: Road map of Xiangfan city, 2005. (Hubei sheng dituce, p. 72a).
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Figure 38: Map of Xiangyang, 1874. (Taken from Xiangyang xian zhi 1874 edition, as found in
Franke’s Studien und Texte zur Kriegsgeschichte der südlichen Sungzeit, appendix). Note that the local
place names are very difficult to read!
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Figure 39: My own sketch of local Xiangyang area, 1206-1207. Note that it is NOT to scale, and I
guessed on the locations of many places based on clues from the diary. This drawing is only meant to
help the reader visualize events and troop movements as recorded in the Diary.
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Figure 40: Rough sketch of Xiangyang’s fortification during 1206-1207 Siege.
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Photos of Xiangyang (personally taken in 2005):

Figure 41: Small North Gate

Figure 42: Bank of Han River facing west, in
front of city wall.

Figure 43: Another small north gate.

Figure 44: Un-restored section of the northeast
city wall. (Probably from Qing Dynasty).
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Figure 45: Bank of the Han River facing East. Bridge connecting Fancheng (left) to Xiangyang (right).

Figure 46: View of moat and old city wall. Apartment building in background.
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Figure 47: Professor Bi Kezhong pictured with me in Xiangfan newspaper. (Xiangfan Wanbao,
7/23/2005, p. 1). ☺ (I could have taken the bus, but bicycling was much more intereting!).
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